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Articles
The Ninth Amendment: It Means What It Says 
Randy E. Barnett*
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be 
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people. 
—U.S. CONST., amend. IX
Although the Ninth Amendment appears on its face to protect 
unenumerated individual rights of the same sort as those that were enumerated 
in the Bill of Rights, courts and scholars have long deprived it of any relevance 
to constitutional adjudication.  With the growing interest in originalist methods 
of interpretation since the 1980s, however, this situation has changed.  In the 
past twenty years, five originalist models of the Ninth Amendment have been 
propounded by scholars: the state law rights model, the residual rights model, 
the individual natural rights model, the collective rights model, and the federal-
ism model.  This Article examines thirteen crucial pieces of historical evidence 
that either directly contradict the state law and residual rights models, undercut 
the collective rights model, or strongly support the individual natural rights and 
federalism models.  Evaluating the five models in light of this evidence estab-
lishes that the Ninth Amendment actually meant at the time of its enactment what 
it appears now to say: the unenumerated (natural) rights that people possessed 
prior to the formation of government, and which they retain afterwards, should 
be treated in the same manner as those (natural) rights that were enumerated in 
the Bill of Rights.  In short, the Amendment is what it appears to be: a 
meaningful check on federal power and a significant guarantee of individual 
liberty. 
 * Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Legal Theory, Georgetown University Law Center.  
Email: rbarnett@gmail.com.  Permission is granted to photocopy for classroom use.  I wish to thank 
Lawrence Solum and Suzanna Sherry for their suggestions on an earlier draft, and Nathan Speed for 
his research assistance.  I am also grateful to the participants in a faculty workshop at the 
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I. Introduction 
The first time one reads the Ninth Amendment, its text is a revelation.  
Here is a sentence that seems explicitly to affirm that persons have other con-
stitutional rights beyond those enumerated in the first eight Amendments.  
Given the fierce debates over the legitimacy of enforcing unenumerated con-
stitutional rights, one immediately wonders why one has not heard of the 
Ninth before.  If this first encounter is as a law student in a course on consti-
tutional law, however, one soon learns why: the Supreme Court has long 
dismissed the Ninth Amendment as a constitutional irrelevance.  As Justice 
Reed wrote in 1947: 
The powers granted by the Constitution to the Federal Government are 
subtracted from the totality of sovereignty originally in the states and 
the people.  Therefore, when objection is made that the exercise of a 
federal power infringes upon rights reserved by the Ninth and Tenth 
Amendments, the inquiry must be directed toward the granted power 
under which the action of the Union was taken.  If granted power is 
found, necessarily the objection of invasion of those rights, reserved 
by the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, must fail.1
Not only does Justice Reed’s construction render the Ninth Amendment 
functionless in constitutional adjudication, it rather carelessly runs it together 
with the Tenth Amendment.2
But this passage is not only cavalier about the text, it is also historically 
incorrect.  The evidence of original meaning that has been uncovered in the 
past twenty years confirms the first impression of untutored readers of the 
Ninth Amendment and undercuts the purportedly more sophisticated reading 
that renders it meaningless.  The purpose of the Ninth Amendment was to 
ensure that all individual natural rights had the same stature and force after 
some of them were enumerated as they had before; and its existence argued 
against a latitudinarian interpretation of federal powers. 
The growth in our understanding of the Ninth Amendment has resulted 
from the interest in the original meaning of the Constitution that began in the 
1980s.3  As originalism grew in popularity, some originalists became under-
standably curious about the history and original meaning of the Ninth 
Amendment.4  And critics of originalism used the original meaning of the 
Ninth Amendment to challenge those early originalists who were then 
1. United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 95–96 (1947). 
2. See U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the 
people.”). 
3. See, e.g., Edwin Meese III, Interpreting the Constitution, in INTERPRETING THE 
CONSTITUTION: THE DEBATE OVER ORIGINAL INTENT 13 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1990) (discussing 
the emerging debate involving original intent of the framers of the constitution). 
4. See generally Symposium on Interpreting the Ninth Amendment, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 37 
(1988) (presenting diverse viewpoints on the proper place of the Ninth Amendment in constitutional 
theory). 
2006] The Ninth Amendment: It Means What It Says 3 
advocating a narrow view of constitutional rights.  As a result, having once 
been largely forgotten by academics, this enigmatic provision has received an 
outpouring of serious scholarly attention over the past twenty years. 
In this Article, I synthesize the developing modern scholarly debate 
about the original meaning of the Ninth Amendment and demonstrate that the 
cumulative evidence of public original meaning supports a view of the 
Amendment as a meaningful check on federal power and a significant 
guarantee of individual liberty.  The synthesis begins with the mapping of the 
intellectual terrain.  Even most constitutional scholars do not realize that five 
distinct originalist models of the Ninth Amendment have emerged since 
1983: (1) the state law rights model, (2) the residual rights model, (3) the in-
dividual natural rights model, (4) the collective rights model, and (5) the 
federalism model. 
The first two of these models—the state law and residual rights 
models—lead to the conclusion that the Ninth Amendment is a constitutional 
truism with no practical significance in constitutional adjudication.  In the 
collective rights model, unless combined with another model, the 
Amendment has a very limited scope.  The individual natural rights and 
federalism models—both of which I have long advocated—accord to the 
Ninth Amendment a significant role in constitutional interpretation, operating 
to preserve unenumerated individual rights and to negate latitudinarian con-
structions of Congress’s enumerated powers.  The last three of these models 
are not mutually exclusive.  Although the evidence supporting the collective 
rights model is thin, were this model to be established, it could be used to 
supplement rather than supplant the individual natural rights and federalism 
models. 
The fact that there have been five distinct models of the Ninth 
Amendment in no way supports a claim that originalism generally, or the 
original meaning of the Ninth Amendment in particular, is indeterminate.  To 
the contrary, as this body of scholarship developed—often through sharp 
debate—it produced an increasingly closer, careful, and comprehensive 
examination of the relevant sources.5  The more we investigated, the more we 
learned.  We now know much more about the Amendment’s original mean-
ing than we used to, and what we know is both internally consistent and 
generally persuasive. 
Progress in originalism is not only possible, it has occurred.6  Because 
originalism is driven by the evidence, progress is made as the evidence 
accumulates, disconfirming some models and providing support for others.  
5. See Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 616–20
(1999) (outlining the incorporation by constitutional scholars of new theories of originalism, the 
demise of the initial, less sophisticated arguments against originalism, and the diverse approaches to 
originalist theory currently embraced by different constitutional scholars). 
6. See id. at 613–14 (discussing the resiliency of originalism despite harsh criticism in the 
1980s, as well as the resurgence of originalism as the “prevailing approach to constitutional 
interpretation”). 
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Although the final word on the Ninth Amendment is yet to be written, a 
compelling pattern has emerged.  In this Article, I describe this emerging 
pattern and show how the cumulative effect of the available historical evi-
dence suggests strong support for the individual rights and federalism 
models. 
This is not to imply that the original meaning of this or any provision 
tells us all we need to know to apply it to current cases and controversies.  
Even for a committed originalist, the determination of specific doctrines or 
rules of law is required to put the original meaning of the Constitution into 
effect, and these “constitutional constructions” are not reducible to the origi-
nal meaning of the text itself.  Instead, competing constructions must be 
assessed to see if they are consistent with this original meaning, though not 
logically deducible from it.7  And for those nonoriginalists for whom original 
meaning provides a starting point or “modality” of constitution 
interpretation,8 it nevertheless remains important to get that original meaning 
correct before moving on to other modalities or to “translate” original mean-
ing into today’s application.9
The meat of this Article will be comparing and contrasting the 
arguments of particular scholars who have written extensively on the Ninth 
Amendment—especially arguments by Russell Caplan, Thomas McAffee, 
Akhil Amar, and most recently by Kurt Lash.  While I strongly disagree with 
the conclusions of Caplan and McAffee, it is worth noting that Professor 
Lash and I end up in a nearly identical place: the Ninth Amendment justifies 
a narrow or “strict” construction of federal powers, and especially implied 
federal powers.10  On both of our accounts, the Ninth Amendment under-
mines what Madison called a “latitudinarian” interpretation of the 
enumerated powers—including the Necessary and Proper Clause.11  While 
7. For a seminal discussion of constitutional construction, see KEITH E. WHITTINGTON,
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 14–15 (1999), which distinguishes constitutional construction 
from interpretation.  See also RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE
PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 118–30 (2004) (discussing how constitutional construction differs from 
constitutional interpretation).  See generally Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 
VA. L. REV. 1, 51 (2004) (arguing that there is a distinction between constitutional meaning and 
constitutional decision rules, which direct the application of that meaning). 
8. See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 13 (1991) (identifying a “historical 
modality” as one of six modalities of constitutional interpretation).  See generally PHILIP BOBBITT,
CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION (1982) (referring to modalities such as 
text, history, precedent, and structure). 
9. See Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEXAS L. REV. 1165, 1182 (1993) 
(suggesting that the first step to maintaining fidelity to constitutional or statutory texts is to “read 
the text in its originating context, finding its meaning there first”). 
10. See Kurt Lash, The Lost Original Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 83 TEXAS L. REV. 331, 
394–99 (2004) [hereinafter Lash, Lost Original Meaning] (arguing that the founders’ understanding 
of the Ninth Amendment supports a narrow construction of federal power). 
11. Id. at 392–93 (describing Madison’s argument that “[a]lthough implied in the original 
Constitution, an express rule against latitudinarian constructions found its ultimate expression in the 
Ninth Amendment”). 
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Professor Lash also defends the collective rights model, he does not deny that 
the Ninth Amendment refers, at least in part, to individual natural rights.12
So readers should not take away from our disagreement about particular 
items of evidence any inference that some great difference turns on the out-
come of our dispute.  Professor Lash’s and my approaches largely overlap 
and, where they differ, are not necessarily mutually inconsistent. 
In Part I of this Article, I begin by identifying the version of originalism 
I will be employing: original public meaning originalism.  Part II consists of 
a very brief description of the origins of the Ninth Amendment.  This legis-
lative history is entirely noncontroversial, and all five competing models rely 
upon it.  In Part III, I neutrally describe each model using the label employed 
by its proponents.  In this Part, I also offer some preliminary critical com-
ments on the plausibility of the state law rights, residual rights, and collective 
rights models. 
Part IV is the heart of the analysis.  There I present a series of key 
pieces of originalist evidence that are inconsistent with some of these models 
and strongly supportive of others.  On the basis of this evidence, the state law 
rights and residual rights models can be eliminated from consideration as 
best describing the original meaning of the Ninth Amendment, while the 
plausibility of the collective rights model is seriously undermined. 
In contrast, all of this evidence either supports or is not inconsistent 
with the individual natural rights and federalist models.  In the end, we shall 
see that the way a member of the public would today read the Ninth 
Amendment—before being exposed to a more “sophisticated” 
interpretation—was also its original public meaning at the time of its 
enactment.  Given that the English language has not changed so much in two 
hundred years, that the Ninth Amendment actually meant then what it now 
appears to say should not come as a surprise. 
II. Originalist Methodology 
The methodology employed in this Article is originalist, but that label is 
ambiguous because there are at least three distinctive originalist approaches: 
original framers’ intent, original ratifiers’ understanding, and original public 
meaning.  Original framers’ intent focuses on the intentions of those who 
wrote the Constitution.13  Original ratifiers’ understanding looks for the 
intentions and expectations of those who voted to ratify the text.14  Original 
public meaning looks to how a reasonable member of the public (including, 
but not limited to, the framers and ratifiers) would have understood the words 
12. See id. at 401 (“[T]here is no textual reason and little historical reason to believe that the 
‘other rights’ of the Ninth Amendment did not include natural rights.”). 
13. See BARNETT, supra note 7, at 92. 
14. H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885, 
888 (1985). 
6 Texas Law Review [Vol. 85:1 
of the text (in context) at the time of its enactment.15  The form of originalism 
I will employ is based on the original public meaning of the text. 
I will not recapitulate here the strengths and weaknesses of each of these 
approaches, as I have done so elsewhere.16  Original framers’ intent was the 
version of originalism first advocated by Attorney General Edwin Meese in 
the 1980s in a series of influential lectures that sparked a voluminous aca-
demic critique.17  Though, for a brief time, some originalists shifted to 
original ratifiers’ understanding, most originalists have come to adopt origi-
nal public meaning, which is now the dominant mode of originalist 
scholarship.18
This evolution in originalist methodology is worth mentioning because 
the timing of academic interest in the Ninth Amendment corresponds to the 
introduction of original framers’ intent originalism in the 1980s.19  As a 
result, we may see early Ninth Amendment scholarship focusing on framers’ 
intent to a degree one would not witness today.  Having said this, these dif-
ferent originalist methods are not always easy to distinguish in practice.  
Evidence of framers’ intent or ratifiers’ understanding is also typically good 
evidence of original public meaning.  Still, it does happen that particular 
items of evidence assume a greater or lesser importance depending upon 
which version of originalism is being employed. 
A good example of this is Roger Sherman’s draft of a bill of rights that 
will be discussed in Part IV.20  Notwithstanding evidence that Sherman him-
self opposed the provisions therein, his use of language in this draft is highly 
pertinent to the original meaning of the words that are also used in the Ninth 
Amendment.  The bearing of this document on the original meaning of the 
Ninth Amendment has nothing whatsoever to do with the intentions of Roger 
Sherman—apart from his intention to use the English language in a manner 
that would be understood by his audience.  The same can be said of evidence 
of word usage by participants at the Constitutional Convention and in private 
correspondence.  It is no accident that these discussions about the language 
used in the text would be pertinent to ascertaining its meaning, wholly apart 
from the intentions or expectations of those who used these words to 
communicate their thoughts to others. 
15. BARNETT, supra note 7, at 92. 
16. See id. at 89–117. 
17. See Meese, supra note 3, at 16 (arguing that the framers set forth principles, the meaning of 
which “can be found, understood, and applied”); Jack N. Rakove, Introduction to INTERPRETING 
THE CONSTITUTION: THE DEBATE OVER ORIGINAL INTENT, supra note 3, at 3, 3 (noting that 
Meese’s speech “sparked—or rather rekindled—a debate about the proper norms of constitutional 
interpretation”). 
18. BARNETT, supra note 7, at 92–93. 
19. See, e.g., Thomas McAffee, The Original Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 90 COLUM. L.
REV. 1215, 1215 (1990) (acknowledging the emergence of the Ninth Amendment as a point of 
contention in the debate over constitutional rights). 
20. See infra notes 157–61 and accompanying text. 
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Unfortunately, the debate over the original meaning of the Ninth 
Amendment cannot be settled with the same sort of quantitative evidence that 
can be used to interpret, for example, key portions of the Commerce 
Clause.21  Unlike the word “commerce,” which can be shown to have a 
discernable meaning distinct from such other economic activities as 
agriculture and manufacturing, the phrase “other rights retained by the 
people” cannot be established by a systematic study of general usage.  
Instead, to establish its public meaning, it becomes necessary to examine the 
publicly known purpose for which the Ninth Amendment was added.  This is 
not to revert to an original framers’ intent approach, however.  We consult 
the publicly known purpose for which the Ninth Amendment was conceived 
because the public understanding of its text was shaped by this purpose. 
Because the words of the Ninth Amendment could have been used in 
different ways at the time of its enactment depending on the context, the 
Ninth Amendment is open to more possible interpretations than other provi-
sions of the text.  The challenge is to identify a conceptual model that best 
fits the available evidence.  The term “model” seems apt because an 
originalist inquiry is empirical in nature.  To the extent that these models are 
mutually exclusive—as the last three models are from the first two, and the 
first two from each other—the challenge is to choose the model (or compati-
ble models) that best fits the available evidence of original public meaning.  
Before describing the models and presenting the key evidence, however, I 
will briefly summarize the legislative history of the Ninth Amendment for 
those who are not familiar with how this pregnant passage came to be in-
cluded in the text. 
III. The Legislative History of the Ninth Amendment 
During the ratification debates over the Constitution, the principal 
objection made by its opponents that resonated with the public was the 
absence of a bill of rights.22  In response to this objection, supporters of the 
Constitution offered two arguments.  First, they argued that a bill of rights 
was unnecessary.  Because the Constitution was one of limited and enumer-
ated powers, these enumerated limits constituted a bill of rights.23  Second, 
21. See Randy E. Barnett, New Evidence of the Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 55 
ARK. L. REV. 847, 856, 865 (2003) (comprehensively surveying the meaning of the word 
“commerce” in the Philadelphia Gazette from 1728 to 1800 and also providing “a selection of 
typical uses of the term ‘commerce’ to . . . give readers a sense of the cumulative weight of the 
evidence”); Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. L. REV.
101, 143, 146 (2001) (comprehensively surveying the use of the word “commerce” in the notes of 
the constitutional convention, the ratification conventions, and the federalist papers, as well as in 
contemporary dictionaries). 
22. LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 12 (1999). 
23. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, at 513–14 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) 
(“For why declare that things shall not be done which there is no power to do?  Why, for instance, 
should it be said that the liberty of the press shall not be restrained, when no power is given by 
which restrictions may be imposed?”). 
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they argued that a bill of rights would be dangerous.  By attempting to enu-
merate any rights to be protected, it would imply that all that were not listed 
were surrendered.  And it would be impossible to enumerate all the rights of 
the people.24
Critics of the Constitution—labeled by its supporters as 
“Antifederalists”—offered two telling rejoinders to these arguments.  As to 
the lack of necessity, they questioned the effectiveness of enumerated powers 
as a limitation of federal powers, especially in light of the existence of the 
Necessary and Proper Clause,25 which was then known as the Sweeping 
Clause.26  As to the issue of dangerousness, they pointed to the rights already 
protected in Article I, Section 9, such as the guarantee of the writ of habeas 
corpus.27  If enumerating any rights was dangerous, then this very short list 
invited the same danger, which would only be ameliorated, however 
imperfectly, by expanding the list of protected rights. 
Opponents of the Constitution, it should be noted, were more interested 
in advancing an argument that would defeat ratification than in actually 
obtaining a bill of rights.28  Their insistence on a bill of rights was offered 
with the objective of recommitting the Constitution to a convention for fur-
ther consideration, during which time it could effectively be killed.29  For this 
reason, supporters of the Constitution countered the popular demand for a 
bill of rights with a pledge to offer amendments to the Constitution after its 
ratification.  This pledge won the day for the Constitution by tipping the po-
litical balance sufficiently to obtain ratification.30  Several ratification 
conventions thereafter accompanied their ratification with a list of proposed 
amendments or changes to the Constitution along with proposals for a bill of 
rights.31
In the first Congress, it fell to Virginia Representative James Madison to 
insist, over both indifference and vocal opposition, that the House take up the 
issue of amendments.  In a now famous and much-analyzed speech, he intro-
duced a list of amendments that he proposed be inserted within the text of the 
Constitution.  At the end of the list of rights to be added to Article I, Section 
9 (where the individual right of habeas corpus was located) was the 
following precursor of what eventually became the Ninth Amendment: 
24. See infra notes 110–13 and accompanying text. 
25. CALVIN R. MASSEY, SILENT RIGHTS: THE NINTH AMENDMENT AND THE CONSTITUTION’S
UNENUMERATED RIGHTS 64–65 (1995). 
26. Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The “Proper” Scope of Federal Power: A 
Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267, 270 (1993). 
27. MASSEY, supra note 25, at 65. 
28. LEVY, supra note 22, at 30–31. 
29. See id. (stating that the Antifederalists sought to use the absence of a bill of rights to defeat 
the Constitution or to promote a second ratification convention in hopes that this second convention 
would revise the Constitution to decrease the power of the national government). 
30. Id. at 31–32. 
31. Id.
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 The exceptions here or elsewhere in the constitution, made in favor 
of particular rights, shall not be so construed as to diminish the just 
importance of other rights retained by the people; or as to enlarge the 
powers delegated by the constitution; but either as actual limitations of 
such powers, or as inserted merely for greater caution.32
By contrast, Madison proposed that the provision that eventually became the 
Tenth Amendment be inserted after Article VI as a new Article VII.33
In his speech, Madison explained this proposed precursor of the Ninth 
Amendment in terms that connect it directly with Federalist objections to the 
Bill of Rights: 
 It has been objected also against a bill of rights, that, by 
enumerating particular exceptions to the grant of power, it would 
disparage those rights which were not placed in that enumeration, and 
it might follow by implication, that those rights which were not 
singled out, were intended to be assigned into the hands of the general 
government, and were consequently insecure.  This is one of the most 
plausible arguments I have ever heard urged against the admission of a 
bill of rights into this system; but, I conceive, that may be guarded 
against.  I have attempted it, as gentlemen may see by turning to the 
last clause of the 4th resolution.34
All of Madison’s proposals were then committed for consideration to a 
Select Committee of which he was a member, along with other members 
such as Connecticut Representative Roger Sherman.35  Although the Select 
Committee proposed integration,36 what eventually emerged from the House 
was a list of amendments to be appended to the end of the Constitution,37
rather than integrated within the text so as literally to amend or change it.38
The eleventh of this list was the amendment that we know as the Ninth 
Amendment.  The numbering changed when the first two proposed 
amendments failed to be ratified, though the one covering congressional pay 
32. James Madison, Speech in Congress Proposing Constitutional Amendments (June 8, 1789), 
in JAMES MADISON, WRITINGS 437, 443 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1999). 
33. Madison Resolution (June 8, 1789), reprinted in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE
DOCUMENTARY RECORD FROM THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 13–14 (Helen E. Veit et al. eds., 
1991) [hereinafter CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS]. 
34. James Madison, Speech in Congress Proposing Constitutional Amendments (June 8, 1789), 
in JAMES MADISON, WRITINGS, supra note 32, at 437, 448–49. 
35. CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 33, at 5–6 (indicating that Madison and 
Sherman were among those appointed to the Select Committee on July 21, 1789). 
36. House Committee Report (July 28, 1789), reprinted in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS,
supra note 33, at 29, 29–33. 
37. House Resolution and Articles of Amendment (Aug. 24, 1789), reprinted in CREATING THE 
BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 33, at 37, 37–41. 
38. See The Congressional Register (Aug. 13, 1789), reprinted in CREATING THE BILL OF 
RIGHTS, supra note 33, at 112, 117–26 (recounting the debate between members of the committee 
of the whole House concerning whether to integrate or append the amendments). 
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increases was eventually ratified in 1992 becoming the Twenty-Seventh 
Amendment.39
After a period of time, the numbers used to refer to the amendments 
were altered to reflect the absence of the first two proposals, but, for a time, 
the Ninth Amendment was called the Eleventh Amendment.40  This change 
in numbering initially inhibited a proper understanding of the Ninth 
Amendment by concealing an important use of the Ninth Amendment in a 
constitutional argument by none other than then-Representative James 
Madison.41  Ever since the rediscovery of Madison’s use of the Ninth 
Amendment, the debate has moved towards substantial convergence, as we 
shall see. 
IV. Five Originalist Models of the Ninth Amendment 
The modern debate over the original meaning of the Ninth Amendment 
was triggered by the testimony of Judge Robert Bork during the hearings 
over his Supreme Court nomination.  After extensive grilling in which he 
was asked to reconcile his originalism with the text of the Ninth Amendment, 
he offered the following analogy: 
 I do not think you can use the ninth amendment unless you know 
something of what it means.  For example, if you had an amendment 
that says “Congress shall make no” and then there is an ink blot and 
you cannot read the rest of it and that is the only copy you have, I do 
not think the court can make up what might be under the ink 
blot . . . .42
Coming from someone committed to originalism, this statement was contro-
versial to say the least.  Within months, an extensive literature on the Ninth 
Amendment began to accumulate.43
Just as interesting as his Senate testimony was how Judge Bork treated 
the Ninth Amendment in his later book, The Tempting of America.  There, he 
39. Compare Articles of Amendment, as Agreed to by the Senate (Sept. 14, 1789), reprinted in
CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 33, at 47, 47–49 (stating the amendments as proposed 
to the legislatures of the several states), with U.S. CONST. amends. I–X, XXVII (stating the 
amendments as ratified by the several states). 
40. Amendments to the Constitution (Sept. 28, 1789), reprinted in CREATING THE BILL OF 
RIGHTS, supra note 33, at 3, 3–4. 
41. See infra subpart V(I). 
42. Nomination of Robert H. Bork to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United 
States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 249 (1989) (statement of 
Robert H. Bork). 
43. For example, see Randy E. Barnett, Foreword: The Ninth Amendment and Constitutional 
Legitimacy, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 37 (1988) and the symposium issue in which it appeared.  The 
Chicago-Kent Symposium became the core of 2 THE RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE: THE 
HISTORY AND MEANING OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT (Randy E. Barnett ed., 1993).  See also 1 THE
RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE: THE HISTORY AND MEANING OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT
(Randy E. Barnett ed., 1989); Randy E. Barnett, Reconceiving the Ninth Amendment, 74 CORNELL 
L. REV. 1 (1988). 
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switched his inkblot metaphor to the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.44  As his interpretation of the Ninth Amendment, he 
offered instead the theory proposed by Russell Caplan in his 1983 Virginia 
Law Review article, The History and Meaning of the Ninth Amendment.45  In 
this manner, Caplan’s thesis was elevated to become the first of five distinct 
models of the Ninth Amendment considered by those seeking its original 
meaning.  So it is to his approach that I first turn. 
A. The State Law Rights Model 
Russell Caplan’s article may have been the first article on the original 
meaning of the Ninth Amendment to gain a wide audience.  As such, it re-
ceived considerable attention and it is unsurprising that his approach would 
have been adopted by Robert Bork.  Caplan’s thesis was that the “other 
rights” to which the Ninth Amendment refers were state constitutional and 
common law rights.  The effect of the Ninth Amendment, he contended, was 
to prevent any suggestion that the adoption of the Constitution displaced or 
supplanted these rights.  Here is how he stated his thesis: 
[T]he ninth amendment is not a cornucopia of undefined federal 
rights, but rather . . . is limited to a specific function, well-understood 
at the time of its adoption: the maintenance of rights guaranteed by the 
law of the states.  These state rights represented entitlements derived 
from both natural law theory and the hereditary rights of Englishmen, 
but ninth amendment protection did not transform these unenumerated 
rights into constitutional, that is, federal, rights. . . .  [The amendment] 
simply provides that the individual rights contained in state law are to 
continue in force under the Constitution until modified or eliminated 
by state enactment, by federal preemption, or by a judicial 
determination of unconstitutionality.46
According to Caplan, states were free to change their own constitutional 
or common law rights without violating the Ninth Amendment, and—under 
the Supremacy Clause—national legislation that affected these state law 
rights, but which was within the powers of the federal government, would 
also not violate the Ninth Amendment.47  Under this reading, the Ninth 
Amendment had no practical application in constitutional adjudication.  
Apart from its conflict with crucial pieces of evidence as we shall see in Part 
IV, Caplan’s thesis also suffers from his inability to produce any 
44. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 166 (1990) (calling the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause “a mystery since its adoption” and comparing it to “a provision that 
is . . . obliterated past deciphering by an ink blot”). 
45. Id. at 184; see also Russell L. Caplan, The History and Meaning of the Ninth Amendment,
69 VA. L. REV. 223 (1983). 
46. Caplan, supra note 45, at 227–28. 
47. See id. at 228. 
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contemporary statement that clearly interprets the Ninth Amendment the way 
he does.  His evidence, such as it is, is entirely circumstantial. 
B. The Residual Rights Model 
In 1990, Thomas McAffee put forth what he called the “residual rights” 
conception of the Ninth Amendment in his article The Original Meaning of 
the Ninth Amendment.48  According to McAffee, the Ninth Amendment was 
originally intended solely to prevent later interpreters of the Constitution 
from exploiting the incompleteness of the enumeration of rights to expand 
federal powers beyond those delegated by the Constitution.49  “On the resid-
ual rights reading, the ninth amendment serves the unique function of 
safeguarding the system of enumerated powers against a particular threat 
arguably presented by the enumeration of limitations on national power.”50
So, for example: 
If the government contended in a particular case that it held a general 
power to regulate the press as an appropriate inference from the first 
amendment restriction on that power, or argued that it possessed a 
general police power by virtue of the existence of the bill of rights, the 
ninth amendment would provide a direct refutation.51
In sum, according to McAffee, the exclusive function of the Ninth 
Amendment is to protect the scheme of delegated powers by arguing against 
this specific sort of inference.  As he puts it: 
The ninth amendment reads entirely as a “hold harmless” provision: it 
thus says nothing about how to construe the powers of Congress or 
how broadly to read the doctrine of implied powers; it indicates only 
that no inference about those powers should be drawn from the mere 
fact that rights are enumerated in the Bill of Rights.52
McAffee denied that what he dubbed the “residual rights” retained by the 
people “are to be defined independently of, and may serve to limit the scope 
of, powers granted to the national government by the Constitution.”53
Instead, he maintained that “the other rights retained by the people are 
defined residually from the powers granted to the national government.”54
Both Russell Caplan and Thomas McAffee viewed the Ninth 
Amendment as having the sole purpose of responding to a single potential 
misconstruction of the Constitution, although they differed on the particular 
misconstruction to which the Ninth Amendment is responding.  According to 
Caplan, the only purpose of the Ninth Amendment is to respond to the 
48. McAffee, supra note 19, at 1221. 
49. Id. at 1221–22. 
50. Id. at 1306–07 (emphasis added). 
51. Id. at 1307. 
52. Id. at 1300 n.325 (emphasis added). 
53. Id. at 1222. 
54. Id. at 1221 (emphasis added). 
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argument, should it ever be made, that the Constitution has supplanted state 
law rights.55  According to McAffee, the only purpose of the Ninth 
Amendment is to respond to the argument, should it ever be made, that the 
enumeration of particular rights in the Constitution implies that Congress has 
broader powers.56
As we shall see in Part V, the most telling evidence against both these 
positions is that James Madison used the Ninth Amendment in a 
constitutional debate, while it was still pending ratification in the states, 
outside the only contexts in which Caplan and McAffee claimed it was 
supposed to be used.57  In his speech to the House about the National Bank, 
Madison cited the Ninth Amendment, though there was no issue of sup-
planting state law rights (as distinct from state powers which were at issue) 
nor any claim that the Congress had the power to enact a bank because of the 
enumeration of rights in the Constitution (which had not yet occurred). 
C. The Individual Natural Rights Model 
In prior work, I have defended the view that the “other rights” protected 
by the Ninth Amendment are individual natural rights.58  The purpose of the 
Ninth Amendment was to ensure that these rights had the same stature and 
force after enumeration as they had before.  Specifically, in the two year in-
terregnum before the enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights, 
Congress would have acted improperly and unconstitutionally had it in-
fringed upon the natural rights to the freedom of speech, to the free exercise 
of religion, and to keep and bear arms.  It would have also acted unconstitu-
tionally had it taken private property for public use without just 
compensation.  All these individual natural rights existed prior to the Bill of 
Rights and were added to the Constitution, in Madison’s words, “for greater 
caution.”59  In contrast, other positive rights, such as the right of trial by jury 
in the Fifth Amendment, were not constitutional rights before their 
enactment.  These rights were added, again in Madison’s words, as “actual 
limitations”60 on delegated federal powers; unlike natural rights, they did not 
preexist the enactment of the Bill of Rights. 
According to the individual natural rights model, the Ninth Amendment 
was meant to preserve the “other” individual, natural, preexisting rights that 
were “retained by the people” when forming a government but were not 
55. Caplan, supra note 45, at 227–28. 
56. See McAffee, supra note 19, at 1226 (“[T]he text of the state proposals that became the 
ninth amendment reflect the general understanding that its purpose was to prevent the inference of a 
government of general powers from the provision in a bill of rights for specific limitations on behalf 
of individual rights.”). 
57. See infra notes 226–29 and accompanying text. 
58. See BARNETT, supra note 7, at 54–86, 235–42. 
59. James Madison, Speech in Congress Proposing Constitutional Amendments (June 8, 1789), 
in JAMES MADISON, WRITINGS, supra note 32, at 437, 443. 
60. Id.
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included in “the enumeration of certain rights.”  These other rights retained 
by the people are as enforceable after the enactment of the Bill of Rights as 
the retained rights of freedom of speech, press, assembly, and free exercise of 
religion were enforceable before the enactment of the Bill of Rights when 
they too were still unenumerated.  In other words, the purpose of the Ninth 
Amendment was to ensure the equal protection of unenumerated individual 
natural rights on a par with those individual natural rights that came to be 
listed “for greater caution” in the Bill of Rights. 
On this reading, the Ninth Amendment has the important function of 
negating any construction of the Constitution that would protect only 
enumerated rights and leave unenumerated rights unprotected.  In this 
manner, the Ninth Amendment specifically negates the judicial philosophy 
adopted in the first paragraph of the famous Footnote Four of United States 
v. Carolene Products Co. in which it is asserted that “[t]here may be nar-
rower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when 
legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the 
Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments . . . .”61
It should be stressed that the individual natural rights model does not 
claim the Ninth Amendment to be a “source” of independent rights—or, as 
Russell Caplan mistakenly characterized it, “a cornucopia of undefined 
federal rights”62—that are immune from any government regulation.  First, 
natural rights precede the Constitution, and the Ninth Amendment is not their 
“source.”  Instead, according to this model, the Ninth Amendment refers to 
these preexisting rights and requires that all natural rights be protected 
equally—not be “disparaged”—whether or not they are enumerated. 
Second, this model does not view constitutional rights as necessarily 
trumping all laws that may affect their exercise.  This model does not ex-
clude the regulation of natural rights, any more than an individual natural 
rights model of the First Amendment excludes all time, place, or manner 
regulations of speech, press, or assembly.63  A proper regulation is not a 
prohibition, but instead proscribes the manner by which a particular liberty is 
to be exercised to protect the rights of others.  The individual natural rights 
model would not end all regulation, but would instead scrutinize a regulation 
of liberty to ensure that it is reasonable and necessary, rather than an im-
proper attempt by government to restrict the exercise of the retained rights. 
In addition, an individual natural rights model would provide no barrier 
to prohibiting (as opposed to regulating) wrongful behavior that violates the 
rights of others.  Under this approach, while rightful exercises of liberty may 
only be regulated (not prohibited), wrongful acts that violate the equal rights 
of others are not exercises of liberty and may be prohibited, not just 
61. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (emphasis added). 
62. Caplan, supra note 45, at 227. 
63. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-3 (2d ed. 1988) 
(discussing time, place, and manner regulation). 
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regulated.  What adhering to this model would bar is the prohibition—as 
opposed to the regulation—of rightful exercises of natural rights. 
Third, the individual natural rights model does not require that judges 
identify particular natural rights and then protect them.  Instead, the courts 
could put the burden of justification on the federal government whenever 
legislation restricts the exercise of liberty.  As I have explained,64 this pre-
sumption may be rebutted by a showing that a particular law was a necessary 
regulation of a rightful act or a prohibition of a wrongful act.65  What is 
barred by the Ninth Amendment under this model is the prohibition or un-
necessary regulation of rightful acts.  According to a presumption of liberty, 
the unenumerated liberties retained by the people would receive the same 
presumptive protection as that now accorded some of the enumerated rights. 
Lastly, it would be mistaken to characterize the individual natural rights 
model as entailing federal restrictions on the powers of states.  The Ninth 
Amendment, like the rest of the Bill of Rights, originally applied only to the 
federal government.66  True, natural rights could also limit the just powers of 
state governments, but this would be because of their independent force; the 
textual existence of the Ninth Amendment would not by itself justify federal 
protection against the violation of natural rights of individuals by their state 
governments.  It was only with the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment—
in particular the Privileges or Immunities Clause—that the federal govern-
ment obtained any jurisdiction to protect the unenumerated retained natural 
rights of the people from infringement by state governments.67
In sum, the individual natural rights model can be viewed as justifying a 
rule of construction by which claims of federal power can be adjudicated, 
rather than as an independent source of rights that automatically trumps any 
exercise of governmental power.  This model does not require that specific 
natural rights be identified but can work in the same presumptive way that 
now protects the natural rights of speech, press, and assembly.  And this 
model does not purport to limit state power. 
D. The Collective Rights Model 
According to the collective rights model, the “other” rights retained by 
the people is a reference to the rights that the people possess as a collective 
64. BARNETT, supra note 7, at 319–34. 
65. The only tricky part of the approach would be the need to distinguish wrongful acts—which 
are not exercises of liberty but rather are acts of license—that can be prohibited, from rightful 
exercises of liberty that can only be regulated reasonably, not prohibited altogether.  But this 
difficulty should not be exaggerated because any liberty may properly be regulated, provided that 
such regulation can be justified as necessary. 
66. See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250–51 (1883) (holding that the Fifth 
Amendment was not incorporated and was only intended to act as a limitation on the exercise of 
power by the federal government). 
67. BARNETT, supra note 7, at 66. 
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political body, as distinct from the rights they possess as individuals.68
Although, so far as I am aware, no Ninth Amendment scholar has claimed 
this to have been the exclusive meaning of the Ninth Amendment, I identify 
it as a separate model because at least two Ninth Amendment scholars—
Akhil Amar and Kurt Lash—have claimed that the purpose of the Ninth 
Amendment was, at least in part and perhaps even primarily, the protection 
of the retained rights of the people viewed collectively, as distinct from the 
rights of particular individuals.69  Akhil Amar comes very close to claiming 
an exclusively collective rights reading of the Ninth Amendment, without 
crossing the line completely: 
 The conspicuously collective meaning of “the people” in the Tenth 
Amendment (and elsewhere) should alert us that its core meaning in 
the Ninth is similarly collective.  Indeed, the most obvious and 
inalienable right underlying the Ninth Amendment is the collective 
right of We the People to alter or abolish government, through the 
distinctly American device of the constitutional convention. . . .  To 
see the Ninth Amendment, as originally written, as a palladium of 
countermajoritarian individual rights—like privacy—is to engage in 
anachronism.70
If taken as the exclusive reading of the Ninth Amendment, the collective 
rights model would be inconsistent with the individual natural rights model.  
But the two are not mutually exclusive.  It is possible that the “other” rights 
retained by the people were both individual and collective, in which case the 
collective rights model identifies a potential application of the Ninth 
Amendment beyond the protection of individual liberties. 
Whatever the merits of the collective rights model of the Bill of Rights 
in general, there is reason to be skeptical of it as a model of the Ninth 
Amendment in particular.  As was seen above, Antifederalist opponents of 
the Constitution objected to its lack of a bill of rights.71  Many of the rights 
that were eventually included were drawn from recommendations of state 
ratification conventions and can be viewed as Antifederalist in their nature.72
By this I mean that these proposals were proposed by and adopted to placate 
Antifederalist opponents of the Constitution who opposed its ratification.  
The original public meaning of these amendments reflects, therefore, their 
68. I was tempted to label this model the “collective natural rights” position because the 
collective political rights that Akhil Amar has in mind—such as the right of revolution—preexist 
the formation of government and are “natural” in the relevant sense.  This label would also have the 
salutary effect of showing the potential compatibility of the individual natural rights model with the 
collective rights model.  However, to avoid confusion, as well as the risk of misrepresentation, I 
have retained the term favored by Amar (and by Kurt Lash). 
69. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 120 (1998); Lash, Lost Original Meaning,
supra note 10, at 342. 
70. AMAR, supra note 69, at 120. 
71. See supra notes 28–29 and accompanying text. 
72. See LEVY, supra note 22, at 32 (noting that every right in the first ten amendments came 
from state recommendations, except for the Fifth Amendment’s requirement of just compensation). 
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Antifederalist source and audience.  As Madison explained in his 
Amendments Speech to the House: 
 It cannot be a secret to the gentlemen in this house, that, 
notwithstanding the ratification of this system of government by 
eleven of the thirteen United States, in some cases unanimously, in 
others by large majorities; yet still there is a great number of our 
constituents who are dissatisfied with it; among whom are many 
respectable for their talents, their patriotism, and respectable for the 
jealousy they have for their liberty, which, though mistaken in its 
object, is laudable in its motive.  There is a great body of the people 
falling under this description, who at present feel much inclined to 
join their support to the cause of federalism, if they were satisfied in 
this one point: We ought not to disregard their inclination, but, on 
principles of amity and moderation, conform to their wishes, and 
expressly declare the great rights of mankind secured under this 
constitution.73
Given the Antifederalist origins of the Bill of Rights—including the 
Tenth Amendment, a form of which was proposed by every ratification 
convention that forwarded amendments74—it is tempting to interpret the 
Ninth Amendment as similarly Antifederalist.  But the temptation should be 
resisted.  As we shall see, Madison designed the Ninth Amendment by sub-
stantially altering state proposals to address the concerns expressed during 
ratification by Federalist supporters of the Constitution.75  In particular, it 
was meant to address their concern that enumerating some rights would be 
dangerous.
In this regard, within the Bill of Rights, the Ninth Amendment is sui
generis.  While the rest of the Bill of Rights was a response to Antifederalist 
objections to the Constitution, the Ninth Amendment was a response to 
Federalist objections to the Bill of Rights.  It is very far from clear that the 
sorts of rights that Federalists feared would be “surrendered up” to a general 
government were “collective” rather than individual in nature.  Evidence of 
Antifederalist attachments to “collective rights” is beside the point.  That 
Madison’s version of the Ninth Amendment was a departure from, rather 
than an incorporation of, the public meaning of similarly worded 
Antifederalist-inspired state proposals will become apparent below.76
E. The Federalism Model of the Ninth Amendment 
Chronologically, the final model to emerge within the Ninth 
Amendment literature of the past twenty years is the federalism model.  
73. James Madison, Speech in Congress Proposing Constitutional Amendments (June 8, 1789), 
in JAMES MADISON, WRITINGS, supra note 32, at 437, 439. 
74. AMAR, supra note 69, at 123. 
75. See infra notes 110–17 and accompanying text. 
76. See infra text accompanying notes 160–83. 
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According to this model, the Ninth Amendment justifies a narrow or strict 
construction of enumerated federal powers, especially powers implied under 
the Necessary and Proper Clause.  I have come to conclude that, unlike the 
first four models already discussed, this is not a model of the original mean-
ing of the text.  In other words, it does not even purport to tell us what the 
text originally and literally said to a member of the general public at the time 
it was enacted.  Instead, it is a model of what is properly considered a 
“constitutional construction” by which the meaning of what the text does say 
can be put into effect.77  For this reason, it should not be surprising that this 
model might well be consistent with both the individual natural rights and 
collective rights models.  By the same token, evidence that the Ninth 
Amendment was used to justify a narrow construction of federal power is, as 
we shall see, inconsistent with the state law rights and residual rights 
models.78
This federalism model of the Ninth Amendment was suggested by Akhil 
Amar shortly after his claim that the “core meaning” of the Ninth 
Amendment is the protection of collective rights: 
 The Ninth Amendment also sounds in part in federalism, but many 
constitutional scholars today have missed the beat.  As with our First 
and Tenth Amendments, the Ninth explicitly sought to protect liberty 
by preventing Congress from going beyond its enumerated powers in 
Article I, section 8 and elsewhere in the Constitution. . . .  To be sure, 
on a federalism-based reading, the Ninth and Tenth fit together snugly, 
as their words and legislative history make clear; but each amendment 
complements the other without duplicating it.  The Tenth says that 
Congress must point to some explicit or implicit enumerated power 
before it can act; and the Ninth addresses the closely related but 
distinct question of whether such express or implied enumerated 
power in fact exists.79
Amar’s initial presentation of this model was fuzzy.  For one thing, he 
presented no originalist evidence of his own, relying solely on Thomas 
McAffee’s historical analysis.80  His explanation of the federalism reading of 
the Ninth Amendment sounds exactly like McAffee’s residual rights 
approach:
In particular, the Ninth [Amendment] warns readers not to infer from 
the mere enumeration of a right in the Bill of Rights that implicit 
federal power in fact exists in a given domain.  Thus, for example, we 
must not infer from our First Amendment that Congress was ever 
77. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
78. See infra notes 114–17 and accompanying text. 
79. AMAR, supra note 69, at 123–24. 
80. See id. at 123 (“As Professor McAffee has shown, the amendment’s legislative history 
strongly supports an enumerated-powers, federalism-based reading.”). 
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given legislative power in the first place to regulate religion in the 
states, or to censor speech.81
He then immediately muddies the water still further by distinguishing the 
federalism reading from the collective rights reading: “Of course, both the 
Ninth and the Tenth go beyond pure federalism in their ringing affirmations 
of popular sovereignty.”82
In short, even knowledgeable readers of Amar are likely to be confused 
into thinking that the “federalism” reading of the Ninth Amendment is both 
reducible to Thomas McAffee’s residual rights model and entirely distinct 
from Amar’s own collective rights model.  If this is what Amar meant to 
claim, then this is not the federalism model I am considering in this section.  
But I think Amar may well have been suggesting a distinctive federalism po-
sition that is quite different from the residual rights model and potentially 
consistent with a concern for collective rights. 
The Ninth Amendment scholar who has done the most to clarify and 
support this sort of distinctive federalism model is Kurt Lash.  A federalism 
model, as he describes it, is one that justifies a strict or narrow construction 
of federal powers, especially the claim of implied powers under the 
Necessary and Proper Clause.83  Lash describes this approach as follows: 
“Although the Ninth and Tenth Amendments both limited federal power, 
they did so in different ways.  The Tenth insured that the federal government 
would exercise only those powers enumerated in the Constitution.  The Ninth 
Amendment went further, however, and prohibited an expanded interpreta-
tion of those enumerated powers.”84  Lash distinguishes his account from 
McAffee’s by use of the helpful distinction between “active” and “passive” 
federalism approaches: 
 To date, federalist theories of the Ninth Amendment have been 
“passive” in that they do not view the Ninth as justifying judicial 
intervention.  This approach reads the Ninth as a mere declaration that 
enumerated rights do not imply otherwise unenumerated federal 
power.  In essence, a passive, federalist reading limits the Ninth to 
preserving the principle declared in the Tenth Amendment—all 
powers not delegated are reserved.85
He then accurately characterizes McAffee as “arguing that the Ninth 
[Amendment] is not a limitation on federal power, but works in conjunction 
with the Tenth to preserve the concept of enumerated power.”86  In contrast, 
Lash allows that it “is possible to take an active federalist approach to the 
81. Id. at 124. 
82. Id.
83. See Lash, Lost Original Meaning, supra note 10, at 355 (noting the concerns of state 
ratification conventions about the Necessary and Proper Clause). 
84. Id. at 399. 
85. Id. at 346. 
86. Id.
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Ninth Amendment.  This would view the Ninth as a judicially enforceable 
rule of construction limiting the power of the federal government to interfere 
with the retained right of the people to local self-government.”87
Here and elsewhere in his two articles, Lash appears to suggest that the 
active federalism approach is meant to protect only collective rights.  For 
example, in the very next paragraph he says that “[j]ust as the active 
Libertarian reading creates a presumption in favor of unenumerated individ-
ual rights, so the active federalist reading creates a presumption in favor of 
the collective right of the people to state or local self-government.”88  This 
sentence implies, wrongly as we shall see, that a “federalist reading” is in-
consistent with a presumption in favor of individual rights.  Examples of this 
sort of collective rights rhetoric are numerous throughout his two lengthy 
articles.89
Taken together with his stark distinction between what he calls the 
“Libertarian reading” and his “federalist” reading, readers are likely to be 
misled into thinking that an active federalism model is somehow 
incompatible with an active individual natural rights model.90  Yet elsewhere, 
when summing up his approach, Lash describes the federalism model as em-
bracing both individual and collective natural rights: 
The text of the Ninth does not limit its application to natural rights.  
All retained rights, natural or otherwise, were protected from denial or 
disparagement as a result of the decision to enumerate “certain rights.”  
Neither the text nor the purpose of the Ninth Amendment was limited 
to protecting a subcategory of retained rights.91
Certainly as a logical matter, an active federalism reading of the Ninth 
Amendment that effectively limited the scope of congressional powers would 
serve to protect both the natural rights of individuals and any collective right 
of the people to self-government (Lash) or to alter or abolish their govern-
ment (Amar).  In this sense the federalism model is consistent with both the 
87. Id.
88. Id. at 346–47.  Notice how “the collective right of the people to state or local self-
government” is an Antifederalist, rather than a Federalist, concern.  I use the term “federalism” 
rather than Lash’s term “federalist” to describe this model because the restrictions on federal powers 
it recommends potentially serve Antifederalist as well as Federalist objectives. 
89. See id. at 362 (“One of the principle issues left open by the text of the Ninth Amendment 
involves the ‘other rights’ protected by the Ninth’s rule of construction.  Federalist theories 
emphasize the collective rights of the people of the several states—the right to local self-
government on all matters not assigned to the federal government.”); see also Kurt T. Lash, The 
Lost Jurisprudence of the Ninth Amendment, 83 TEXAS L. REV. 597, 609 (2005) [hereinafter Lash, 
Lost Jurisprudence] (“The rarity and universal rejection of attempts to read the Ninth Amendment 
as a source of libertarian rights tracks the original understanding of the Ninth as a rule protecting the 
retained collective rights of the people of the several states.”); id. at 684 (“Hughes’s opinion in 
Ashwander presents one of the clearest examples of Ninth Amendment rights being read to refer to 
the collective rights of local self-government.”). 
90. See Lash, Lost Original Meaning, supra note 10, at 343 (contrasting the Libertarian and 
federalist theories of Ninth Amendment understanding). 
91. Id. at 399. 
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individual and collective natural rights models.  With the Ninth Amendment, 
as elsewhere in the Constitution, federalism is a means rather than an end in 
itself.  And a principal end of federalism is the protection of the liberties of 
the people, both personal and political. 
Perhaps the biggest mistake of contending Ninth Amendment theorists 
is to view their favored model as exclusive.  Once we distinguish means from 
ends, evidence supporting a federalism function of the Ninth Amendment can 
be viewed as logically consistent with both the individual and collective 
rights models.  Arguing against a latitudinarian construction of express and 
implied federal powers is a powerful means of protecting whatever rights 
were thought retained by the people, whether individual, collective, or both. 
That the federalism model is logically compatible with both the 
individual and collective natural rights models, however, does not entail that 
all three comprise the actual original meaning of the Ninth Amendment.  
That question must be settled by evidence.  And, even if these three models 
can be rendered compatible with each other, that does not entail that they are 
also compatible with the state law rights or residual rights models.  Indeed, as 
will be shown in the next Part, important pieces of evidence of original 
meaning are incompatible with either of these earlier originalist models. 
V. Key Evidence of Original Meaning 
Most originalist analyses of the Ninth Amendment consist of lengthy 
renditions of the historical developments leading up to its adoption, the 
process of its drafting and ratification, and constitutional commentary 
afterwards.92  To this, Kurt Lash has added an entire article on the use of the 
Ninth Amendment by various courts and litigants after its enactment.93
These presentations are always impressive and tend to be persuasive to those 
unfamiliar with the terrain. 
The difference in their conclusions largely results from differences in 
how particular items of evidence are placed in a larger context.  Further, ear-
lier work failed to consider vital pieces of evidence that only gained wide 
attention as the scholarly debate evolved.  Also, crucial moves are sometimes 
made without support, though this is often hard to see given that these par-
ticular assertions are surrounded by a dense thicket of evidence that does not 
directly establish the point at issue. 
We have already seen one example of the last phenomenon in Akhil 
Amar’s unsupported assertion (apart from his intratextual linkage to other 
Amendments and a single citation to Thomas McAffee) that “the most 
obvious and inalienable right underlying the Ninth Amendment is the 
collective right of We the People to alter or abolish government, through the 
92. See, e.g., id. at 348–410. 
93. Lash, Lost Jurisprudence, supra note 89. 
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distinctly American device of the constitutional convention.”94  No direct or 
indirect evidence is provided here or elsewhere that this is the right to which 
the Ninth Amendment specifically refers.  By the time they reach page 120 
of Amar’s otherwise well-researched book, however, readers are likely not to 
notice that this particular claim lacks any evidentiary support. 
On the other hand, it is not implausible to think that the right of the 
people to alter or abolish their governments was among the rights retained by 
the people.  It was affirmed in one form or another in every state constitution 
that preceded the Constitution.95  The problem with this reference in Amar’s 
discussion is that it appears to reduce the Ninth Amendment to this particular 
collective right as its “core meaning” without any support whatsoever for this
interpretive claim.  Given that only one state ratification convention proposed 
its addition to the Constitution while the recommendations of all the rest 
were silent on this right,96 the lack of any other affirmative evidence for this 
claim is telling. 
94. AMAR, supra note 69, at 120. 
95. Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, 
Vermont, and Virginia all had state constitutions affirming this right, and each of these state 
constitutions preceded the U.S. Constitution.  See MARYLAND DECLARATION OF RIGHTS of 1776,
art. I, reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND 
ORIGINS 676 (Neil H. Cogan ed., 1997) [hereinafter THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS] (“That all 
government of right originates from the people, is founded in compact only, and instituted solely for 
the good of the whole.”); MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. 1, art. VII, reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL
OF RIGHTS, supra, at 677 (“Government is instituted for the common good; for the protection, 
safety, prosperity and happiness of the people . . .  [t]herefore the people alone have an 
incontest[a]ble, unalienable, and indefeasible right to institute government; and to reform, alter, or 
totally change the same, when their protection, safety, prosperity and happiness require it.”); N.J.
CONST. of 1776, preamble, reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra, at 678 
(“[Government] was by Compact, derived from the People, and held for them, for the common 
Interest of the whole Society . . . .”); NORTH CAROLINA DECLARATION OF RIGHTS of 1776, § 1,
reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra, at 678 (“That all political Power is vested in 
and derived from the People only.”); PA. CONST. of 1776, preamble, reprinted in THE COMPLETE 
BILL OF RIGHTS, supra, at 678 (“[T]he people have a right, by common consent to change [the 
government], and take such measures as to them may appear necessary to promote their safety and 
happiness.”); S.C. CONST. of 1790, art. IX, § 1, reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra,
at 680 (“All power is originally vested in the people; and all free governments are founded on their 
authority, and are instituted for their peace, safety and happiness.”); VT. CONST. of 1777, preamble, 
reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra, at 680 (“[T]he People have a Right by 
common Consent to change [the government], and take such Measures as to them may appear 
necessary to promote their Safety and Happiness.”); VIRGINIA DECLARATION OF RIGHTS of 1776,
§ 2, reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra, at 680 (“That all power is vested in, and 
consequently derived from the people; that Magistrates are their trustees and servants, and at all 
times amenable to them.”). 
96. See Amendments Proposed by the New York Convention (July 26, 1788), in THE
COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 95, at 635, 635 (explaining that New York proposed the 
following addition to the Constitution: “That the Powers of Government may be reassumed by the 
People, whensoever it shall become necessary to their Happiness”).  Even the proposals by 
minorities in the state ratification conventions are devoid of references to this right.  See, e.g.,
Amendments Proposed by the Maryland Convention Minority (Apr. 26, 1788), reprinted in THE 
COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 95, at 674; Amendments Proposed by the Pennsylvania 
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Another example of unsupported claims is in Russell Caplan’s article: 
For the federalists, the Bill of Rights was a concession to skeptics, 
merely making explicit the protection of rights that had always been 
implicit.  The unenumerated rights retained under the ninth 
amendment were to continue in force as before, as the operative laws 
of the states.  Unenumerated rights were not federal rights, as were 
the enumerated rights, but represented the persistence of the 
“legislative regulation” of the states.97
The first of these sentences is unproblematic, as is the second until its 
concluding phrase “as the operative laws of the states.”  The third sentence is 
highly contentious.  None of these three sentences is accompanied by foot-
notes of support. 
So too with Caplan’s claim that natural rights were subject to the 
regulation of state laws—especially the common law.  So they were thought 
to be.  The question is whether this means that the Ninth Amendment pro-
vided no constitutional barrier to federal interference with the exercise of 
these rights, as did the enumerated natural rights of freedom of speech, press, 
assembly, and to keep and bear arms—natural rights that were also regulated 
by state laws.  Evidence for this interpretive claim is completely lacking. 
Still, readers grow understandably impatient over this or that omission 
of support and may even give up their pursuit of original meaning in 
frustration over their inability to referee such arcana.  This is why, when 
direct evidence of particular usage is unavailable (unlike, for example, with 
the Commerce Clause), the formulation of clear models is essential as a first 
step to adjudicating a dispute over original meaning.  With these models in 
mind, we can then survey a series of highly salient and probative pieces of 
evidence to see which model or models fits them most closely and which is 
actually refuted by this evidence. 
While each of the models fits the general history of the Ninth 
Amendment, each does not fit equally well these particular items of 
evidence.  Evaluating the compatibility of these clear models against this 
body of evidence makes possible the historical equivalent of a “crucial 
Convention Minority (Dec. 12, 1787), reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 95, 
at 675. 
97. Caplan, supra note 45, at 243 (emphasis added).  One needs to search elsewhere in Caplan’s 
article to discover that the quoted phrase “legislative regulation” in this passage is from The 
Federalist No. 83 in which Hamilton explains that, in the then-unamended Constitution, the right of 
trial by jury was left to the states to protect.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 83, at 503 (Alexander Hamilton) 
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).  Not only is Hamilton’s reference completely unconnected to the Ninth 
Amendment, but it precedes the Bill of Rights by three years.  Moreover, as we shall see, trial by 
jury was, according to Madison, a “positive right” that resulted from the compact, rather than a 
“natural right” that preceded the Constitution.  See infra note 134.  Before the Bill of Rights, all
natural rights—including the freedom of speech, press, assembly, and the rights to keep and bear 
arms and to just compensation for public takings—were unenumerated.  Caplan does not discuss 
any aspect of this important nuance. 
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experiment” in the natural sciences.98  So I now turn to the particular items of 
historical evidence that are most telling in supporting or undercutting these 
five models. 
A. Madison’s Bill of Rights Speech 
Without doubt, to establish the original public meaning of the Ninth 
Amendment, we should begin with Madison’s speech to the House in which 
he specifically explains the purpose of his initial proposal that morphed into 
the Ninth Amendment.  As was discussed in Part III, Federalists made two 
objections to adding a bill of rights to the Constitution.99  The first was that it 
was unnecessary because Congress was only given specific enumerated 
powers.  Here is how Madison responds to this objection in his speech: 
I admit that these arguments are not entirely without foundation; but 
they are not conclusive to the extent which has been supposed.  It is 
true the powers of the general government are circumscribed; they are 
directed to particular objects; but even if government keeps within 
those limits, it has certain discretionary powers with respect to the 
means, which may admit of abuse to a certain extent, in the same 
manner as the powers of the state governments under their 
constitutions may to an indefinite extent; because in the constitution of 
the United States there is a clause granting to Congress the power to 
make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into 
execution all the powers vested in the government of the United 
States, or in any department or officer thereof . . . .100
In other words, an enumeration of rights is useful to limit the exercise of 
enumerated powers, especially given the existence of the Necessary and 
Proper Clause.101
98. See 4 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 75 (2d ed. 1989) (“[C]rucial: . . . 2.  That finally 
decides between two rival hypotheses, proving the one and disproving the other; more loosely, 
relating to, or adapted to lead to such decision. . . .  This sense is taken from Bacon’s phrase 
instantia crucis, explained by him as a metaphor from a crux or finger-post at a bivium or 
bifurcation of a road.  Boyle and Newton used the phrase experimentum crucis.  These give ‘crucial 
instance’, ‘crucial experiment’, whence the usage has been extended.”). 
99. See supra notes 23–24 and accompanying text. 
100. James Madison, Speech in Congress Proposing Constitutional Amendments (June 8, 
1789), in JAMES MADISON, WRITINGS, supra note 32, at 437, 447 (emphasis added). 
101. In addition, Madison responded to the objection that the existence of state bills of rights 
made a federal bill of rights unnecessary: 
  I admit the force of this observation, but I do not look upon it to be conclusive.  In 
the first place, it is too uncertain ground to leave this provision upon, if a provision is 
at all necessary to secure rights so important as many of those I have mentioned are 
conceived to be, by the public in general, as well as those in particular who opposed 
the adoption of this constitution.  Beside some states have no bills of rights, there are 
others provided with very defective ones, and there are others whose bills of rights are 
not only defective, but absolutely improper; instead of securing some in the full extent 
which republican principles would require, they limit them too much to agree with the 
common ideas of liberty. 
Id. at 448. 
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The second Federalist objection to a bill of rights was that it would be 
dangerous—or, as Madison stated in his speech, 
[T]hat, by enumerating particular exceptions to the grant of power, it 
would disparage those rights which were not placed in that 
enumeration, and it might follow, by implication, that those rights 
which were not singled out, were intended to be assigned into the 
hands of the general government, and were consequently insecure.102
Characterizing this objection as “one of the most plausible arguments I 
have ever heard urged against the admission of a bill of rights into this 
system.”103  Madison then makes the following crucial assertion: “[B]ut, I 
conceive, that may be guarded against.  I have attempted it, as gentlemen 
may see by turning to the last clause of the 4th resolution.”104  The “last 
clause of the 4th resolution” to which Madison referred was, by all accounts, 
the precursor of the Ninth Amendment that read (as was previously quoted): 
The exceptions here or elsewhere in the constitution, made in favor of 
particular rights, shall not be so construed as to diminish the just 
importance of other rights retained by the people; or as to enlarge the 
powers delegated by the constitution; but either as actual limitations of 
such powers, or as inserted merely for greater caution.105
All by itself, Madison’s characterization of the problem for which the 
Ninth Amendment was his solution substantially undercuts Russell Caplan’s 
thesis that the Ninth Amendment was added to address the concerns of 
Antifederalists that the Constitution would supplant state law rights.  
According to Madison, the Ninth Amendment was formulated specifically to 
respond to the completely different objection by Federalists to adding a bill 
of rights, which Antifederalists were themselves advocating over Federalist 
objections.  But there is another more subtle implication of Madison’s 
argument.
Madison first emphasizes the need for enumerating rights to limit the 
means by which the enumerated powers are exercised, especially under the 
Necessary and Proper Clause.  He then adds the Ninth Amendment to avoid 
any implication that those rights that were not enumerated were surrendered 
up to the general government and were consequently insecure.  Madison’s 
reasons for enumerating rights, coupled with his explanation for the Ninth 
Amendment, strongly suggest the unenumerated rights must likewise limit 
the means by which federal powers are exercised.  Otherwise, the failure to 
include them expressly in the Constitution would certainly suggest that they 
had been surrendered up to the general government and were therefore 
102. Id. at 448–49. 
103. Id. at 449. 
104. Id.
105. Id. at 443 (emphasis added).  I emphasize here the portion of this proposal that clearly 
connects it with the final version of the Amendment.  We shall consider the other language in the 
proposal in due time. 
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insecure, which would serve to deny or disparage them.  This suggestion is 
borne out, as we shall see, by Madison’s actual use of the Ninth Amendment 
in his Bank Speech to the First Congress when arguing against a 
latitudinarian interpretation of the enumerated powers and, in particular, the 
Necessary and Proper Clause.106
Madison’s stated reason for formulating the Ninth Amendment, coupled 
with his own later usage, undercuts Raoul Berger’s contention107 that the 
following passage of Madison’s Bill of Rights speech proves that 
unenumerated rights are not to be judicially protected: 
If they are incorporated into the constitution, independent tribunals of 
justice will consider themselves in a peculiar manner the guardians of 
those rights; they will be an impenetrable bulwark against every 
assumption of power in the legislative or executive; they will be 
naturally led to resist every encroachment upon rights expressly 
stipulated for in the constitution by the declaration of rights.108
 Madison’s prescient statement about the practical importance of 
enumerating rights says nothing about how unenumerated rights ought to be 
treated, much less that they are to be judicially unenforceable.  This claimed 
benefit of enumeration must be read together with Madison’s reasons, of-
fered just moments earlier, for including the Ninth Amendment—in 
particular his denial that “those rights which were not singled out, were in-
tended to be assigned into the hands of the general government, and were 
consequently insecure.”109  Because Berger’s reading of the Ninth 
Amendment would have precisely this effect, we cannot attribute his 
interpretation to Madison based solely on an unstated negative inference 
from his reference to “rights expressly stipulated for.”  And this statement by 
Madison is the only evidence of which I am aware from the founding that 
even remotely supports treating unenumerated rights differently from those 
that were enumerated. 
Finally, because the enumerated rights were individual in nature, one 
may also reasonably conclude that so too would be the unenumerated rights 
retained by the people.  For it was the enumeration of “certain” individual
rights that might lead to a construction that “other” comparable rights were 
surrendered up to the general government and were consequently insecure.  
But this conclusion need not rest solely on inference.  It is also supported by 
how the Federalists formulated their argument that enumerating any rights 
106. See infra notes 226–29 and accompanying text. 
107. See Raoul Berger, The Ninth Amendment, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 9 (1980) (suggesting 
that because unenumerated rights are not “embodied in the Constitution,” suits brought to vindicate 
such rights cannot arise under the Constitution and thus are not within the jurisdiction of Article III 
courts).
108. James Madison, Speech in Congress Proposing Constitutional Amendments (June 8, 
1789), in JAMES MADISON, WRITINGS, supra note 32, at 437, 449 (emphasis added). 
109. Id. at 448–49. 
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would be dangerous.  The precise nature of their objection favors some mod-
els of the Ninth Amendment and disfavors others. 
B. The Federalist Objection to the Danger of a Bill of Rights 
In a speech, widely discussed at the time, James Wilson defended the 
proposed Constitution against those who complained about the absence of a 
bill of rights.  For Wilson, it was the impracticality of identifying all the 
rights that survive the delegation of powers to Congress that was the source 
of danger: 
All the political writers, from Grotius and Puffendorf down to Vattel,
have treated on this subject; but in no one of those books, nor in the 
aggregate of them all, can you find a complete enumeration of rights 
appertaining to the people as men and as citizens. . . .  Enumerate all 
the rights of men!  I am sure, sir, that no gentleman in the late 
Convention would have attempted such a thing.110
Before the Pennsylvania ratification convention, Wilson clarified the 
danger still further: 
In all societies, there are many powers and rights, which cannot be 
particularly enumerated.  A bill of rights annexed to a constitution is 
an enumeration of the powers reserved.  If we attempt an enumeration, 
everything that is not enumerated is presumed to be given.  The 
consequence is, that an imperfect enumeration would throw all 
implied power into the scale of the government; and the rights of the 
people would be rendered incomplete.111
The same danger was warned against by Charles Pinckney in the South 
Carolina House of Representatives: 
[W]e had no bill of rights inserted in our Constitution; for, as we 
might perhaps have omitted the enumeration of some of our rights, it 
might hereafter be said we had delegated to the general government a 
power to take away such of our rights as we had not 
enumerated . . . .112
Then there is the even more colorful explanation of the danger by future 
Supreme Court Justice James Iredell to the North Carolina ratification 
convention:
110. The Debates in the Convention of the State of Pennsylvania on the Adoption of the Federal 
Constitution (Dec. 4, 1781), in 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE 
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 415, 454 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1907) [hereinafter 
ELLIOT’S DEBATES] (remarks of James Wilson). 
111. The Pennsylvania Convention (Nov. 28, 1787), in 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE 
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 378, 388 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1976) (remarks of James 
Wilson). 
112. Debates in the Legislature and in Convention of the State of South Carolina, on the 
Adoption of the Federal Constitution (Jan. 18, 1788), in 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 110, at 
253, 316 (remarks of Charles Pinckney). 
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[I]t would be not only useless, but dangerous, to enumerate a number 
of rights which are not intended to be given up; because it would be 
implying, in the strongest manner, that every right not included in the 
exception might be impaired by the government without usurpation; 
and it would be impossible to enumerate every one.  Let any one make 
what collection or enumeration of rights he pleases, I will immediately 
mention twenty or thirty more rights not contained in it.113
Given that Madison’s Bill of Rights speech to the House directly 
connects his proposed precursor to the Ninth Amendment to this specific 
Federalist concern about adding a bill of rights, what does this concern tell us 
about the merits or demerits of the five models?  First, none of these protests 
make any direct connection to state law rights, or the rights of the people in 
their respective states.  Although such rights might well have been included 
among the impossible-to-enumerate rights retained by the people, these 
quotes fail to reveal any hint that the retained rights are limited to state con-
stitutional or common law rights.  Therefore, while these quotes do not 
directly contradict the state law rights model, they offer scant support for it. 
Second, these quotes undercut the residual rights model of the Ninth 
Amendment, according to which the rights of the people are defined 
residually by what remains after the delegation of federal powers and these 
rights play no role whatsoever in the definition or limitation of those powers.  
The thrust of these Federalist objections is that the people retain myriad 
rights that may not, in Iredell’s words, “be impaired” by Congress “without 
usurpation.”114  Given that the Federalists were arguing at this juncture 
against any enumeration in the constitution of certain rights, the then-
unenumerated rights retained by the people to which they referred included 
the natural rights of speech, press, assembly and to keep and bear arms. 
Federalists were contending that these rights and all others were best 
protected by leaving them unenumerated.  That these rights eventually came 
to be enumerated did not, therefore, add to their status as rights that may not 
“be impaired by the government without usurpation.”115  They had this status 
for the two years after the adoption of the Constitution, and before the ratifi-
cation of the First and Second Amendments.  All other rights retained by the 
people to which Wilson, Pinckney, and Iredell referred, therefore, retained 
their power-constraining status after the Ninth Amendment that they held 
before, and this was the very same status as the rights of speech, press, and 
assembly. 
Indeed, preventing any “implication, that those rights which were not 
singled out, were intended to be assigned into the hands of the general 
113. Debates in the Convention of the State of North Carolina, on the Adoption of the Federal 
Constitution (July 29, 1788), in 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 110, at 1, 167 (remarks of James 
Iredell). 
114. Id.
115. Id. 
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government, and were consequently insecure” was the express purpose 
offered by Madison for adding the provision that eventually became the 
Ninth Amendment.116  In other words, enumerating a right did not somehow 
elevate its legal status and thereby diminish the just importance, or deny or 
disparage, the other rights not enumerated.  I know of not a single figure 
from the Founding who asserted clearly that enumerated rights would or did 
hold an enhanced legal status that unenumerated rights lacked.117  (And, as 
discussed above,118 Madison’s reference in his Bill of Rights speech to the 
judicial protection of “rights expressly stipulated for” makes no mention of 
the protection afforded by unenumerated rights that are not, according to the 
Ninth Amendment, to be denied or disparaged.) 
Therefore, the precise nature of this Federalist objection constitutes key 
evidence strongly supporting the conclusion that the rights retained by the 
people were neither state law rights that Congress could freely restrict under 
the Supremacy Clause nor whatever rights were left over after the delegation 
of powers, the scope of which was defined solely by the delegation itself.  
The Bill of Rights did not change the legal status of the previously unenu-
merated rights.  The “enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights” did 
not make previously unenforceable natural rights enforceable; they were en-
forceable all along.  This entails that those rights that remained 
unenumerated remained as enforceable as those singled out for enumeration. 
What about the individual and collective natural rights models?  While 
these quotes do not definitively establish the precise nature of the rights to 
which the speakers were referring, they do offer some hints.  For example, in 
Wilson’s speech, he refers to “rights appertaining to the people as men and as 
citizens” and “the rights of men.”119  The former formulation’s reference to 
“rights appertaining to the people as men” seems clearly to evoke individual 
natural rights—a subject on which Wilson lectured at the University of 
Pennsylvania.120
“Government, in my humble opinion,” wrote Wilson in his published 
lectures, “should be formed to secure and to enlarge the exercise of the 
natural rights of its members; and every government, which has not this in 
116. James Madison, Speech in Congress Proposing Constitutional Amendments (June 8, 
1789), in JAMES MADISON, WRITINGS, supra note 32, at 437, 448–49 (emphasis added). 
117. This is not to claim, however, that attitudes about the judicial protection of either 
enumerated or unenumerated rights were well articulated.  For evidence that judicial nullification of 
unconstitutional laws was widely accepted, however, and was included in the original meaning of 
the “judicial power,” see Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Judicial Power, 12 SUP.
CT. ECON. REV. 115 (2004) and Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, The Origins of Judicial 
Review, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 887 (2003). 
118. See supra notes 108–09 and accompanying text. 
119. The Debates in the Convention of the State of Pennsylvania on the Adoption of the Federal 
Constitution (Dec. 4, 1787), in 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 110, at 415, 454 (remarks of James 
Wilson). 
120. See James Wilson, Of the Natural Rights of Individuals, in 2 THE WORKS OF JAMES
WILSON 585 (Robert G. McCloskey ed., 1967). 
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view, as its principal object, is not a government of the legitimate kind.”121
Nor for Wilson were these mere “theoretical” or “philosophical” rights with 
no enforceable bite: 
I go farther; and now proceed to show, that in peculiar instances, in 
which those rights can receive neither protection nor reparation from 
civil government, they are, notwithstanding its institution, entitled still 
to that defence, and to those methods of recovery, which are justified 
and demanded in a state of nature.   
  The defence of one’s self, justly called the primary law of nature, is 
not, nor can it be abrogated by any regulation of municipal law.122
True, in his speech Wilson refers as well to the “rights appertaining to 
the people . . . as citizens,” but even here this seems to evoke individual 
political rights, as opposed to some collective right of the people as a 
whole.123  At most, it suggests that both individual and collective rights were 
retained by the people. 
Similarly suggestive of individual natural rights is Iredell’s challenge: 
“Let any one make what collection or enumeration of rights he pleases, I will 
immediately mention twenty or thirty more rights not contained in it.”124  He 
is obviously not talking about some “core” or primary right of the people 
collectively to alter and abolish their government or a singular right of the 
people to govern themselves in their states.  Contrary to the arguments of the 
Federalists, these two rights would be easy to enumerate. 
Indeed, if the Ninth Amendment was meant to protect only one or both 
of these “collective” rights to be exercised collectively, it would have been 
relatively simple to enumerate them in the Bill of Rights!  Yet, Iredell never-
theless emphasizes the impossibility of such an enumeration and the literally 
limitless nature of these retained rights.  No matter how long a list anyone 
might propose, he could name twenty or thirty more.  Of what sort of rights 
could he possibly have been thinking?  Because it suggests an answer to this 
question, I consider the next key piece of evidence outside its chronological 
appearance.
C. The Sedgwick–Benson–Page Exchange in the First Congress 
Before considering the evidence provided by the amendments proposed 
by state ratification conventions and the drafting history of the Ninth 
121. Id. at 592. 
122. Id. at 609 (citations omitted).  Wilson’s lectures also undermine the claim that, by the time 
of the Constitution, Americans had lost their Lockean and revolutionary ardor for natural rights in 
favor of a more conservative Blackstonian positivism that favored legislative supremacy. 
123. The Debates in the Convention of the State of Pennsylvania, on the Adoption of the 
Federal Constitution (Dec. 4, 1787), in 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 110, at 415, 454 (remarks 
of James Wilson). 
124. Debates in the Convention of the State of North Carolina, on the Adoption of the Federal 
Constitution (July 29, 1788), in 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 110, at 1, 167 (remarks of James 
Iredell). 
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Amendment itself, it is worth considering an exchange that took place on the 
floor of Congress during the debate over what eventually became the First 
Amendment.  For this exchange provides an explanation of how Iredell could 
claim that the rights retained by the people were effectively unenumerable. 
During the debate on the proposed inclusion of the right of assembly in 
what eventually became the First Amendment (but was originally proposed 
to the states as the third amendment), Representative Theodore Sedgwick 
objected on the grounds that “it is a self-evident, unalienable right which the 
people possess; it is certainly a thing that never would be called in question; 
it is derogatory to the dignity of the House to descend to such minutiæ.”125
Notice that Sedgwick identifies the right of assembly as an “unalienable 
right,” which is terminology that is used to describe certain natural rights. 
This inference is reinforced by the reply to Sedgwick’s objection by 
Representative Egbert Benson: “The committee who framed this report 
proceeded on the principle that these rights belonged to the people; they 
conceived them to be inherent; and all that they meant to provide against was 
their being infringed by the Government.”126  That “inherent” rights was a 
synonym for natural rights can be seen in Sedgwick’s next response to 
Benson:
[I]f the committee were governed by that general principle, they might 
have gone into a very lengthy enumeration of rights; they might have 
declared that a man should have a right to wear his hat if he pleased; 
that he might get up when he pleased, and go to bed when he thought 
proper . . . .127
Both examples of “inherent,” “self-evident,” and “unalienable” rights 
offered by Sedgwick could only be described as personal and individual.  His 
examples of these types of rights well illustrate how Iredell could boast that, 
for every list of rights, no matter how long, he could name twenty or thirty 
more. 
Representative John Page’s reply to Sedgwick defending the inclusion 
of the right of assembly in the Bill of Rights reinforced the fact that 
Sedgwick’s examples of personal individual “inherent” liberty rights were on 
a par with the right of assembly: 
[L]et me observe to him that such rights have been opposed, and a 
man has been obliged to pull off his hat when he appeared before the 
face of authority; people have also been prevented from assembling 
together on their lawful occasions, therefore it is well to guard against 
such stretches of authority, by inserting the privilege in the declaration 
of rights.128
125. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 759 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of Rep. Sedgwick, Aug. 15, 
1789).
126. Id. (statement of Rep. Benson). 
127. Id. at 759–60 (statement of Rep. Sedgwick). 
128. Id. at 760 (statement of Rep. Page). 
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Sedgwick’s original objection was that the Constitution should not be 
cluttered with a potentially endless list of trifling rights129 that “never would 
be called in[to] question”130 and were not “intended to be infringed.”131  In a 
very real sense, he considered the right of assembly to be too fundamental 
(and unlikely to be infringed) to justify inclusion in a bill of rights.  As re-
vealed by his two examples, Sedgwick’s argument assumes that the “self-
evident, unalienable,” inherent and unenumerated rights retained by the peo-
ple are personal liberty rights that are unenumerable because the human 
imagination is limitless.  All the actions one might freely take with what is 
rightfully his or hers can never be specified or reduced to a list.  It includes 
the right to wear a hat, to get up when one pleases and go to bed when one 
thinks proper, to scratch one’s nose when it itches (and even when it 
doesn’t), to eat steak when one has a taste for it, or to take a sip of Diet 
Mountain Dew when one is thirsty.  Make any list of liberty rights you care 
to, and one can always add twenty or thirty more. 
In choosing among the proposed models of the Ninth Amendment, this 
exchange is telling, especially when combined with the Federalist objection 
to enumerating any rights, which is directly linked to Madison’s stated 
rationale for the Ninth Amendment.  None of the three congressmen make 
any reference to state constitutional or common law rights (though, of course, 
the right to wear a hat and to go to bed when one thinks proper is protected 
by the common law governing person and property).  The state law rights 
model does not fit well with this exchange, an exchange that goes 
unmentioned in Caplan’s article. 
Nor does it square with the residual rights model.  Sedgwick and Page 
both are referring to specific identifiable rights.  They are not referring to 
anything that might simply be left over after an enumeration of powers.  And 
Page’s defense of the right of assembly suggests that this right would restrict 
the exercise of delegated powers.  Indeed, his reply even intimates that the 
inherent, though unenumerated, rights to wear one’s hat and go to bed when 
one thinks proper could also restrict the proper exercise of delegated 
powers—though he does not propose adding them to the Constitution. 
This exchange stands in sharp contrast with the collective rights model.  
Here the congressmen are clearly talking about personal individual rights, 
and they do so while invoking the supposedly collective term “the people.”  
Sedgwick specifically characterizes the right of assembly as “a self-evident, 
unalienable right which the people possess,” to which he adds the personal 
individual inherent rights to wear a hat and go to bed when one thinks 
129. For a discussion of the founding generation’s view of “trivial rights,” see Philip A. 
Hamburger, Trivial Rights, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (1994). 
130. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 759 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of Rep. Sedgwick, Aug. 15, 
1789).
131. Id. at 760. 
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proper.132  Page then underscores the equivalence of these personal rights 
with that of the right of assembly.133  At least in this exchange, all these per-
sonal individual rights were thought to appertain to “the people.”  Page even 
uses the term “people” here to refer to the plural of individual persons, rather 
than to some mystical corporate body. 
To recap: We have now connected Madison’s explanation of the 
purpose of the Ninth Amendment to Federalist objections that a bill of rights 
would be dangerous.  To appreciate the nature of that danger, we need to ap-
preciate that Wilson and the others were referring to individual natural rights.  
To see why an enumeration of natural rights must inevitably be dangerously 
incomplete, we examined the debate in the House about the meaning of in-
herent rights.  But the evidence that the rights “retained by the people” in the 
Ninth Amendment was a reference to inherent or natural individual rights 
does not end here.  Two additional pieces of evidence suggest the same con-
clusion and return us to the legislative history leading up to the Ninth 
Amendment’s enactment into law. 
D. Madison’s Notes for His Bill of Rights Speech 
According to the individual natural rights model of the Ninth 
Amendment, the rights retained by the people refer to natural rights, and the 
purpose of the Amendment is to ensure that these rights are treated on a par 
with the natural rights that happen to have been expressly included in the Bill 
of Rights.  This model, then, depends on the claim that at least some of the 
rights in the Bill of Rights were natural, inherent, or retained rights, as was 
evidenced by the exchange in the House between Representatives Benson, 
Sedgwick, and Page. 
What of Madison’s Bill of Rights speech to the House?  In his speech, 
Madison describes his proposed amendments as including three categories of 
rights:
In some instances they assert [1] those rights which are exercised by 
the people in forming and establishing a plan of government.  In other 
instances, they specify [2] those rights which are retained when
particular powers are given up to be exercised by the legislature.  In 
other instances, they specify [3] positive rights, which may seem to 
result from the nature of the compact. Trial by jury cannot be 
considered as a natural right, but a right resulting from the social 
compact which regulates the action of the community, but is as 
essential to secure the liberty of the people as any one of the pre-
existent rights of nature.134
132. Id. at 759–60. 
133. Id. at 760 (statement of Rep. Page). 
134. James Madison, Speech in Congress Proposing Constitutional Amendments (June 8, 
1789), in JAMES MADISON, WRITINGS, supra note 32, at 437, 445–46 (emphasis added).  I have 
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By distinguishing the “positive rights” in the third category from “natural 
right[s]” or the “pre-existent rights of nature,” this passage strongly suggests 
that the second category of “rights which are retained” are indeed natural 
rights.
Confirmation of this suggestion, along with an example of the rights to 
which Madison was referring as those “which are retained,” is provided by 
his notes for this speech in which the following appears: 
Contents of Bill of Rhts. 
1.  assertion of primitive equality &c. 
2.  do. of rights exerted in formg. of Govts. 
3.  natural rights retained as speach [illegible]. 
4.  positive rights resultg. as trial by jury. 
5.  Doctrinl. artics vs. Depts. distinct electn. 
6.  moral precepts for the administrn. & natl. character—as justice—
economy—&c.135
These notes provide critical evidence that the other rights “retained by 
the people” to which Madison’s proposal and the final version of the Ninth 
Amendment refer are indeed inherent or natural rights.  For Madison himself 
writes in his own hand the term “natural rights retained.”  These natural re-
tained rights are to be distinguished from “positive rights” that result from 
the enactment of the Constitution and its amendments.  The Bill of Rights is 
not the source of these natural rights, but they are added to the text of the 
Constitution, as his proposal reads, “for greater caution.”136  In contrast, the 
positive rights that result from the compact or Constitution provide “actual 
limitations of such powers”137 as are delegated to Congress. 
Crucially, these natural rights retained “when particular powers are 
given up to be exercised by the legislature”138 include the individual
enumerated right of freedom of speech.139  In both his notes and speech, such 
rights are explicitly distinguished by Madison from the political “rights 
inserted the numbers in brackets to demarcate the three types of rights that were included in the 
enumeration.
135. Madison’s Notes for Amendments Speech 1789, in 1 THE RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE 
PEOPLE: THE HISTORY AND MEANING OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT 64, 64 (Randy E. Barnett ed., 
1989) [hereinafter Madison’s Notes].  From the published accounts of his speech, Madison did not 
get to all six categories on his list—perhaps because he was going long.  In the margins of his notes 
for his speech, we find the following notation: “watch Time”!  For an image of the notes (showing 
the underlining of “natural rights”), see James Madison, Notes for Speech on Constitutional 
Amendments (June 8, 1789), http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage?collId=mjm&fileName=04/ 
mjm04.db&recNum=319&itemLink=D?mjm:5:./temp/~ammem_pGR4::. 
136. James Madison, Speech in Congress Proposing Constitutional Amendments (June 8, 
1789), in JAMES MADISON, WRITINGS, supra note 32, at 437, 443. 
137. Id.
138. Id. at 445. 
139. In the published reports of his speech (as fully quoted above), Madison gives no examples 
of these rights.  This vital information is provided by his notes. 
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which are exercised by the people in forming and establishing a plan of 
government” that both Akhil Amar and Kurt Lash refer to as “collective” in 
their model.140  When combined with Madison’s explanation of the Ninth 
Amendment that soon follows in his speech, this is excellent evidence that 
the rights retained by the people to which the Ninth Amendment refers are 
individual rights like speech, rather than the political rights he separately 
lists.  For it was the enumeration in the Constitution of such individual rights 
as freedom of speech that threatened to render insecure other comparable 
rights “which were not singled out.”141
I do not wish to make too much of this point.  Because I think that the 
right of the people to establish or alter governments—what Lash calls 
“political” rights—is both an individual and natural right, I see no problem 
with its inclusion among the rights retained by the people to which the Ninth 
Amendment refers.  Nevertheless, this passage of Madison’s speech and 
notes seriously undercuts Akhil Amar’s confident claim—unsupported as it 
is by any evidence—that the “core meaning [of ‘the People’] in the Ninth 
is . . . collective”142 and that “the most obvious and inalienable right underly-
ing the Ninth Amendment is the collective right of We the People to alter or 
abolish government, through the distinctly American device of the constitu-
tional convention.”143  Also undercut by Madison’s speech and notes is 
Amar’s conclusion that “[t]o see the Ninth Amendment, as originally written, 
as a palladium of countermajoritarian individual rights—like privacy—is to 
engage in anachronism.”144
Amar’s accusation of anachronism is further undermined by a different 
portion of Madison’s notes for his Bill of Rights speech.  In the published 
report of his speech, immediately after reading his proposed amendments,
Madison said, “The first of these amendments, relates to what may be called 
a bill of rights . . . .”145  However, his notes for this part of his speech cast 
this statement in a more individualistic light: 
Read the amendments— 
140. See supra notes 68–76 and accompanying text.  I am a bit skeptical that the “collective” 
rights to which Professors Amar and Lash refer were of a different order than the natural individual 
rights.  In a sense, Amar agrees when he tries to treat even individual rights as collective.  AMAR,
supra note 69, at 120.  In contrast, I would treat political rights as individual in nature.  But I will 
not try to establish this point in this Article and, for present purposes, merely assume that political 
rights, such as the right to form and establish governments, are somehow “collective” in nature as 
Amar and Lash contend. 
141. James Madison, Speech in Congress Proposing Constitutional Amendments (June 8, 
1789), in JAMES MADISON, WRITINGS, supra note 32, at 437, 448–49. 
142. AMAR, supra note 69, at 120 (emphasis added). 
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. James Madison, Speech in Congress Proposing Constitutional Amendments (June 8, 
1789), in JAMES MADISON, WRITINGS, supra note 32, at 437, 444. 
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They relate 1st. to private rights—.146
Combining the speech as reportedly delivered with this passage of the 
notes strongly suggests that the “first of these amendments [that] relates to 
what may be called a bill of rights” are “private rights.”147  And the stated 
purpose of the Ninth Amendment is to protect the “other” retained natural 
rights from the inference that they were assigned into the hands of the gen-
eral government and were consequently insecure.  There is no indication 
whatsoever that these other retained natural rights were of a different order 
than the “private” rights to which Madison referred.  Indeed, the most obvi-
ous danger posed by enumerating some private rights is that other private 
rights would be denied or disparaged.  Therefore, it is hardly anachronistic to 
conclude that the unenumerated rights retained by the people were every bit 
as individual and private as the rights that were included on his list. 
Moreover, in a different and much truncated report of his Bill of Rights 
speech in the Gazette of the United States,148 Madison contrasts the powers of 
states—which Kurt Lash sometimes identifies with the collective rights of 
the people149—with that of the natural rights retained by the people: 
It has been observed, that the Constitution does not repeal the State 
bills of rights; to this it may be replied, that some of the States are 
without any—and that articles contained in those that have them, are 
very improper, and infringe upon the rights of human nature, in 
several respects.150
146. Madison’s Notes, supra note 135, at 64 (emphasis added).  There is no “second” that 
follows.  Next in his notes is a different point: “Bill of Rights—useful not essential—fallacy in both 
sides . . . .”  Id.  I have enhanced the positioning of the text by referring directly to the image of 
Madison’s notes.  See supra note 135. 
147. This sentence also suggests that not all the amendments or proposed changes were 
conceived by Madison as “what may be called a bill of rights,” by which is meant a list of particular 
rights.  Other provisions, such as the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, were rules by which 
governmental powers and the enumeration of certain rights were to be construed. 
148. Two additional very brief press reports of Madison’s speech in The Daily Advertiser (June 
9, 1789) and The New-York Daily Gazette (June 9, 1789) offer no details of its content, though the 
former characterizes Madison’s speech as “long and able” while the latter refers to it as “a very 
lengthy discussion.”  THE DAILY ADVERTISER, June 9, 1789, reprinted in 11 DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: 4 MARCH
1789 – 3 MARCH 1791, at 804 (Charlene Bangs Bickford et al. eds., 1992) [hereinafter 11 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS] (stating that Madison’s speech was 
“long and able”); THE N.Y. DAILY GAZETTE, June 9, 1789, reprinted in 11 DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, supra, at 804 (stating that Madison’s speech was “a 
very lengthy discussion”). 
149. Lash, Lost Original Meaning, supra note 10, at 388 (“To those who argued that Congress 
could act for the ‘general welfare’ so long as it did not interfere with the powers of the States, 
Madison responded that chartering a bank ‘would directly interfere with the rights of the States, to 
prohibit as well as to establish banks.’ . . .  It was the collective rights of the people of the several 
states which were threatened by the Bill.”). 
150. GAZETTE OF THE UNITED STATES (Phila.), June 10, 1789, reprinted in 11 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, supra note 148, at 808 (emphasis added).  In the more 
commonly used and far more detailed account, the explicit reference to natural rights is omitted: 
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This passage does not mesh well with the claim that the Ninth 
Amendment, devised by Madison, merely referred to state bills of rights, as 
is contended by the state law rights model.151  Nor is it consistent with the 
residual rights model.152  According to Madison here, natural rights are not 
simply what is left over after a delegation of powers to government.  Instead, 
even constitutional delegations of powers are “improper” when they 
“infringe upon the rights of human nature.”  In this manner, natural rights 
provide a way of evaluating governmental powers, whether express or 
implied. 
By the same token, this passage of Madison’s speech concerning state 
bills of rights sheds light on the original meaning of the Necessary and 
Proper Clause,153 which elsewhere in his speech Madison cites as a reason 
why a bill of rights is needed even with a government of enumerated 
powers.154  In this passage, Madison explicitly contends that a power 
contained in an “article” of a state constitution that infringes upon the rights 
of human nature—which we know also as the rights retained by the people—
is  “improper.”  What is true of a power expressly, though improperly, 
granted to state governments by their constitutions, is surely equally true of a 
claim of implied power under the Necessary and Proper Clause.  Thus, ac-
cording to Madison, laws that violate the retained “rights of nature” are 
improper.  As we shall see, Madison did not hesitate to rely on the rule of 
construction provided by, inter alia, the Ninth Amendment to criticize a 
claim of implied power under what was then derisively known as “the 
Sweeping Clause.”155
Lest there be any methodological confusion, my extensive examination 
of Madison’s Bill of Rights speech, including his notes, is not a reliance on 
his private original intent.  It is instead strong evidence of the public meaning 
of the words used in the Ninth Amendment—a provision which, as we have 
seen, he devised to meet the very public Federalist objections to enumerating 
any rights in a bill of rights.  None of the claims or usages by Madison which 
I have emphasized here were contradicted by anyone else in Congress after 
Beside some states have no bills of rights, there are others provided with very defective 
ones, and there are others whose bills of rights are not only defective, but absolutely 
improper; instead of securing some in the full extent which republican principles would 
require, they limit them too much to agree with the common ideas of liberty. 
THE CONGRESSIONAL REGISTER, June 8, 1789, reprinted in 11 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE 
FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, supra note 148, at 824.  Yet combining the two yields a strong 
association of the “rights of human nature” with the “common ideas of liberty.” 
151. See supra subpart IV(A). 
152. See supra subpart IV(B). 
153. It is not, but ought to have been, among the evidence I compiled and evaluated in Randy 
E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 183 
(2003).
154. James Madison, Speech in Congress Proposing Constitutional Amendments (June 8, 
1789), in JAMES MADISON, WRITINGS, supra note 32, at 437, 447–48. 
155. For a general discussion of this clause, see Lawson & Granger, supra note 26. 
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his speech (though other congressmen did strongly contest the need for a bill 
of rights or whether then was the right time to draft one).  Moreover, 
Madison’s usages and views were shared by others, as evidenced by the 
Sedgwick–Benson–Page exchange (and other evidence yet to be 
discussed).156
Even if Madison’s speech and notes were relevant only to his private 
beliefs, they would still undercut the charge by Akhil Amar that it is 
anachronistic to attribute these views to the founders.  To the contrary, what 
may indeed be anachronistic is some hard distinction between “individual” 
and “collective” rights, a distinction that does not appear explicitly in the 
sources.  The closest to this distinction is Madison’s contention that the first 
portion of the Bill of Rights refers to “private” rights, as contrasted to the 
political rights that are first on his list.  But I must leave the evaluation of this 
possible anachronism to the future. 
E. Roger Sherman’s Draft Bill of Rights 
Madison’s speech is not the only evidence we have that the public 
meaning of rights “retained by the people” is that of natural rights belonging 
to individuals.  Serving with Madison on the Select Committee to draft a bill 
of rights was Roger Sherman, a representative from Connecticut.  In the 
1980s, there was found among Madison’s papers a draft of a bill of rights 
that was eventually attributed to Sherman.157  Sherman’s second amendment 
reads as follows: 
The people have certain natural rights which are retained by them 
when they enter into Society, Such are the rights of Conscience in 
matters of religion; of acquiring property and of pursuing happiness & 
Safety; of Speaking, writing and publishing their Sentiments with 
decency and freedom; of peaceably assembling to consult their 
common good, and of applying to Government by petition or 
remonstrance for redress of grievances.  Of these rights therefore they 
Shall not be deprived by the Government of the united States.158
156. See supra notes 125–31 and accompanying text. 
157. See Scott D. Gerber, Roger Sherman and the Bill of Rights, 28 POLITY 521, 521, 528 
(1996) (describing the draft written by Sherman as a record of the combined effort of members of a 
select committee).  Gerber supplies an itemized comparison of Sherman’s draft with both Madison’s 
proposal and the final versions of the amendments.  Id. at app. B.  He also provides evidence that 
this draft did not represent Sherman’s own view, but more likely was a draft showing how a bill of 
rights could be appended to the end of the Constitution, rather than inserted within as Madison had 
originally proposed.  See id. at 527–28.  Sherman’s sustained opposition to a bill of rights in 
general, and Madison’s draft proposal in particular, has no bearing, however, on the significance of 
Sherman’s draft as evidence of the original meaning of the phrase “rights . . . retained by the 
people.” See id. at 530–31.  This is a good example of how evidence bearing on private original 
intent, e.g., Sherman’s opposition to the proposed amendments, would be wholly irrelevant to 
evidence of original public meaning provided by the words he chose to use in his proposal. 
158. Roger Sherman, Draft of the Bill of Rights, in 1 THE RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE 
351, 351 (Randy E. Barnett ed., 1989) (emphasis added). 
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Like Madison’s notes, this provision explicitly links the term “natural 
rights” with that of rights “retained” by “The people”—all of which appear in 
its first sentence.  And the examples of these rights that follow—which are 
not meant to be exclusive (“Such are”)—include the undeniably individual 
rights of conscience, acquiring property, and pursuing happiness and safety, 
along with the individual rights to speak, write, and publish their sentiments.  
Although the rights to peaceably assemble and petition government could be 
construed as somehow “collective” because exercised in groups, these rights 
can just as well be conceived as belonging to individuals who then band to-
gether to exercise their individual rights in a common cause.  Given that only 
a portion of these rights were enumerated in the Bill of Rights, the Ninth 
Amendment appears designed to protect the others, not enumerated, from 
being ignored or treated in any inferior manner, i.e., denied or disparaged. 
Sherman’s proposal not only strongly supports an individual natural 
rights reading of the words “retained” rights but is also incompatible with 
both the state law rights and residual rights models.  None of these rights to 
which Sherman’s proposal refers are state law rights (though they may well 
have been regulated by state law).  Instead they are “natural rights which are 
retained by [the People] when they enter into Society.”  Nor are these rights 
defined residually by the enumeration of powers.  Instead, they are identified 
by name. 
Sherman’s identification of these natural rights was commonplace.159
Another example of this list of individual private rights can be found in the 
first paragraph of another proposed list of amendments as inscribed in the 
Senate Legislative Journals on September 8, 1789: 
“That there are certain natural rights, of which men, when they form a 
social compact, cannot deprive or divest their posterity, among which 
are the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring, 
possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining 
happiness and safety.”160
159. See Jeff Rosen, Note, Was the Flag Burning Amendment Unconstitutional?, 100 YALE L.J. 
1073, 1075–79 (1991) (stating that commentators agree that the Framers and ratifiers of the Bill of 
Rights believed in natural rights, including the rights of worship, defending life and liberty, 
property, pursuing happiness and safety, assembly, and freedom of speech). 
160. Journal of the First Session of the Senate of the United States, reprinted in 1 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
4 MARCH 1789 – 3 MARCH 1791, at 160 (Linda Grant De Pauw et al. eds., 1972).  This proposal in 
the Senate echoes those made by some states who proposed amendments.  For example, this was 
proposed as the first amendment by the Virginia convention: 
First, That there are certain natural rights of which men, when they form a social 
compact cannot deprive or divest their posterity, among which are the enjoyment of 
life and liberty, with the means of acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and 
pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety. 
Amendments Proposed by the Virginia Convention (June 27, 1788), in THE COMPLETE BILL OF 
RIGHTS, supra note 95, at 636, 636.  New York’s proposal contained similar natural rights 
language: “That the enjoyment of Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness are essential rights 
which every Government ought to respect and preserve.”  Amendments Proposed by the New York 
40 Texas Law Review [Vol. 85:1 
What makes Sherman’s draft particularly significant is its explicit linkage of 
the term “natural rights” with “retained by them”—with “them” referring to 
“the People”—and the individual personal rights it then provides as 
examples. 
To be clear, I do not claim that Sherman’s proposed second amendment 
is a precursor of the Ninth Amendment.  Instead, it shows rather dramatically 
how those in Congress during the drafting process thought of natural rights.  
First, natural rights were individual, personal, or private rights, as evidenced 
by the examples enumerated by Sherman.  Second, at this level of generality, 
those who enter into social compacts cannot deprive or divest their posterity 
of these natural rights regardless of the powers they may delegate to govern-
ment.  They are, in other words, inalienable.161  For all these reasons, 
Sherman’s draft is inconsistent with the state law rights and residual rights 
models, as well as any suggestion that the rights retained by the people were 
exclusively “collective” or “political” in nature. 
F. Proposed Rights and Amendments by State Ratification Conventions 
After a bill of rights was promised by supporters of the Constitution to 
avoid a second constitutional convention, state ratification conventions began 
accompanying their resolutions ratifying the Constitution with lists of rights 
(and various other amendments) they proposed be added after ratification.  
While all Ninth Amendment scholars have discussed these proposals, no one 
has placed greater stress on their precise nature and scope than Kurt Lash.  
Convention (July 26, 1788), in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 95, at 635, 635.  Many 
state constitutions contained similar language as well.  See MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. 1, art. I, 
reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 95, at 637 (“ALL men are born free and 
equal, and have certain natural, essential and unalienable rights; among which may be reckoned the 
right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties; that of acquiring, possessing, and protecting 
property; in fine, that of seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness.”); N.H. CONST. of 1783, 
pt. 1, art. II, reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 95, at 637–38 (“All men have 
certain natural, essential, and inherent rights; among which are—the enjoying and defending life 
and liberty—acquiring, possessing and protecting property—and in a word, of seeking and 
obtaining happiness.”); N.Y. CONST. of 1777, reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra
note 95, at 638 (“We hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created equal; that they 
are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights; that among these are, Life, Liberty 
and the Pursuit of Happiness . . . .”); PA. CONST. of 1776, ch. I, art. I, reprinted in THE COMPLETE
BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 95, at 639 (“THAT all men are born equally free and independent, and 
have certain natural, inherent and unalienable rights, amongst which are, the enjoying and defending 
life and liberty, acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness 
and safety.”); VT. CONST. of 1777, ch. I, art. I, reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra
note 95, at 640 (“That all Men are born equally free and independent, and have certain natural, 
inherent and unalienable Rights, amongst which are the enjoying and defending Life and Liberty; 
acquiring, possessing and protecting Property, and pursuing and obtaining Happiness and Safety.”). 
161. Cf. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (“We hold these truths to 
be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain 
unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.”). 
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Professor Lash traces the Ninth Amendment to proposals made by some rati-
fication conventions concerning how the Constitution was to be construed.162
He begins with the proposal made by New York: 
[T]hat every Power, Jurisdiction and Right, which is not by the said 
Constitution clearly delegated to the Congress of the United States, or 
the departments of the Government thereof, remains to the People of 
the several States, or to their respective State Governments to whom 
they may have granted the same;  
And that those Clauses in the said Constitution, which declare, that 
Congress shall not have or exercise certain Powers, do not imply that 
Congress is entitled to any Powers not given by the said Constitution; 
but such Clauses are to be construed either as exceptions to certain 
specified Powers, or as inserted merely for greater Caution.163
The first paragraph concerns the reservation to the states of all powers 
not “delegated” to Congress—as eventually did the Tenth Amendment.  The 
second paragraph concerns how clauses limiting the powers of Congress 
should “be construed,” which assists us, Lash contends, in interpreting the 
Ninth Amendment. 
He finds a similar parallelism in the proposals from Virginia and North 
Carolina.  Here are two of Virginia’s proposals: 
First, That each State in the Union shall respectively retain every 
power, jurisdiction and right which is not by this Constitution 
delegated to the Congress of the United States or to the departments of 
the Foederal Government. 
. . . . 
Seventeeth [sic], That those clauses which declare that Congress shall 
not exercise certain powers be not interpreted in any manner 
whatsoever to extend the powers of Congress.  But that they may be 
construed either as making exceptions to the specified powers where 
this shall be the case, or otherwise as inserted merely for greater 
caution.164
162. Lash, Lost Original Meaning, supra note 10, at 360. 
163. Amendments Proposed by the New York Convention (July 26, 1788), in CREATING THE 
BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 33, at 21, 21–22 (emphasis added). 
164. Amendments Proposed by the Virginia Convention (June 27, 1788), in THE COMPLETE 
BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 95, at 675, 675. 
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North Carolina’s identical proposal165 appears to have been merely 
copied from Virginia’s (just as New Hampshire copied the proposals of 
Massachusetts166).  As William Davie of North Carolina wrote James 
Madison two days after Madison’s Bill of Rights speech: “That farrago of 
amendments borrowed from Virginia is by no means to be considered as the 
sense of this country; they were proposed amidst the violence and confusion 
of party heat, at a critical moment in our Convention, and adopted by the op-
position without one moment’s consideration.”167  North Carolina’s 1788 
ratification convention adopted the Virginia proposals without ratifying the 
Constitution; it did not reconvene to actually ratify the Constitution until af-
ter Madison’s Bill of Rights speech and after Congress had finalized the 
proposed amendments and referred them to the states for ratification.168
Lash correctly observes that both forms of proposed amendments 
“reflect dual strategies for controlling the expansion of federal power.  The 
primary strategy was to declare the principle of enumerated federal power.  
A secondary strategy was to control the interpretation of enumerated federal 
power.”169  After identifying the dual strategy for limiting federal power 
165. The North Carolina proposal stated: 
  I.  That each state in the union shall, respectively, retain every power, jurisdiction 
and right, which is not by this constitution delegated to the Congress of the United 
States, or to the departments of the Federal Government. 
  . . . . 
  XVIII.  That those clauses which declare that Congress shall not exercise certain 
powers, be not interpreted in any manner whatsoever to extend the powers of 
Congress; but that they be construed either as making exceptions to the specified 
powers where this shall be the case, or otherwise, as inserted merely for greater 
caution.
Amendments Proposed by the North Carolina Convention (Aug. 1, 1788), in THE COMPLETE BILL 
OF RIGHTS, supra note 95, at 674, 674–75. 
166. Amendments Proposed by the Massachusetts Convention (Feb. 6, 1788), in THE
COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 95, at 674, 674 (“First, That it be Explicitly declared that 
all Powers not expressly delegated by the aforesaid Constitution are reserved to the several States to 
be by them exercised.”); Amendments Proposed by the New Hampshire Convention (June 21, 
1788), in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 95, at 674, 674 (“First that it be Explicitly 
declared that all Powers not expressly & particularly Delegated by the aforesaid Constitution are 
reserved to the several States to be, by them Exercised.”). 
167. Letter from William R. Davie to James Madison (June 10, 1789), in 5 DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 1786–1870, at 176, 176–77 
(U.S. Dep’t of State ed., 1905) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION].  
Davie, a supporter of ratification, apparently wrote Madison to elicit a progress report on the bill of 
rights.  See id. at 177 (“I am extremely anxious to know the progress of this delicate and interesting 
business . . . [which] might perhaps be of some consequence to this country . . . .”). 
168. See id. at 176 (explaining that the convention would meet in November to adopt the 
Constitution and amendments). 
169. Lash, Lost Original Meaning, supra note 10, at 358.  Lash sees a difference between the 
Virginia and North Carolina proposals and those by New York that I confess I cannot discern.  
“New York’s declarations reflect the primary strategy: The enumeration of rights must not suggest a 
government of unenumerated power.  Proposals like those submitted by North Carolina and 
Virginia highlight the second, complementary strategy of controlling the interpreted scope of 
enumerated power.”  Id.  To my eyes, New York’s proposals embody the same dual strategy that 
Lash identifies in Virginia and North Carolina. 
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found in these proposals, Lash explains why a simple reservation of rights 
not delegated was thought to be inadequate to limiting federal power: 
The problem was, as the Antifederalists pointed out, merely declaring 
the principle of enumerated powers by itself did not control the 
interpreted scope of federal power.  There being no fixed rules of 
interpretation for the courts to follow, judicial construction of enumer-
ated powers had no limit.  Worse, adding a Bill of Rights might imply 
that the only limits to broad readings of federal power were those spe-
cific limits listed in Article I and the Bill of Rights.  In such a 
situation, states still would retain all nondelegated powers, but those 
powers would be few (if any), with the federal government having oc-
cupied the field.  Preventing this from coming to pass required the 
adoption of two provisions.  One declaring the principle of enumerated 
power; the second denying the implied expansion of federal power due 
to the addition of specific rights.170
He then notes other state conventions that submitted proposals to 
address the construction of federal powers.  In addition to proposing that 
Congress “shall not exercise any powers whatever, but such as are expressly 
given to that body by the Constitution,” Pennsylvania also proposed prohib-
iting the executive and judicial branches from assuming any “authority, 
power, or jurisdiction” under any “pretence of construction or fiction.”171
South Carolina declared that “no section or paragraph of the said 
Constitution warrants a construction that the states do not retain every power 
not expressly relinquished . . . .”172
Lash summarizes this two-track approach of the states as follows: 
 All of these declarations and proposals share a common dual 
approach to controlling federal power.  First, a declaration must be 
added that expressly declares the federal government has limited enu-
merated powers.  All powers, jurisdiction, and rights not delegated to 
the federal government were to be retained by the states.  Second, the 
enumeration of certain rights was not to be construed in any manner 
that expanded the scope of enumerated federal power.  Both the decla-
rations and the rules of construction focused on controlling the 
expansion of federal power and reserving all nondelegated powers and
rights to the states.173
But this summary greatly overstates the commonality of these 
proposals.174  True, there certainly appears to have developed a dual strategy 
170. Id. at 359. 
171. Amendments Proposed by the Pennsylvania Convention (Sept. 3, 1788), in THE
COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 95, at 648, 648. 
172. Ratification of the Constitution by the Convention of the State of South Carolina (May 23, 
1788), in 1 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 110, at 325, 325. 
173. Lash, Lost Original Meaning, supra note 10, at 358 (first two emphases added). 
174. One page later, Lash offers a more accurate summary: “First, they declared that the federal 
government had limited enumerated powers, with all nondelegated power, jurisdiction, and rights 
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that mirrors the Tenth and Ninth Amendments: (a) emphasize the delegated 
powers scheme as did the Tenth, and (b) propose some rule of construction 
as did the Ninth.  But the rule of construction being recommended varied 
substantially among these proposals, and this is precisely what is at issue 
when interpreting the Ninth. 
To begin with, there is a major difference between the Virginia and 
New York proposed rules of construction.  Virginia’s proposal speaks of the 
retention of “every power, jurisdiction and right” in “each State in the 
Union.”175  In contrast, New York’s speaks of “every Power, Jurisdiction and 
Right” remaining in “the People of the several States, or to their respective 
State Governments to whom they may have granted the same.”176  In this 
manner, New York’s proposal distinguishes between “the People” and “State 
Governments” and reserves rights to the people, as opposed to Virginia’s 
which refers only to reserving rights to the states. 
In the passage quoted above, Lash strongly implies that when the Ninth 
Amendment speaks of “rights” that are “retained by the people,” this is a 
reference to the “powers, jurisdiction, and rights . . . retained by the states.”
Although the Virginia version does bear this construction, New York’s does 
not.  According to New York, all power, jurisdiction, and rights are retained 
by the people (who may then allocate powers to their state governments).  
Moreover, Pennsylvania’s proposed rule of construction did not apply to the 
Congress at all, but only to the executive and judicial branches of the federal 
government.177  South Carolina’s proposed rule of construction refers only to 
“powers” not rights.178
To round out the survey, while both the Massachusetts and the identical 
New Hampshire recommendations contain a Tenth Amendment-like 
reference to delegated powers,179 neither contains any guide to construing the 
power of Congress analogous to the Ninth Amendment.180  Rhode Island 
accompanied its ratification with a recommended revision similar to New 
retained by the states.  Second, the states proposed a rule of construction that preserved the retained 
powers of the states by preventing the constructive expansion of federal power.”  Id. at 359–60. 
175. See supra note 164 and accompanying text (emphasis added). 
176. See supra note 163 and accompanying text (emphasis added). 
177. Amendments Proposed by the Pennsylvania Convention (Sept. 3, 1788), in THE
COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 95, at 648, 648. 
178. Ratification of the Constitution by the Convention of the State of South Carolina (May 23, 
1788), in 1 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 110, at 325, 325. 
179. Compare Amendments Proposed by the Massachusetts Convention (Feb. 6, 1788), in THE 
COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 95, at 674, 674 (“That it be explicitly declared that all 
Powers not expressly delegated by the aforesaid Constitution are reserved to the several States to be 
by them exercised.”), with Amendments Proposed by the New Hampshire Convention (June 21, 
1788), in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 95, at 674, 674 (same). 
180. See THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 95, at 635–36 (listing the proposals 
addressing the Ninth Amendment from the state conventions, which included proposals from New 
York, North Carolina, and Virginia, but not from Massachusetts or New Hampshire). 
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York’s, but only ratified the Constitution nearly a year after the Bill of Rights 
had been drafted by Congress and submitted to the states for ratification.181
So in the end, Lash’s contention that the rule of construction proposed 
by the state ratification conventions reserved rights (as distinct from powers) 
to the several states (as distinct from the people) is limited to the proposal by 
Virginia, which was copied verbatim by North Carolina.  Though Lash’s 
claim that “[w]hen James Madison drafted the Bill of Rights, he referred to 
and relied upon these proposals”182 is likely correct,183 Madison had a diver-
sity of proposals from which to draw inspiration. 
Reviewing Madison’s actual proposal to Congress shows that, while he 
does indeed appear to be borrowing from those offered by the states, he 
deviated markedly from Virginia’s: 
 The exceptions here or elsewhere in the constitution, made in favor 
of particular rights, shall not be so construed as to diminish the just 
importance of other rights retained by the people; or as to enlarge the 
powers delegated by the constitution; but either as actual limitations of 
such powers, or as inserted merely for greater caution.184
Here, like New York, Madison refers only to the “rights retained by the 
people.”  He does not refer, as does Virginia, to rights reserved or retained by 
the states—he does not refer to “the states” at all.  True, New York’s pro-
posal also refers to powers retained by the people, but the Tenth Amendment 
was eventually revised to include this as well—to the consternation of some 
in Virginia, as will be discussed below.185  Of course the actual Ninth 
Amendment as enacted deviates still further from those aspects of the state 
recommendations that Madison’s original proposal resembles.  It requires 
181. The Bill of Rights was proposed to the states by Congress on March 4, 1789.  1 ELLIOT’S
DEBATES, supra note 110, at 338.  Rhode Island ratified the Constitution on May 29, 1790.  
Ratification of the Constitution by the Convention of the State of Rhode Island and Providence 
Plantations (May 29, 1790), in 1 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 110, at 334, 334–35.  Lash stresses 
that “Rhode Island submitted a declaration almost identical to New York’s.”  Lash, Lost Original 
Meaning, supra note 10, at 356.  But Rhode Island’s proposal was made after the Ninth Amendment 
was drafted in its present form.  Indeed, inducing Rhode Island to ratify the Constitution was one of 
the purposes for proposing a Bill of Rights.  See GAZETTE OF THE UNITED STATES (Phila.), June 10, 
1798, reprinted in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 33, at 66 (reporting Madison’s 
recommendation that a select committee be formed to explore “some alteration of the Constitution” 
to encourage Rhode Island and North Carolina to ratify).  If Rhode Island’s reassertion of New 
York’s proposal has any interpreted significance (which is doubtful), it is that its convention viewed 
New York’s proposed rule of construction as substantially different from the text of the Ninth 
Amendment that had already been submitted to the states for ratification. 
182. Lash, Lost Original Meaning, supra note 10, at 360. 
183. See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 775 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of Rep. James Madison, 
Aug. 15, 1789) (“I concurred, in the convention of Virginia, with those gentlemen, so far as to agree 
to a declaration of those rights which corresponded with my own judgment, and the other alterations 
which I had the honor to bring forward before the present congress.”). 
184. James Madison, Speech in Congress Proposing Constitutional Amendments (June 8, 
1789), in JAMES MADISON, WRITINGS, supra note 32, at 437, 443. 
185. See infra notes 194–205 and accompanying text. 
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great care to interpret the enacted text of the Constitution in light of rejected 
proposals.
Before turning to the evidence of original meaning provided by the 
Virginia debate over the enacted text of the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, 
let me summarize how the wording of these varying state proposals supports 
or undercuts the five originalist models.  None of the proposals discussed 
supports the state law rights model.  However, Pennsylvania also proposed 
“that every reserve of the rights of individuals, made by the several constitu-
tions of the states in the Union, shall remain inviolate, except so far as they 
are expressly and manifestly yielded or narrowed by the national 
Constitution.”186  While this is a clear assertion of state law rights, it 
addresses the effect of adopting the Constitution, not the effect of 
enumerating certain rights in the Constitution, which is the subject of the 
Ninth Amendment. 
The state proposals described above seriously undercut the residual 
rights model.  That model claims that the Ninth Amendment tells us nothing 
about the scope of federal powers but merely restates the importance of enu-
merated powers.  Yet each of the rules of construction recommended by the 
states were proposals for how enumerated powers should be construed: 
narrowly, so as not to violate the reserved powers, jurisdiction, or rights of 
the people or states (depending on the particular formulation). 
Only the Virginia–North Carolina proposal clearly fits the collective 
rights model.  The proposals by Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and especially 
New York are consistent instead with the individual natural rights model.  As 
we shall see, the difference in the wording proposed by Virginia from the 
actual wording of the Ninth Amendment, and Virginia’s reaction to that 
change, severely undercuts the collective rights model and strongly supports 
the individual rights model.  Finally, all these proposals concerning the con-
struction of federal powers provide strong support for the federalism model, 
which is compatible with either the collective rights model, or individual 
natural rights model, or both. 
G. The Virginia Debates over the Ninth Amendment 
As we have just seen, Madison’s initial proposal looked in form very 
similar to the rules of construction proposed by several state ratification 
conventions, though in substance it was more similar to New York’s than to 
Virginia’s.  Here, once more, is Madison’s original formulation: 
 The exceptions here or elsewhere in the constitution, made in favor 
of particular rights, shall not be so construed as to diminish the just 
importance of other rights retained by the people; or as to enlarge the 
186. Amendments Proposed by the Pennsylvania Convention (Sept. 3, 1788), in THE
COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 95, at 648, 648. 
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powers delegated by the constitution; but either as actual limitations of 
such powers, or as inserted merely for greater caution.187
Clearly borrowed from state proposals is the language, “or as to enlarge 
the powers delegated by the constitution; but either as actual limitations of 
such powers, or as inserted merely for greater caution.”188  Also taken from 
the proposals is the reference to enumerated rights as “exceptions” to granted 
powers.189  To the language proposed by the states Madison added a refer-
ence to provisions in the Constitution “made in favor of particular rights” 
that does not appear in the state proposals concerning construction.  
Crucially, he also added the language, “shall not be so construed as to 
diminish the just importance of other rights retained by the people.”  Unlike 
New York’s language, this does not read “the People of the several States” 
but simply “the people.”190  It does not mention the states at all. 
Here, again, is the final form of the Ninth Amendment as it emerged 
from Congress (as the eleventh proposed amendment) and was transmitted to 
the states for ratification: “The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain 
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the 
people.”191  Gone now is any reference to “exceptions” to the powers of 
Congress.  In place of the states’ proposed reference to “clauses which de-
clare that Congress shall not exercise certain powers” is a reference to the 
“rights . . . retained by the people.”  In place of the earlier draft’s language 
“shall not be so construed . . . as to enlarge the powers delegated by the 
constitution; but either as actual limitations of such powers” is the language 
“shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.” 
Also absent from the Ninth Amendment is any reference to the states.  
In the amendments as proposed by Congress and ratified, the only explicit 
reference to the reserved powers of states came in the Tenth Amendment—
originally the twelfth proposed amendment—which reads: “The powers not 
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the 
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”192  This 
language is nearly identical to that recommended by every state ratification 
convention that made proposals, with one difference: the unexplained 
addition by the Senate of the words “or to the people” at the end. 
187. James Madison, Speech in Congress Proposing Constitutional Amendments (June 8, 
1789), in JAMES MADISON, WRITINGS, supra note 32, at 437, 443. 
188. See, e.g., Amendments Proposed by the New York Convention (July 26, 1788), in THE 
COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 95, at 674, 674 (proposing the text “[does] not imply that 
Congress is entitled to any Powers not given by the said Constitution; but such Clauses are to be 
construed either as exceptions to certain specified Powers, or as inserted merely for greater 
Caution”).
189. See, e.g., id. 
190. See id. 
191. U.S. CONST. amend. IX. 
192. U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
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While Virginia’s proposal contained no analogue to this additional 
language, New York had proposed that “every Power . . . which is not by the 
said Constitution clearly delegated to the Congress of the United States, or 
the departments of the Government thereof, remains to the People of the 
several States, or to their respective State Governments to whom they may 
have granted the same.”193  However, whereas New York refers to “the 
People of the several States,” the final version of the Tenth Amendment, like 
the final version of the Ninth, refers simply to “the People.” 
After Congress submitted its version of the amendments to the states for 
ratification, an interesting debate transpired in the Virginia legislature 
concerning the Ninth and Tenth Amendments.  The principal objection to the 
Ninth Amendment by Edmund Randolph has been much discussed in the 
Ninth Amendment literature in the context of Madison’s reply to a letter 
written to him by Hardin Burnley, a member of the Virginia house.194  On 
November 28, 1789, Burnley reported to Madison that, while the first ten 
amendments “were acceeded [sic] to with but little opposition,” the last two 
were rejected.195  He then reported Randolph’s objection to the Ninth 
Amendment: 
Mr. E. Randolph who advocated all the others stood in this contest in 
the front of opposition.  His principal objection was pointed against 
the word retained in the eleventh proposed amendment, and his 
argument if I understood it was applied in this manner, that as the 
rights declared in the first ten of the proposed amendments were not 
all that a free people would require the exercise of; and that as there 
was no criterion by which it could be determined whither [sic] any 
other particular right was retained or not, it would be more safe, & 
more consistant [sic] with the spirit of the 1st & 17th amendments 
proposed by Virginia, that this reservation against constructive power, 
should operate rather as a provision against extending the powers of 
Congress by their own authority, than as a protection to rights 
reducable [sic] to no definitive certainty.196
On December 5th, Madison related Burnley’s report of Randolph’s 
objections to George Washington,197 but on the very next day, Randolph 
wrote Washington himself to report that amendments had passed the Virginia 
193. Amendments Proposed by the New York Convention (July 26, 1788), in THE COMPLETE 
BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 95, at 674, 674 (emphasis added). 
194. See, e.g., Lash, Lost Original Meaning, supra note 10, at 333, 375–79; McAffee, supra 
note 19, at 1287–93. 
195. Letter from Hardin Burnley to James Madison (Nov. 28, 1789), in 5 DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 167, at 219, 219. 
196. Id. 
197. Letter from James Madison to George Washington (Dec. 5, 1789), in 5 DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 167, at 221, 221–22.  In this letter, Madison gives his 
now much-discussed reply to Randolph’s objections, which I will examine below. 
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house and were now before its senate.198  Nine days later Randolph explained 
to Washington: “It has been thought best by the mo[mutilated] zealous 
friends to the constitution to let the whole of them rest.  I have submitted to 
their opinion; not choosing to rely upon my own judgment in so momentous 
an affair.”199
In the Virginia senate, more dominated by Antifederalists, the 
amendments had a tougher sledding.  The senate rejected the third (First), 
eighth (Sixth), eleventh (Ninth) and thirteenth (Tenth) amendments.  The 
reasons given for rejecting the eleventh (the Ninth Amendment) were similar 
to the reasons given by Randolph but add a significant statement that pertains 
to its original public meaning: 
We do not find that the 11th article is asked for by Virginia or any 
other State; we therefore conceive that the people of Virginia should 
be consulted with respect to it, even if we did not doubt the propriety 
of adopting it; but it appears to us highly exceptionable.200
In other words, the public meaning of the Ninth Amendment appeared 
so different from anything proposed by Virginia’s ratification convention that 
the Virginians in the Senate do not find it in their proposals.  This perceived 
difference in public meaning is further reflected in their substantive objec-
tions to the new language: “If it is meant to guard against the extension of the 
powers of Congress by implication, it is greatly defective, and does by no 
means comprehend the idea expressed in the 17th article of amendments 
proposed by Virginia . . . .”201  Here they specifically find that the meaning of 
the Ninth Amendment differs from that of their proposed seventeenth. 
This reaction in the Virginia senate is consistent with the reaction of 
Virginia’s two United States Senators who had previously reported the 
proposed amendments to the Governor of Virginia accompanied by their 
stern disapproval. 
[I]t is with grief that we now send forward propositions inadequate to 
the purpose of real and substantial Amendments, and so far short of 
the wishes of our Country.  By perusing the Journal of the Senate, 
your Excellency will see, that we did, in vain, bring to view the 
198. Letter from Edmund Randolph to George Washington (Dec. 6, 1789), in 5 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 167, at 222, 222 (“[T]he whole twelve 
were ratified.  They are now with the senate, who were yesterday employed about them.”).  
Randolph then predicted accurately, “That body will attempt to postpone them; for a majority is 
unfriendly to the government.  But an effort will be made against this destructive measure.”  Id.
199. Letter from Edmund Randolph to George Washington (Dec. 15, 1789), in 5 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 167, at 225, 225. 
200. Entry of Dec. 12, 1789, in JOURNAL OF THE SENATE OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF 
VIRGINIA 60, 63 (Richmond, Thomas W. White 1828) [hereinafter VIRGINIA SENATE JOURNAL]
(emphasis added).  Kurt Lash was the first Ninth Amendment scholar to examine and discuss this 
source. See Lash, Lost Original Meaning, supra note 10, at 380–84. 
201. Entry of Dec. 12, 1789, in VIRGINIA SENATE JOURNAL, supra note 200, at 63 (emphasis 
added).
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Amendments proposed by our Convention, and approved by the 
Legislature.202
Each senator also expressed this opinion even more vociferously in 
private correspondence with Patrick Henry.  In the words of Senator William 
Grayson, “[T]hey are so mutilated & gutted that in fact they are good for 
nothing, & I believe as many others do, that they will do more harm than 
benefit: The Virginia amendments were all brought into view, and regularly 
rejected.”203  And Senator Richard Henry Lee explained, 
As they came from the H. of R. they were very far short of the wishes 
of our Convention, but as they are returned by the Senate they are 
certainly much weakened.  You may be assured that nothing on my 
part was left undone to prevent this, and every possible effort was 
used to give success to all the Amendments proposed by our 
Country—We might as well have attempted to move Mount Atlas 
upon our shoulders.204
After complaining that the Ninth Amendment was completely new, the 
majority report in the Virginia senate then identifies the other rights retained 
by the people as “personal” as opposed to collective, though it finds the 
protection of these rights deficient: 
[A]nd as it respects personal rights, [it] might be dangerous, because, 
should the rights of the people be invaded or called in question, they 
might be required to shew by the constitution what rights they have 
retained; and such as could not from that instrument be proved to be 
retained by them, they might be denied to possess.  Of this there is 
ground to be apprehensive, when Congress are already seen denying 
certain rights of the people, heretofore deemed clear and 
unquestionable.205
Unfortunately, for our purposes, they provide no examples of such “denials” 
of rights.  Note, however, their use of the term “deny” to connote violation or 
infringement. 
Of course, these Virginians proved prescient about the effectiveness of 
the Ninth.  Under the modern approach to constitutional rights, as embodied 
in Footnote Four,206 only enumerated rights shift the presumption of 
constitutionality,207 unless a litigant can establish that an unenumerated right 
202. Letter from Richard Henry Lee and William Grayson to the Governor of Virginia (Sept. 
28, 1789), in 5 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 167, at 216, 216. 
203. Letter from William Grayson to Patrick Henry (Sept. 29, 1789), in CREATING THE BILL OF 
RIGHTS, supra note 33, at 300, 300. 
204. Letter from Richard Henry Lee to Patrick Henry (Sept. 14, 1789), in CREATING THE BILL
OF RIGHTS, supra note 33, at 295, 295. 
205. Entry of Dec. 12, 1789, in VIRGINIA SENATE JOURNAL, supra note 200, at 63–64. 
206. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
207. Id. (“There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality 
when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution . . . .”). 
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is “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty”208 or “deeply rooted in this 
Nation’s history and tradition”209—and very few unenumerated rights have 
been protected by this route. 
Still, the effectiveness of the Ninth Amendment is one thing; its original 
meaning is another.  The report of the Virginia senate offers powerful evi-
dence that the replacement of the words of the seventeenth proposal by 
Virginia with that of the actual Ninth Amendment represented a change in its 
public meaning from the protection of state powers to the protection of 
“personal rights.”  The report of the minority in the Virginia senate who 
supported ratifying all the amendments, including the Ninth, bears this out 
insofar as it agreed with the majority that the amendment was not called for 
by the states.  Despite this, the minority disagreed that it was dangerous: 
“Because the 11th amendment, though not called for by any of the adopting 
States, we consider as tending to quiet the minds of many, and in no possible 
instance productive of danger to the liberties of the people . . . .”210  Of 
course, we know that, in the end, Randolph was convinced to support the 
Ninth Amendment, despite his reservations, and Virginia ultimately ratified 
it.211
The arguments made about the Ninth Amendment in the Virginia 
ratification process strongly support the individual natural rights model and 
severely undercut the collective rights model that would read the Ninth as 
completely equivalent to Virginia’s seventeenth.  This change in meaning 
does not, however, preclude the federalism model’s rule of construction.  
Indeed, the Virginia senate considered the possibility that the Ninth 
Amendment “is meant to guard against the extension of the powers of 
Congress by implication.”212  As we shall soon see, this is exactly how James 
Madison uses the Ninth Amendment in his speech concerning the constitu-
tionality of the national bank.213
Finally, by affirming the idea that the Ninth Amendment refers to 
“personal rights” without any reference to state law rights, this evidence 
undercuts the state law rights model.  It is also inconsistent with the residual 
rights model insofar as the Virginia senate’s reading of the Ninth 
Amendment does not even hint at the idea that the “personal rights” to which 
it refers are to be exclusively defined by the enumerated powers included in 
the Constitution. 
208. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). 
209. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977). 
210. Entry of Dec. 14, 1789, in VIRGINIA SENATE JOURNAL, supra note 200, at 66–67 
(emphasis added). 
211. See LEVY, supra note 22, at 42–43 (discussing the “two years of procrastination” in the 
Virginia senate prior to ratification). 
212. Entry of Dec. 12, 1789, in VIRGINIA SENATE JOURNAL, supra note 200, at 63. 
213. See infra subpart V(I). 
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Before leaving the Virginia debates, it is useful to consider the objection 
of the majority in the Virginia senate to the wording of the twelfth 
amendment—what we know as the Tenth Amendment—for it sheds light on 
the meaning of “the people” in the Ninth.  Here is what the majority reports: 
We conceive that the 12th article would come up to the 1st article of 
the Virginia amendments, were it not for the words “or to the people.”  
It is not declared to be the people of the respective States; but the 
expression applies to the people generally as citizens of the United 
States, and leaves it doubtful what powers are reserved to the State 
Legislatures.  Unrestrained by the constitution or these amendments, 
Congress might, as the supreme rulers of the people, assume those 
powers which properly belong to the respective States, and thus 
gradually effect an entire consolidation.214
This objection echoes that of Richard Henry Lee: 
By comparing the Senate amendments with [those] from below by 
carefully attending to the m[atter] the former will appear well 
calculated to enfeeble [and] produce ambiguity—for instance—Rights 
res[erved] to the States or the People—The people here is evidently 
designed fo[r the] People of the United States, not of the Individual 
States [page torn] the former is the Constitutional idea of the people—
We the People &c. . . .  [T]his mode of expressing was evidently 
calculated to give the Residuum to the people of the U. States, which 
was the Constitutional language, and to deny it to the people of the 
Indiv. State—At least that it left room for cavil & false construction—
They would not insert after people therof—altho it was moved.215
While it is far from dispositive, this objection to the Tenth Amendment 
severely undercuts the collective rights and the state law rights models, as it 
indicates that “the People” in both the Ninth and Tenth Amendments was 
read as referring to the people of the United States, and not the people of 
each of the several states.  And this, in turn, supports the conclusion that the 
rights and powers of the people, to which both Amendments refer, are the 
natural rights and powers of the people as individuals, rather than particular 
rights they may have as citizens of their respective states. 
On the other hand, it also must be remembered that these are all 
objections made by and to other Antifederalist opponents of the new 
Constitution.216  It was never clear that these opponents really wanted an 
214. Entry of Dec. 12, 1789, in VIRGINIA SENATE JOURNAL, supra note 200, at 64. 
215. Letter from Richard Henry Lee to Patrick Henry (Sept. 14, 1789), in CREATING THE BILL
OF RIGHTS, supra note 33, at 295, 296 (alterations in the original).  But cf. Letter from Edmund 
Randolph to George Washington (Dec. 6, 1789), in 5 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE 
CONSTITUTION, supra note 167, at 222, 223 (“The twelfth amendment does not appear to me to 
have any real effect, unless it be to excite a dispute between the United States, and every particular 
state, as to what is delegated.  It accords pretty nearly with what our convention proposed; but being 
once adopted, it may produce new matter for the cavils of the designing.”). 
216. See supra notes 28–29 and accompanying text. 
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effective bill of rights, and were not simply using its absence as a political 
weapon to defeat the new Constitution itself.  This opposition comes through 
clearly both in the statements of those who objected to the proposed 
amendments217 and in the reactions to these protests by supporters of the 
Constitution and amendments.218
So we need consider these objections by Virginian Antifederalists, 
heartfelt as they were, with some measure of skepticism.  Still, had these not 
seemed like reasonable interpretations of the public meaning of the text, cit-
ing them would not have advanced the Antifederalist cause of undercutting 
the amendments being offered to bolster the perceived legitimacy of the new 
Constitution.  Whatever is the appropriate discount to be applied to this 
evidence, it cuts in favor of the individual natural rights and federalism 
models, and against the state law rights, residual rights, and collective rights 
models. 
H. Madison’s and Burnley’s Replies to Randolph’s Objections 
Madison’s immediate reply to Randolph’s objection suggests that the 
protection of retained rights and a rule of construction limiting the extensions 
of federal power amounted in practice to the same thing.  In his letter to 
Washington, Madison writes: 
The difficulty started agst the amendments is really unlucky, and the 
more to be regretted as it springs from a friend to the Constitution.  It 
is a still greater cause of regret, if the distinction be, as it appears to 
me, altogether fanciful.  If a line can be drawn between the powers 
granted and the rights retained, it would seem to be the same thing, 
whether the latter be secured, [“whether” stricken out] by declaring 
that they shall not be abridged [“be violated” stricken out], or that the 
former shall not be extended.  If no line can be drawn, a declaration in 
either form would amount to nothing.219
This passage has been much debated by Ninth Amendment scholars.  While 
it is inconsistent with a state law rights model, Thomas McAffee has claimed 
217. See, e.g., Letter from Richard Henry Lee to Patrick Henry (Sept. 14, 1789), in CREATING
THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 33, at 295, 295 (“The most essential danger for the present System 
arises, [in my] opinion, from its tendency to a Consolidated government, instead of a Union of 
Confederate States—The history of the world and reason concurs in proving that so extensive a 
Territory [as the] U. States comprehend never was, or can be governed in freed[om] under the 
former idea.”).  Other examples abound. 
218. Letter from Edmund Randolph to George Washington (Nov. 26, 1789), in 5 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 167, at 216, 216 (referring to letter by 
Senators Lee and Grayson as “printed by the enemies to the constitution”). 
219. Letter from James Madison to George Washington (Dec. 5, 1789), in 5 DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 167, at 221, 221–22.  Madison concludes: “If the 
distinction were just it does not seem to be of sufficient importance to justify the risk of losing the 
amendts of furnishing a handle to the disaffected, and of arming N. C. with a pretext, if she be 
disposed, to prolong her exile from the Union.”  Id. at 222. 
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that it implies his residual rights model.220  Yet the residual rights model 
insists that the Ninth Amendment tells us nothing about how the powers of 
Congress are to be construed.221  In contrast, Madison insists that the protec-
tion of the rights retained by the people is a means by which “the powers 
granted . . . not be extended.”  Remember that the provision in his original 
proposal, which borrowed from the language proposed by Virginia and other 
states, was that express exceptions to federal power “not be so 
construed . . . as to enlarge the powers delegated by the constitution.”222
One way to unpack Madison’s typically complex phraseology is by 
distinguishing between means and ends.  In this letter, Madison explains that 
the single end of the provision is that “the latter be secured,” referring to the 
“rights retained.”  He then identifies two means to this end that might have 
been included in the text: an expressed declaration of “rights retained . . . that 
shall not be abridged” or an expression that “powers granted . . . shall not be 
extended.”  As means to the end that “the rights retained . . . be secured,” 
both of these textual formulations amount to “the same thing.”  Which is not 
to say that either formulation is the same as an explicit protection of the 
rights of states as was proposed by Virginia. 
This difference between means and ends is even clearer in Hardin 
Burnley’s response to Randolph’s objections: 
But others among whom I am one see not the force of the distinction, 
for by preventing an extension of power in that body from which 
danger is apprehended safety will be insured if its powers are not too 
extensive already, & so by protecting the rights of the people & of the 
States, an improper extension of power will be prevented & safety 
made equally certain.223
As I have discussed elsewhere,224 even more clearly than Madison, 
Burnley is here assessing two competing means to the end of protecting the 
rights of the people.  According to Burnley, “by protecting the rights of the 
people & of the States, an improper extension of power will be prevented & 
safety made equally certain.”  That is, Burnley advocates protecting rights as 
a means of preventing an improper extension of power—exactly how 
Madison used the Ninth Amendment in his bank speech, as we shall see.  
The other method of ensuring safety is “by preventing an extension of 
power.”  True, Burnley wrote of the “rights of the people & of the States,”
which might suggest that he thought the actual Ninth Amendment protected 
220. McAffee, supra note 19, at 1290. 
221. See supra text accompanying note 52. 
222. James Madison, Speech in Congress Proposing Constitutional Amendments (June 8, 
1789), in JAMES MADISON, WRITINGS, supra note 32, at 437, 443 (emphasis added). 
223. Letter from Hardin Burnley to James Madison (Nov. 28, 1789), in 2 THE BILL OF RIGHTS:
A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1188, 1188 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1971). 
224. BARNETT, supra note 7, at 250–52 (responding to Thomas McAffee’s interpretation of 
Madison’s letter to Washington). 
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both.  Yet by this very language Burnley himself clearly distinguishes 
between “the people” and “the states” and the actual words of the Ninth 
Amendment refer only to the former. 
Madison’s reply to Randolph’s concerns can be viewed as endorsing a 
restrictive construction of federal power as a means to the end of protecting 
the natural individual rights retained by the people.  It is, therefore, consistent 
with both the federalism and natural individual rights models of the Ninth 
Amendment.  Madison’s letter offers no support whatsoever for the collec-
tive rights model.  For while Madison equates the protection of the rights 
retained by the people with construing the federal powers narrowly, he—
unlike Burnley—does not even intimate any protection of powers of states, 
or that the rights to be protected were collective in nature.  The fact that 
Madison equates the Ninth Amendment with that aspect of Virginia’s sev-
enteenth proposal that would narrowly construe federal power in no way 
supports an equivalence between the Ninth Amendment and that part of 
Virginia’s proposal that would have protected the reserved rights of the 
states, rather than the retained rights of the people. 
I. Madison’s Bank Speech 
If Madison’s explanation of the purpose of the Ninth Amendment in his 
Bill of Rights speech is the most important evidence of its original meaning, 
then how he actually used the Ninth Amendment in a constitutional argument 
in his speech to the House opposing a national bank is a close second.  In this 
speech, Madison contended that a national bank was unconstitutional be-
cause it was beyond the power of Congress to establish.225  Because he 
actually used the Ninth Amendment in a constitutional argument, this speech 
is very useful to understanding its role in constitutional adjudication.  The 
implications of his usage are so obvious that they do not take long to explain. 
Near the end of his speech—in which he was arguing that the power to 
incorporate a bank, and grant it a monopoly, were beyond those granted to 
Congress under the Necessary and Proper Clause—Madison observed, “The 
latitude of interpretation required by the bill is condemned by the rule fur-
nished by the Constitution itself.”226  As one authority for this “rule” of 
interpretation, Madison cited the Ninth Amendment: 
The explanatory amendments proposed by Congress themselves, at 
least, would be good authority with them; all these renunciations of 
power proceeded on a rule of construction, excluding the latitude now 
contended for. . . .  He read several of the articles proposed, remarking 
particularly on the 11th [the Ninth Amendment] and 12th [the Tenth 
Amendment], the former, as guarding against a latitude of 
225. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1944 (1791) (statement of Rep. Madison, Feb. 2, 1791). 
226. Id. at 1949 (emphasis added). 
56 Texas Law Review [Vol. 85:1 
interpretation; the latter, as excluding every source of power not 
within the Constitution itself.227
Thus, Madison viewed the Ninth and Tenth Amendments as playing the 
distinct roles that, Kurt Lash has rightly emphasized, can be found in 
different proposals by the states.228  Madison viewed the Tenth Amendment 
as authority for the rule that Congress could only exercise a delegated power.  
For example, Congress could not establish a post office or raise and support 
armies without a delegation of power to pursue these ends.  In contrast, 
Madison viewed the Ninth Amendment as providing authority for a rule 
against the loose construction of these powers—especially the Necessary and 
Proper Clause—when legislation affected the rights retained by the people.  
As Madison concluded in his Bank Speech, “In fine, if the power were in the 
Constitution, the immediate exercise of it cannot be essential; if not there, the 
exercise of it involves the guilt of usurpation.”229
Madison’s use of the Ninth Amendment in his Bank Speech 
substantiates the inference raised by his Bill of Rights speech that the 
unenumerated individual rights retained by the people provide the same sort 
of check on latitudinarian constructions of federal power as do the 
enumerated individual rights.  This strongly confirms the federalism model, 
in which the Ninth Amendment argues against a latitudinarian construction 
of federal powers.  This is hardly surprising as the modern federalism model 
was devised largely on the strength of Madison’s usage in this speech. 
In contrast, Madison’s speech comprises a virtual refutation of the 
residual rights model, as Madison is using the Ninth Amendment as means of 
construing the power of Congress—which Thomas McAffee (who advanced 
that model) expressly denied was a purpose of the Ninth Amendment.230  In 
other words, Madison himself used the Ninth Amendment in a manner that is 
completely outside the only function that the residual rights model claims it 
has.  Nor is Madison’s usage consistent with the state law rights model.  Al-
though the national bank was opposed, in part, as an interference with the 
power of states to have their own banks, the state law rights model concerns 
the rights of individuals as protected by state bills of rights or the common 
law.231  In making his Ninth Amendment argument, Madison referred to nei-
ther sort of individual state law rights. 
Whether this speech supports the individual rights or collective rights 
models is disputed.  Kurt Lash has fervently claimed that it supports the latter 
and not the former, but his presentation of the evidence is erroneous in two 
important respects.  First, Lash relies heavily upon a statement by Madison 
that, at first blush, looks like it does indeed support Lash’s claim: 
227. Id. at 1951 (emphasis added). 
228. See Lash, Lost Original Meaning, supra note 10, at 355–58. 
229. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1951 (1791) (statement of Rep. Madison, Feb. 2, 1791). 
230. McAffee, supra note 19, at 1300 & n.325. 
231. See supra subpart IV(A). 
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To those who argued that Congress could act for the “general welfare” 
so long as it did not interfere with the powers of the States, Madison 
responded that chartering a bank “would directly interfere with the 
rights of the States, to prohibit as well as to establish banks.”  Here, 
Madison sounds a theme that would continue throughout his speech: 
Chartering the bank would violate the rights of the states.232
But immediately after the quoted statement, Madison says this: “3.  
Interference with the power of the States was no constitutional criterion of 
the power of Congress.  If the power was not given, Congress could not ex-
ercise it; if given, they might exercise it, altho it should interfere with the 
laws, or even the constitution of the States.”233
How are these two seemingly contradictory statements to be reconciled?  
Easily, as it turns out.  As Lash notes, Madison is here responding to an ar-
gument by supporters of the bank that the “general welfare” clause means 
that “a general power might be exercised by Congress, without interfering 
with the powers of the States; and that the establishment of a National Bank 
was of this sort.”234  In other words, the only prohibition on congressional 
lawmaking for the general welfare is when such laws interfere with the pow-
ers of the states.235  Madison then replies to this purported interpretation with 
four alternative counterarguments including the second, that this power does
interfere with the powers of the states, and the third, that it does not matter 
whether it does or not if the power was really delegated to Congress, in 
which case it would supersede state powers.236
232. Lash, Lost Original Meaning, supra note 10, at 388.  The entire sentence from the report 
of Madison’s speech reads: “2.  It would directly interfere with the rights of the States, to prohibit as
well as to establish Banks, and the circulation of Bank Notes.  He mentioned a law of Virginia, 
actually prohibiting the circulation of notes payable to bearer.”  GAZETTE OF THE UNITED STATES
(Phila.), Feb. 23, 1791, reprinted in 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL 
CONGRESS, supra note 148, at 370.  The entire quote is needed to identify the location of a similar 
statement in a different report of Madison’s speech.  See infra note 236. 
233. GAZETTE OF THE UNITED STATES (Phila.), Feb. 23, 1791, reprinted in 14 DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, supra note 148, at 370. 
234. Id. (emphasis added). 
235. This argument has the same structure as today’s Tenth Amendment doctrine by which the 
laws enacted by Congress are improper when they directly commandeer state governments.  See
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 919–20 (1997) (“[T]he Framers rejected the concept of a 
central government that would act upon and through the States, and instead designed a system in 
which the State and Federal Governments would exercise concurrent authority over the people.”). 
236. A more truncated report of Madison’s speech in The General Advertiser reports his 
argument based on the example of Virginia’s law, without catching that it was a response in the 
alternative to a particular interpretation of the General Welfare Clause: 
To exercise the power included in the bill was an infringement of the rights of the 
several states; for they could establish banks within their respective jurisdictions and 
prohibit the establishment of any others: a law existed in one of the states prohibiting 
the passing of cash notes of hand payable on demand: The power of making such a law 
could not, he presumed be denied to the states; and if this was granted and such laws 
were in force, it certainly would effectually exclude the establishment of a bank. 
THE GENERAL ADVERTISER (Phila.), Feb. 7, 1791, reprinted in 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF 
THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, supra note 148, at 379–80.  The subtle distortion of Madison’s 
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Lash’s second error is to dismiss my contention that Madison’s 
constitutional argument was based, in part, on the fact that the bank would 
violate individual rights—in particular, when Madison argues that “[i]t 
involves a monopoly, which affects the equal rights of every citizen.”237
Lash argues to the contrary that “[a]t no point did Madison argue that char-
tering a bank violated an individual right.”238  Lash then claims that 
“Madison’s argument about the unequal treatment of citizens went to his un-
derstanding of the effects of the monopoly and were separate from his views 
regarding the constitutionality of the bank.”239
To support this reading, Lash reproduces a veto statement that Madison 
had drafted for President Washington, which I too now present in its entirety: 
Feb. 21, 1791 
Gentlemen of the Senate 
Having carefully examined and maturely considered the Bill entitled 
“An Act[”] I am compelled by the conviction of my judgment and the 
duty of my Station to return the Bill to the House in which it 
originated with the following objections: 
(if to the Constitutionality) 
I object to the Bill because it is an essential principle of the 
Government that powers not delegated by the Constitution cannot be 
rightfully exercised; because the power proposed by the Bill to be 
exercised is not expressly delegated; and because I cannot satisfy 
myself that it results from any express power by fair and safe rules of 
implication. 
(if to the merits alone or in addition) 
I object to the Bill because it appears to be unequal between the public 
and the Institution in favor of the institution; imposing no conditions 
on the latter equivalent to the stipulations assumed by the former. 
[quer. if this lie within the intimation of the President]   
I object to the Bill because it is in all cases the duty of the Government 
to dispense its benefits to individuals with as impartial a hand as the 
public interest will permit; and the Bill is in this respect unequal to 
individuals holding different denominations of public Stock and 
willing to become subscribers.240
argument in this report (at least as compared with the fuller context provided by The Gazette of the 
United States) suggests the need to exercise some degree of caution against too heavily relying upon 
the precise wordings of reported speeches. 
237. GAZETTE OF THE UNITED STATES (Phila.), Feb. 23, 1791, reprinted in 14 DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, supra note 148, at 373. 
238. Lash, Lost Original Meaning, supra note 10, at 388. 
239. Id. at 390. 
240. James Madison, Proposed Veto Statement (Feb. 21, 1791), in 6 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES
MADISON 42, 42–43 n.I (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1906). 
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From this, Lash contends that Madison’s reference to “equal rights” went “to 
the merits alone” rather than “to the Constitutionality.”241
This is mistaken.  First, the veto statement does not mention the prob-
lem of monopoly.  The specific inequalities to which it does refer did indeed 
appear in Madison’s speech in his “general review of the advantages and dis-
advantages of banks.”242  There, Madison is reported to have made the 
precise objection found in the draft veto statement: 
The plan was unequal to the public creditors—it gave an undue 
preference to the holders of a particular denomination of the public 
debt, and to those at and within reach of the seat of government.  If the 
subscriptions should be rapid, the distant holders of paper would be 
excluded altogether.243
However, the very next sentence reads: “In making these remarks on the 
merits of the bill, he had reserved to himself, he said, the right to deny the 
authority of Congress to pass it.”244
Madison’s reference to “a monopoly, which affects the equal rights of 
every citizen” appears some five pages later amid the heart of his 
constitutional objections.245  And in considering this to be a constitutional 
argument, Madison was not alone.  That same day, Representative James 
Jackson of Georgia “urged the unconstitutionality of the plan—called it a 
monopoly—such an one as contravenes the spirit of the constitution.”246
Representative Hugh Williamson of North Carolina (who supported the bill) 
“adverted to the objections deduced from the constitution, and explained the 
clause respecting monopolies as referring altogether to commercial 
monopolies.”247
In sum, the full context reveals that the sentence on which Lash 
principally relies for his claim that it “was the collective rights of the people 
of the several states which were threatened by the Bill”248 is completely 
misinterpreted.  And his claim that Madison was not adverting to an 
infringement of an individual right when making his constitutional objections 
is also in error.249  However, Lash overlooks two other statements that come 
closer to lending support for his claim. 
In Madison’s discussion of the Necessary and Proper Clause, he makes 
the following argument: 
241. Lash, Lost Original Meaning, supra note 10, at 390. 
242. GAZETTE OF THE UNITED STATES (Phila.), Feb. 23, 1791, reprinted in 14 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, supra note 148, at 367. 
243. Id. at 368. 
244. Id.
245. Id. at 373. 
246. Id. at 363–64. 
247. Id. at 365 (emphasis added). 
248. Lash, Lost Original Meaning, supra note 10, at 388. 
249. Id. at 390. 
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The States have, it is allowed on all hands, a concurrent right to lay 
and collect taxes.  This power is secured to them not by its being 
expressly reserved, but by its not being ceded by the constitution.  The 
reasons for the bill cannot be admitted, because they would invalidate 
that right . . . .250
And Madison also argues that the overbroad interpretation of the General 
Welfare Clause “would give to Congress an unlimited power; would render 
nugatory the enumeration of particular powers; would supercede all the 
powers reserved to the state governments.”251  There is nothing exceptionable 
about these arguments, but to see why, we need to take a step back from the 
minutia of particular statements. 
Madison is arguing here against a latitudinarian interpretation of various 
enumerated powers.  There is no question but that an overly broad interpre-
tation of enumerated powers can both interfere with the reserved political 
powers of the states, as well as violate the individual rights retained by the 
people.  In his speech he offers pages of different types of authority for his 
claim that “[t]he latitude of interpretation required by the bill is condemned 
by the rule furnished by the constitution itself.”252  His reference to the Ninth 
Amendment comes two pages later, after the introductory statement (quoted 
above) that “[t]he explanatory amendments proposed by Congress 
themselves, at least, would be good authority with them; all these 
renunciations of power proceeded on a rule of construction, excluding the 
latitude now contended for.”253  The fact that a particular claim of implied 
power might trench upon the powers of states referenced by the Tenth 
Amendment was a consideration arguing against such a claim.  That the 
Ninth Amendment referred only to individual rights would not entail that a 
latitude of construction was therefore warranted when the powers of states 
were being restricted. 
In other words, Madison’s use of an argument based on state powers in 
this speech does not directly tell us that the original meaning of the Ninth 
Amendment included states rights.  Rather, Madison’s specific use of the 
Ninth Amendment tells us only that it argues against “a latitude of 
interpretation” with respect to enumerated powers.  On this important point, 
Kurt Lash and I agree.254  Madison’s other statements elsewhere in his speech 
that refer to restrictions on state powers may not connect at all to the Ninth 
Amendment but may simply be a part of his general collection of arguments 
against this use of implied powers to justify the Bank. 
250. GAZETTE OF THE UNITED STATES (Phila.), Feb. 23, 1791, reprinted in 14 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, supra note 148, at 372. 
251. Id. at 369. 
252. Id. at 372. 
253. Id. at 375. 
254. Lash, Lost Original Meaning, supra note 10, at 391–93. 
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Here is another way to understand this point.  The other evidence we 
have examined to this point show that the Ninth Amendment was intended to 
handle a particular problem created by a bill of rights: to ensure that, when 
particular natural rights of the people were enumerated (which were all indi-
vidual personal rights), other natural rights of the people should not be 
construed to have been surrendered up to the general government and conse-
quently left insecure.  That the Ninth Amendment is a textual argument 
against such an improper construction of federal power does not preclude the 
different claim that it is also improper to invoke an implied federal power 
that would interfere with a reserved power of the states. 
For the Ninth Amendment to read as proponents of the collective rights 
model would have it, the rest of the Bill of Rights would have to have 
primarily concerned protecting the powers of states.  It would have to mean, 
in effect, “The enumeration in the Constitution of certain powers/rights of 
states shall not be construed to deny or disparage other powers/rights of 
states.”  But claims by those who would read the Second Amendment other-
wise notwithstanding,255 the other Amendments were not about states’ rights.  
We can be certain, therefore, that this was not the meaning of the Ninth 
Amendment because this was not the problem for which the Ninth 
Amendment was devised by Madison to be the solution.  While Akhil Amar 
puts forth a collective rights reading of the Bill of Rights as a whole, this in-
terpretation is at odds with the evidence presented here and elsewhere.256
Kurt Lash does not make such a claim, and even Amar does not claim that 
the Bill of Rights was exclusively collective. 
Finally, we ought not make too much of Madison’s two uses of the 
word “rights” when referring to the powers of states.257  The Constitution is 
far more scrupulous about using the terms “rights” only when speaking of the 
people or citizens or persons, and “powers” when speaking of either the gov-
ernment or the people.  In everyday discourse, speakers were not so 
punctilious.  Overwhelmingly, however, Madison refers in his speech to the 
powers of states, rather than to their rights.258
Despite the fact that the Constitution speaks only of governmental 
powers and not rights, however, there is nothing inaccurate about referring to 
the “rights of states” within the federal system established by the 
255. See generally Randy E. Barnett, Was the Right to Keep and Bear Arms Conditioned on 
Service in an Organized Militia?, 83 TEXAS L. REV. 237 (2004); Randy E. Barnett & Don B. Kates, 
Under Fire: The New Consensus on the Second Amendment, 45 EMORY L.J. 1139 (1996). 
256. See AMAR, supra note 69, at 215–16.  A general critique of Amar’s collective rights 
reading of the Bill of Rights is beyond the scope of this Article. 
257. James Madison, Speech in Congress Opposing the National Bank (Feb. 2, 1791), in JAMES
MADISON, WRITINGS, supra note 32, at 480, 485. 
258. Madison refers to the powers of states four times.  Id. at 483, 490.  One reason it is so hard 
to stick religiously to this terminological distinction—I slip up myself on occasion—is indicated by 
Madison’s statement that a power “not being included could never be rightfully exercised.”  Id. at
488.  When speaking of the rightfully exercised powers of states, it is easy to refer simply to the 
rights of states. 
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Constitution.  But this does not mean that the “rights . . . retained by the 
people” is a reference to these rights that may be either explicit or implicit in 
a federal scheme of delegated powers.  But even if it was, as was noted in the 
Introduction, this is not logically inconsistent with a reading of the Ninth 
Amendment as protecting both individual and states’ rights from a 
latitudinarian interpretation of the enumerated powers.259  Were states’ rights 
included in the meaning along with individual rights, it would simply 
broaden the scope of the Ninth Amendment to include situations where no 
individual liberty rights were at issue. 
So the only claim that contradicts the individual natural rights model 
would be that the collective rights model is the exclusive interpretation of the 
Ninth Amendment.  By now I trust that readers can see how nonexistent is 
the evidence to support such a claim of exclusivity and how powerful is the 
evidence against it.  While Kurt Lash denies this is his position,260 there are 
places in his article, such as those discussed in this section, that give readers 
this misimpression.261  To the extent that Kurt Lash’s use of Madison’s Bank 
Speech is meant to suggest that Madison had only collective and not individ-
ual rights in mind when he invoked the Ninth Amendment, I have explained 
here why the evidence cited by Lash is mistakenly interpreted. 
J. Madison’s Whiskey Rebellion Speech 
Generally overlooked in the literature on the Ninth Amendment is 
another apparent reference by Madison to individual rights retained by the 
people when construing the powers of Congress, though the significance of 
this reference is fuzzier than the others.  Three years after his Bank Speech, 
in 1794, Madison would again argue in Congress that the unenumerated 
rights retained by the people directly constrained congressional power.  
When Congress sought to censure the activities of certain self-created 
societies for their participation in the Whiskey Rebellion earlier that year, 
Madison contended that: “When the people have formed a Constitution, they 
retain those rights which they have not expressly delegated.”262  Here 
Madison was asserting that the unenumerated retained right of the people to 
hold opinions constrained the power of Congress to issue a censure in the 
same manner as “the liberty of speech, and of the press.”263  Indeed, “the 
censorial power is in the people over the Government, and not in the 
Government over the people.”264
259. See supra text accompanying notes 10–12. 
260. See Lash, Lost Original Meaning, supra note 10, at 363 (“At the time of the Founding, it 
was possible to embrace both natural rights and a strong belief in the collective right of the people 
to local self-government.”). 
261. See supra notes 232, 238, 239, 241. 
262. 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 934 (statement of Rep. Madison, Nov. 27, 1794). 
263. Id.
264. Id.
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By directly referring to an unenumerated individual right as 
constraining the powers of Congress, Madison’s usage here strongly supports 
the individual natural rights and federalism models but is inconsistent with 
the state law rights model.  Although referring to the enumerated powers, this 
statement is inconsistent with the residual rights model’s claim that the resid-
ual rights of the people are defined by the enumerated powers.  To the 
contrary, Madison is referring to an unenumerated right of the people to cen-
sure their government as an argument against the exercise of federal power. 
This statement also undercuts any claim that the “rights . . . retained by 
the people” were exclusively “collective” and that to speak of them as 
individual is to engage in anachronism.  The rights to which Madison 
referred were held by individuals who organized themselves into private as-
sociations or “societies.”  The rights of these associations of “insurgents” 
could hardly be equated with the “collective rights” of the people as a whole,
unless the concept of “collective right” is stretched to the breaking point.265
On the other hand, this statement by Madison is not crystal clear.  Most 
importantly, Madison does not explicitly refer to the Ninth Amendment.  Just 
as “retained those rights” evokes the Ninth Amendment, Madison’s reference 
to “which they have not expressly delegated” seems to evoke the Tenth 
Amendment.  But if he had the Tenth Amendment in mind, it is that portion 
of the Tenth that refers to the reserved powers of the people, not the states.  If 
so, these powers too are individual and not collective.  Moreover, these re-
served powers are closely connected to the retained rights.  Madison more 
clearly invokes the reserved powers of the people in the context of the Tenth 
Amendment in his famed Report on the Virginia Resolutions to which we 
now turn. 
K. Madison’s Report on the Virginia Resolutions
In 1798, Congress enacted the Alien and Sedition Acts empowering the 
President to deport aliens deemed dangerous—though these aliens were not 
from an enemy nation—and making it a federal crime to disparage the 
federal government and its officials.266  That same year, James Madison 
drafted the Virginia Resolutions declaring the Acts to be unconstitutional.  In 
1800, his lengthy Report on the Alien and Sedition Acts267 was approved by 
265. See id. at 935 (“[T]he whole Continent reprobates the conduct of the insurgents . . . .”).  
Indeed, I find that the slippery concept of “collective rights” lacks a rigorous definition. 
266. An Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes against the United States (Sedition Act), ch. 
74, 1 Stat. 596 (1798) (expired 1801); An Act Respecting Alien Enemies (Alien Enemies Act), ch. 
66, 1 Stat. 577 (1798) (current version at 50 U.S.C. §§ 21–24 (2000)); An Act Concerning Aliens 
(Alien Enemies Act), ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570 (1798) (expired 1800); An Act to Establish an Uniform 
Rule of Naturalization (Naturalization Act of 1798), ch. 54, 1 Stat. 566 (1798) (repealed 1802). 
267. James Madison, Report on the Alien and Sedition Acts (Jan. 7, 1800), in JAMES MADISON,
WRITINGS, supra note 32, at 608, 608. 
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the Virginia assembly.268  Madison’s report received wide attention.  As late 
as 1819, it was described as “the Magna Charta” of the Republicans “after 
the great struggle in the year 1799.”269
Because it does not discuss the Ninth Amendment—and perhaps also 
because it comes nine years after the Bill of Rights was adopted—Madison’s
Report has not often been the subject of Ninth Amendment scholarship.270
But as Kurt Lash now contends that the Ninth Amendment, and not the 
Tenth, was meant to protect the rights of states against a latitude of construc-
tion of federal powers, Madison’s Report becomes relevant.  For, in 
contesting the constitutionality of the Alien and Sedition Acts, Madison re-
lies on both the First and Tenth Amendments, but does not rely on the Ninth.  
Therefore, given that Madison is arguing against a latitude of interpretation 
of enumerated federal powers because it interferes with the reserved rights 
and powers of the states, Madison’s Report is powerful evidence that the 
Tenth Amendment, and not the Ninth, is the source of a “federalism” rule of 
construction protecting the rights and powers of the states, as well as the 
powers of the people.  Since we know from his Bank Speech that Madison 
also viewed the Ninth Amendment as arguing against a latitude of 
construction,271 its “federalism” rule of construction would protect the 
individual natural rights retained by the people, rather than the reserved 
(rights and) powers of states protected by the Tenth. 
To his credit, Kurt Lash discusses Madison’s Report.  His reason for 
dismissing its relevance is short: 
 Congress based its authority to pass the Acts on its inherent 
unenumerated power to enforce the common law.  According to the 
Virginia Resolutions, the Acts “exercise[] in like manner, a power not 
delegated by the constitution, but on the contrary, expressly and posi-
tively forbidden by one of the amendments thereto.”  This case did not 
involve the construction of enumerated power.  It involved a power 
derived from unenumerated common law and stood in clear violation 
of the positive denial of power contained in the First 
Amendment. . . .  Given the common law basis of arguments 
268. Id. at 662; see Jack N. Rakove, Chronology to JAMES MADISON, WRITINGS, supra note 
32, at 893, 903 (describing the report as having been written in 1799 and approved by the Virginia 
assembly on January 7, 1800). 
269. Spencer Roane, Hampden Essays, RICHMOND ENQUIRER (June 11, 1819), reprinted in 
JOHN MARSHALL’S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND 106, 113 (Gerald Gunther ed., 1969); 
see also id. (“The principles of this report equally consult the rights and happiness of the several 
states, and the safety and independence of the union.”).  Roane refers to Madison’s report as “the 
celebrated report of 1799.”  Id. at 116. 
270. But see Leslie W. Dunbar, James Madison and the Ninth Amendment, 42 VA. L. REV. 627, 
635–37 (1956) (pondering the significance of Madison’s failure to raise the Ninth during discussion 
of the Alien and Sedition Acts); Mark C. Niles, Ninth Amendment Adjudication: An Alternative to 
Substantive Due Process Analysis of Personal Autonomy Rights, 48 UCLA L. REV. 85, 96 n.30 
(2000) (discussing Madison’s failure to mention the Ninth). 
271. See supra subpart V(I). 
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supporting the Alien and Sedition Acts, if ever there was a Tenth
Amendment issue, this was it.272
By this reasoning, if the case did involve “the construction of enumerated 
power,” then, on Lash’s theory, Madison should have invoked the Ninth.  If 
Madison nevertheless invoked the Tenth instead of the Ninth, this would be 
significant evidence against Lash’s theory.  In essence, it would pit Madison 
against Lash. 
As it happens, although Madison’s Report did focus on the claim that 
the Sedition Act was authorized by federal common law,273 various 
latitudinarian constructions of enumerated powers were also offered on 
behalf of the Alien Act.  In particular, Madison discussed claims based on the 
enumerated powers to “grant letters of marque and reprisal,”274 the “power of 
war,”275 and the power “to protect each state against invasion.”276  As to the 
claim that Congress has the power over all means that may tend to prevent an 
invasion, Madison replied, “Such a latitude of construction would render 
unavailing, every practicable definition of particular and limited powers.”277
With respect to the Sedition Act, Madison responded to the claim that 
the federal codification of the common law was justified by the enumerated 
Judicial Power of Article III, Section 2.  To this he responded, “Never per-
haps was so broad a construction applied to a text so clearly unsusceptible of 
it.”278  Later he observed: 
It is indeed distressing to reflect, that it ever should have been made a 
question, whether the constitution, on the whole face of which is seen 
so much labour to enumerate and define the several objects of federal 
power, could intend to introduce in the lump, in an indirect manner, 
and by a forced construction of a few phrases, the vast and multi-
farious jurisdiction involved in the common law; a law filling so many 
ample volumes; a law overspreading the entire field of legislation; and 
a law that would sap the foundation of the constitution as a system of 
limited and specified powers.279
272. Lash, Lost Original Meaning, supra note 10, at 413 (first emphasis added) (citations 
omitted). 
273. James Madison, Report on the Alien and Sedition Acts (Jan. 7, 1800), in JAMES MADISON,
WRITINGS, supra note 32, at 608, 632. 
274. Id. at 626.  To this claim Madison replied: “It must be considered as an abuse of words to 
call the removal of persons from a country, a seizure or reprisal on them . . . .”  Id.
275. Id.  To this claim, Madison replied “that the removal of alien enemies is an incident to the 
power of war; that the removal of alien friends, is not an incident to the power of war.”  Id. at 626–
27.
276. Id. at 627. 
277. Id. (emphasis added). 
278. Id. at 636; see also id. at 637 (“[E]ven if this part of the constitution could be 
strained . . . .”). 
279. Id. at 641 (emphasis added). 
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Therefore, it is simply inaccurate to claim that the “case did not involve 
the construction of enumerated power[s].”280  In each of these instances, 
Madison discusses an overbroad construction of an enumerated power that 
impairs the rights and powers of states.  That Madison does not mention the 
Ninth Amendment is evidence that he did not think the Ninth Amendment 
applied to this situation.  The only fair reading of this fifty page report is that 
it is grounded on the First and Tenth Amendments, and not at all on the 
Ninth.
References to the principle articulated in the Tenth Amendment pervade 
the opinion.281  Moreover, Madison refers to “the authorities, rights, and 
liberties, reserved to the states respectively, or to the People,”282 and “the 
rights reserved to the states, or to the people.”283  While Lash contends that 
the “rights” of states must be included in the Ninth Amendment’s reference 
to “rights . . . retained by the people” whenever federal powers are being 
construed, Madison clearly considers these “rights reserved to the states”284
to be embraced by the Tenth rather than by the Ninth. 
We have already seen how Madison’s Bank Speech demolishes the 
residual rights model.285  In that speech, Madison uses the Ninth Amendment 
outside the only context in which, according to that model, it was applicable.  
Similarly, Madison’s failure to cite the Ninth Amendment when these 
latitudinarian constructions of particular federal powers jeopardize the 
“rights” and powers of states both undercuts the collective rights model of 
the Ninth Amendment and explodes the claim that the federalism model ap-
plies exclusively to the Ninth and not also to the Tenth Amendment. 
To this point I have confined myself to examples of enumerated powers 
because of Lash’s claim that it is only in such a case that a rule of 
construction protecting the rights and powers of states based on the Ninth 
Amendment would have been invoked.  But on his reading, why would the 
invocation of an implied power that threatens the rights and powers of states 
not also be rejected under his interpretation of the Ninth Amendment?  After 
all, according to his theory, only the Ninth Amendment, and not the Tenth, 
provides a rule of construction against a latitudinarian interpretation of fed-
eral powers.  Therefore, I see no reason why any construction of federal 
power that violated the reserved “rights and powers” of states, including a 
latitudinarian claim of implied power, should not also be handled by the 
Ninth Amendment instead of the Tenth under Lash’s account. 
280. Lash, Lost Original Meaning, supra note 10, at 413. 
281. See, e.g., James Madison, Report on the Alien and Sedition Acts (Jan. 7, 1800), in JAMES 
MADISON, WRITINGS, supra note 32, at 608, 621 (citing the Tenth Amendment); id. at 648 (“[A]ll 
powers not given by it . . . were reserved.”). 
282. Id. at 659. 
283. Id. at 660. 
284. Id. (emphasis added). 
285. See supra text accompanying notes 230–31. 
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Yet in his Report, Madison repeatedly rejects claims of implied powers 
as overbroad without invoking the Ninth Amendment.  For example, he con-
siders whether the Necessary and Proper Clause could be used to justify the 
Sedition Act and offers the same argument concerning the meaning of 
“necessary” as he did in his Bank Speech: 
[T]he first question is, whether the power be expressed in the 
constitution.  If it be, the question is decided.  If it be not expressed; 
the next enquiry must be, whether it is properly an incident to an 
express power, and necessary to its execution.  If it be, it may be 
exercised by Congress.  If it be not; Congress cannot exercise it.286
As he did in his Bank Speech, Madison ties this rule of construction to asser-
tions made by Federalists in the ratification conventions, and then adds that 
“it is a construction absolutely necessary to maintain their consistency with 
the peculiar character of the government, as possessed of particular and de-
fined powers only; not of the general and indefinite powers vested in 
ordinary governments.”287
As he was to do later when criticizing John Marshall’s opinion in 
McCulloch v. Maryland,288 Madison also justifies his construction of the 
Necessary and Proper Clause on the ground that it is justiciable: 
If it be understood that the powers implied in the specified powers, 
have an immediate and appropriate relation to them, as means, 
necessary and proper for carrying them into execution, questions on 
the constitutionality of laws passed for this purpose, will be of a 
nature sufficiently precise and determinate for Judicial cognizance 
and controul.  If, on the other hand, Congress are not limited in the 
choice of means by any such appropriate relation of them to the 
specified powers; but may employ all such means as they may deem 
fitted to prevent as well as to punish, crimes subjected to their 
authority; such as may have a tendency only to promote an object for 
which they are authorized to provide; every one must perceive that 
questions relating to means of this sort, must be questions of mere 
policy and expediency; on which legislative discretion alone can 
decide, and from which the judicial interposition and controul are 
completely excluded.289
286. James Madison, Report on the Alien and Sedition Acts (Jan. 7, 1800), in JAMES MADISON,
WRITINGS, supra note 32, at 608, 642. 
287. Id. at 643. 
288. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
289. James Madison, Report on the Alien and Sedition Acts (Jan. 7, 1800), in JAMES MADISON,
WRITINGS, supra note 32, at 608, 608, 643–44 (first and last emphases added).  Compare Letter 
from James Madison to Spencer Roane (Sept. 2, 1819), in JAMES MADISON, WRITINGS, supra note
32, at 733, 734 (“Does not the Court also relinquish by their doctrine, all controul on the Legislative 
exercise of unconstitutional powers? . . . [A] question, the moment it assumes the character of mere 
expediency or policy, being evidently beyond the reach of Judicial cognizance.”). 
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Yet this rule of construction against a latitudinarian interpretation of federal 
powers is based on the Tenth Amendment not the Ninth, presumably because 
it is the rights and powers of states, rather than of individuals, that are 
jeopardized.
Of course, the Sedition Act also violated the individual natural rights 
retained by the people: viz. the rights of freedom of speech and press.  There 
was no need for Madison to cite the Ninth Amendment in this context, 
however, because these rights were enumerated in the First Amendment, as 
Madison takes pains to explain.  In other words, because a latitude of con-
struction is not being used here to infringe upon an unenumerated individual 
right retained by the people, the Ninth Amendment would not pertain. 
Madison also connects the enumerated right protected by the First 
Amendment with powers not delegated to the federal government:  
If no such power be expressly delegated, and it be not both necessary 
and proper to carry into execution an express power; above all, if it be 
expressly forbidden by a declaratory amendment to the constitution, 
the answer must be, that the federal government is destitute of all such 
authority.290
In other words, where Congress is expressly denied a power, this power is 
reserved to the people, as affirmed by the Tenth Amendment.  As Madison 
explained in his earlier discussion of the Aliens Act, “there are powers exer-
cised by most other governments, which, in the United States are withheld by 
the people, both from the general government and from the state 
governments.”291  This reservation of powers in the people negates any 
“inference . . . that the powers supposed to be necessary which are not so 
given to the state governments, must reside in the government of the United 
States.”292
How then can we reconcile Madison’s repeated use of the Tenth 
Amendment in his Report to argue against a “latitude of construction”293 with 
the statement in his Bank Speech that the Ninth Amendment guards against a 
“latitude of interpretation”?294  The explanation cannot be, as Lash proposes, 
that the Ninth Amendment provides a rule of construction and the Tenth 
Amendment does not.295  After all, even a constitutional provision that does 
290. James Madison, Report on the Alien and Sedition Acts (Jan. 7, 1800), in JAMES MADISON,
WRITINGS, supra note 32, at 608, 650. 
291. Id. at 628.  Madison cites an example of this: “A tax on exports can be laid by no 
Constitutional authority whatever.”  Id.
292. Id. at 629. 
293. Id. at 627. 
294. James Madison, Speech in Congress Opposing the National Bank (Feb. 2, 1791), in JAMES
MADISON, WRITINGS, supra note 32, at 480, 489. 
295. See Lash, Lost Original Meaning, supra note 10, at 410 (asserting that the Ninth 
Amendment’s “rule of construction” must be distinguished from the Tenth Amendment’s 
declaration of the “principle of enumerated federal power”). 
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not include the phrase “shall not be construed” could potentially support a 
rule of construction, depending on its meaning. 
The obvious way to reconcile these two vital Madisonian clues is to 
distinguish between the differing source of the danger posed by any 
particular latitude of interpretation.  The Ninth Amendment can be viewed as 
aimed at the danger of latitudinarian constructions of federal power that 
threaten the (individual natural) rights retained by the people.  The Tenth 
Amendment can be viewed as aimed at the danger of latitudinarian construc-
tions of federal power that threaten the powers (and rights) reserved by the 
Constitution to the states, as well as the powers reserved to the people.296  As 
it turns out, within three years of Madison’s Report, this very interpretation 
of the Ninth and Tenth Amendments was offered by a distinguished Virginia 
professor and jurist. 
L. St. George Tucker’s Notes on the Constitution 
St. George Tucker was a professor of law at the College of William and 
Mary, one of the leading judges of the General Court in Virginia, and the 
American editor of Blackstone’s Commentaries, the most influential and 
authoritative legal work of the period.297  In the 1803 edition of the 
Commentaries he attached an appendix entitled Notes of Reference to the 
Constitution and Laws of the Federal Government of the United States; and 
of the Commonwealth of Virginia, in which he provides the first scholarly 
gloss on the meaning of the Constitution.298  Though published after 1800, 
Tucker’s treatise was based on notes of his lectures given throughout the 
1790s and contemporaneous with the earliest years of the Constitution.299
In his treatise on the Constitution, Tucker offered an interpretation of 
the Ninth Amendment very similar to that provided by Madison in his Bank 
Speech and an interpretation of the Tenth Amendment very similar to that 
provided by Madison in his Report.  Tucker begins his explanation of the 
Ninth and Tenth Amendments (still referred to as the “eleventh” and 
“twelfth”) by discussing them together in the following passage: 
296. This distinction between rules of construction attending different dangers adds some 
support for the conclusion that Madison did indeed think that the bank bill threatened individual 
rights, as he asserted: “It involves a monopoly, which affects the equal rights of every citizen.”  
GAZETTE OF THE UNITED STATES (Phila.), Feb. 23, 1791, reprinted in 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, supra note 148, at 373. 
297. See BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE TO THE CONSTITUTION 
AND LAWS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES; AND OF THE 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA (St. George Tucker ed., Augustus M. Kelley 1969) (1803) 
[hereinafter TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES]. 
298. St. George Tucker, Note D to 1 TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES, supra note 
297, app. at 140 [hereinafter Tucker, Note D] (expounding upon the nature, structure, and 
organization of the Constitution). 
299. 1 TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES, supra note 297, at vxviii (explaining the 
origins of his treatise in lectures prepared for courses at the College of William and Mary). 
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 All the powers of the federal government being either expressly 
enumerated, or necessary and proper to the execution of some 
enumerated power; and it being one of the rules of construction which 
sound reason has adopted; that, as exception strengthens the force of a 
law in cases not excepted, so enumeration weakens it, in cases not 
enumerated; it follows, as a regular consequence, that [1] every power 
which concerns the right of the citizen, must be construed strictly, 
where it may operate to infringe or impair his liberty; and liberally, 
and for his benefit, where it may operate to his security and happiness, 
the avowed object of the constitution: and, in like manner, [2] every 
power which has been carved out of the states, who, at the time of 
entering into the confederacy, were in full possession of all the rights 
of sovereignty, is in like manner to be construed strictly, wherever a 
different construction might derogate from the rights and powers,
which by the latter of these articles, are expressly acknowledged to be 
reserved to them respectively.300
I have inserted numbers in brackets to indicate the distinct treatment given 
the Ninth and Tenth Amendments respectively. 
According to Tucker, the Ninth Amendment provides a rule of 
construction when the “right[s] of the citizen”—to which he refers also as 
“his liberty”—are at stake.  Notice his use of the singular tense (“the citizen,” 
“his liberty,” “his benefit,” and “his security”).  The Tenth Amendment (“the 
latter of these articles”), in contrast, argues for a strict construction of federal 
powers when a “different construction” (as distinct from the text of the 
Constitution itself) might derogate from the rights and powers of states.  
Tucker shared with Madison the view that the Ninth Amendment provided an 
argument against a latitudinarian interpretation of the delegated powers, but 
he also made even clearer that its purpose is the protection of individual 
liberty, which justifies both a “strict construction” of powers and “liberal 
construction” of rights. 
Earlier in his Notes, Tucker provides another description of the two 
constructions that further emphasizes the personal nature of the liberties 
protected by the Ninth Amendment.  “As federal it is to be construed strictly, 
in all cases where the antecedent rights of a state may be drawn in 
question . . . .”301  This sentence is followed by a footnote citing the Tenth 
(twelfth) Amendment.  The passage then continues: 
[A]s a social compact it ought likewise to receive the same strict 
construction, wherever the right of personal liberty, of personal 
security, or of private property may become the subject of dispute; 
because every person whose liberty or property was thereby rendered 
subject to the new government, was antecedently a member of a civil 
society to whose regulations he had submitted himself, and under 
300. Tucker, Note D, supra note 298, app. at 30708 (emphasis added). 
301. Id. app. at 151 (emphasis added). 
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whose authority and protection he still remains, in all cases not 
expressly submitted to the new government.302
This passage is followed by a footnote reference to the Ninth (eleventh) and 
Tenth (twelfth) Amendments. 
Reading Tucker lays to rest any contention that an individual rights 
reading of the Ninth Amendment is anachronistic.  A “federal” system is the 
source of the reserved powers (and rights) of states.  But the “social 
compact” is the source of the retained natural rights (and powers) of 
individuals.  Notice that Tucker specifically notes that “the rights and 
powers” of the states are expressly acknowledged in the Tenth Amendment 
(“the latter of these articles”) rather than the Ninth.303  He then provides a 
lengthy paragraph about the rule of construction he says is provided by the 
Tenth Amendment.304
Of particular interest is the observation, portions of which are copied 
nearly verbatim from Madison’s Report,305 that the Tenth Amendment 
acknowledges that the people, as well as the states, have reserved powers: 
[T]here are powers, exercised by most other governments, which in 
the United States are withheld by the people, both from the federal 
government and from the state governments: for instance, a tax on 
exports can be laid by no constitutional authority whatever, whether of 
the United States, or of any state; no bill of attainder, or ex post facto
law can be passed by either; no title of nobility can be granted by 
either.306
Tucker then explains that the power of regulating liberty lies with the states, 
such as the power of regulating the course in which property may be 
transmitted by deed, will, or inheritance; the manner in which debts 
may be recovered, or injuries redressed; the right of defining and pun-
ishing offences against the society, other than such as fall under the 
express jurisdiction of the federal government; all which, and all 
others of a similar nature are reserved to, and may be exercised by the 
state governments.307
302. Id. (emphasis added). 
303. Id. app. at 308. 
304. Id. app. at 308–09. 
305. James Madison, Report on the Alien and Sedition Acts (Jan. 7, 1800), in JAMES MADISON,
WRITINGS, supra note 32, at 608, 628 (“[T]here are powers exercised by most other governments, 
which, in the United States are withheld by the people, both from the general government and from 
the state governments.  Of this sort are many of the powers prohibited by the Declarations of right 
prefixed to the Constitutions, or by the clauses in the Constitutions, in the nature of such 
Declarations.”).
306. Tucker, Note D, supra note 298, app. at 308–09 (emphasis added). 
307. Id. app. at 308.  As an aside, Tucker endorses the “negative” or “dormant” Commerce 
power:
From those powers, which are in express terms granted to the United States, and 
though not prohibited to the states respectively, are not susceptible of a concurrent 
exercise of authority by them, the states, notwithstanding this article, will continue to 
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As was mentioned in Part III, it is important to remember that reading 
the Ninth Amendment as protecting individual liberty rights no more 
precludes their reasonable regulation than does reading the First Amendment 
to protect an individual right preclude “time, place and manner” regulations 
or the law of libel or slander.308  What is needed is a way to ensure that laws 
restricting liberties are genuine regulations providing for the manner of exer-
cising one’s rights, or the prohibition of wrongful acts.  What is improper is 
imposing restrictions that prohibit rightful acts.309
But in making this point, one should not lose sight of the fact that 
originally the Ninth Amendment, like the rest of the Bill of Rights, was 
applicable only to the federal government.  To evaluate federal constitutional 
restrictions on infringements of natural rights by state governments requires 
consideration of the Fourteenth Amendment—especially the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause—that substantially altered the constitutional structure. 
The two rules of construction provided by Tucker’s distinction between 
the Ninth and Tenth Amendments are devastating both to Amar’s claim that 
reading the Ninth Amendment as protecting individual rights is anachronistic 
and Lash’s claim that only the Ninth and not the Tenth Amendment provides 
a rule of construction narrowing federal power.310  Indeed, in the beginning 
of his Notes, Tucker states the proposition (that originated in the Articles of 
Confederation311), so emphasized by Lash,312 that “[t]he state governments 
not only retain every power, jurisdiction, and right not delegated to the 
United States, by the constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states.”313  This 
is followed by a footnote citation to the Tenth (twelfth) Amendment, not the 
Ninth (eleventh).  Tucker then says that the construction “that in the new 
government, as in the old, the general powers are limited, and that the states, 
in all unenumerated cases, are left in the enjoyment of their sovereign and 
independent jurisdictions . . . has since been fully confirmed by the twelfth
article of amendments.”314
Kurt Lash’s discussion of Tucker’s apparently telling “personal rights” 
gloss on the Ninth Amendment is brief and confined to a footnote: “As the 
be excluded; such is the power to regulate commerce, . . . from which the states, 
respectively, are by necessary and unavoidable construction excluded from any share 
or participation. 
Id.
308. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
309. See Randy E. Barnett, The Proper Scope of the Police Power, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
429, 493 (2004) (contending that the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment limits the 
states’ police power to prohibiting wrongful and regulating rightful behavior that may injure the 
rights of others). 
310. See AMAR, supra note 69, at 120; Lash, Lost Original Meaning, supra note 10, at 399. 
311. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. II (“Each state retains . . . every power, jurisdiction 
and right, which is not . . . expressly delegated . . . .”). 
312. Lash, Lost Original Meaning, supra note 10, at 360, 363, 376 n.213. 
313. Tucker, Note D, supra note 298, app. at 141. 
314. Id. app. at 142–43 (emphasis added). 
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above shows, Tucker places both the Ninth and Tenth Amendments in a 
decidedly federalist context.  Tucker could not possibly have been referring 
to individual natural rights if the Ninth was meant to avoid interfering with or 
adding to an individual’s prior obligations to the state.”315
The first of these sentences is nonproblematic.  Tucker contends that 
both the Ninth and Tenth Amendments supported “federalism” rules of con-
struction limiting federal power.316  The second claim that Tucker “could not 
possibly have been referring to individual natural rights” is hyperbole.  Not 
only is the natural rights reading a “possible” meaning of Tucker’s words, it 
is the most obvious and natural one.  One would have to present a pretty per-
suasive case to deprive “the right of personal liberty, of personal security, or 
of private property” of its then-commonplace individual natural rights 
meaning.
Lash bases his claim on Tucker’s statement (quoted above) that “every 
person whose liberty or property was thereby rendered subject to the new 
government, was antecedently a member of a civil society to whose 
regulations he had submitted himself, and under whose authority and 
protection he still remains, in all cases not expressly submitted to the new 
government.”317  To begin with, this statement is Tucker’s justification for 
the “strict construction” of federal power when “personal” rights are “the 
subject of dispute.”  The purported justification does not in any way change 
the personal nature of the rights being protected.  Tucker is simply saying 
why the potential infringement of personal rights justifies strict construction 
of federal powers.  But we are looking to Tucker’s Notes to discern the origi-
nal public meaning of the Ninth Amendment, not his justification for that 
provision, and his description of the Amendment strongly supports the indi-
vidual natural rights model. 
Second, Tucker’s justification is not in conflict with the rights protected 
by the Ninth Amendment being individual natural rights.  Tucker is merely 
saying that the fundamental natural rights of individuals were, before the 
Constitution, subject to the protection and regulation of state governments.  
For the jurisdiction over these rights to be transferred to the new national 
government would have required an express delegation of power, which was 
lacking.  This amounts merely to the uncontroversial claim that the 
Constitution did not grant the federal government a general police power.  In 
other words, these natural rights may not be regulated by the federal 
315. Lash, Lost Original Meaning, supra note 10, at 397 n.317.  Lash then cites Joseph Story as 
“evidently read[ing] Tucker’s interpretation of the Ninth as a states’ rights interpretation, despite 
Tucker’s language of personal liberty.”  Id.  Reading Tucker through the eyes of the opinionated 
Story writing thirty years later, however, may obscure as much as illuminate the original, more 
contemporary source.  Lash also notes that others read “Tucker’s work” as “representing a states’ 
rights perspective of constitutional interpretation,” as no doubt it was in most respects.  Id. 
316. Tucker, Note D, supra note 298, app. at 307–08. 
317. Lash, Lost Original Meaning, supra note 10, at 397 (quoting Tucker). 
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government unless such regulation is incident to an enumerated federal 
power.
In sum, in the absence of a delegation of powers, the federal 
government lacks the power to deny or disparage the other natural liberty 
rights retained by the people.  The power to protect and regulate individual 
rights remains with the states to whom citizens did and still do owe a duty of 
obedience in return for the protection of their rights.  But a police power to 
protect and regulate the exercise of individual natural rights does not include 
the power to abridge or violate them.  Nevertheless, with some exceptions—
for example the Contracts Clause318—there was no federal jurisdiction to 
protect the rights retained by the people from infringement by state 
governments until the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The only reason given by Lash for depriving Tucker’s words of their 
most obvious and natural meaning, then, falls far short—especially in light of 
the myriad other evidence supporting the individual natural rights model we 
have surveyed in this Article.  If all the other evidence lined up in favor of a 
collective rights reading of the Ninth Amendment, perhaps there would be 
some warrant for rejecting the natural reading of Tucker’s words or to reject 
the distinguished St. George Tucker himself as an aberration.  But the other 
evidence that lines up in support of the individual rights and federalism mod-
els is completely consistent with Tucker’s words, which in turn adds weight 
to those models.  After all, Tucker was simply asserting that the Ninth 
Amendment provides a narrowing rule of construction of federal power to 
protect the rights of individuals (which rights should be liberally construed), 
while the Tenth Amendment protects the reserved powers of both states and 
individuals (and justifies a narrowing rule of construction of federal power to 
accomplish this).  But is this not exactly what the two Amendments appear to 
say? 
Finally, Lash completely overlooks the other respect in which his thesis 
is directly contradicted by Tucker’s Notes.  Lash claims that the Ninth 
Amendment, and not the Tenth, provides a narrowing construction of federal 
power.319  This is why he interprets any argument made by Madison or others 
concerning the reserved or retained rights and powers of states as references 
to the Ninth Amendment and supportive of the collective rights model of the 
Ninth.  But Tucker clearly and explicitly says that both Amendments justify 
the strict construction of federal power, albeit in response to different 
dangers.  And Tucker’s reading of the Tenth Amendment relies upon and is 
wholly consistent with Madison’s lengthy analysis in his Report.  If Tucker 
(and Madison) are correct that the Tenth Amendment also supports a 
narrowing construction of federal powers, then much of Lash’s attempt to 
318. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
319. Lash, Lost Original Meaning, supra note 10, at 399. 
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link various references to the rights, powers, and jurisdiction of states to the 
Ninth Amendment is severely undercut. 
St. George Tucker’s treatment of the Ninth Amendment sharply 
contradicts both the state law rights and residual rights models.  Nowhere in 
his account is the protection of state law rights mentioned as the object of the 
Amendment (though state law can be used to regulate these rights, as we 
have seen).  And Tucker in no way says or implies that the rights retained by 
the people are to be defined “residually” by the enumerated powers of 
Congress.  To the contrary, he asserts that the Ninth Amendment provides a 
rule of construction by which powers should be strictly construed and rights 
liberally construed—exactly what Thomas McAffee denies is the purpose of 
the Ninth Amendment under the residual rights model.320
Tucker’s endorsement of the strict construction of federal powers 
strongly supports the federalism model, though his “liberal construction” of 
individual liberty rights goes beyond it.  And it is hard to imagine more tell-
ing direct evidence on behalf of the individual natural rights model than 
Tucker’s discussion of personal rights.  Tucker’s explicit distinction between 
the Ninth Amendment protecting personal rights and the Tenth Amendment 
protecting the reserved rights of states is nothing short of a repudiation of a 
collective rights interpretation of the rights “retained by the people” to which 
the Ninth Amendment refers.  Anyone who could read “the right of personal 
liberty, of personal security, or of private property” collectively could read 
anything collectively, rendering the collective rights model nonfalsifiable. 
M. Adoption of Ninth Amendment-Like Provisions by States 
After the Ninth Amendment was invented by James Madison as a 
means of protecting unenumerated rights, the idea caught on.  Several states 
eventually adopted similar provisions in their state constitutions.321  For 
320. See supra text accompanying notes 48–56. 
321. See ALA. CONST. of 1819, art. I, § 30 (“This enumeration of certain rights shall not be 
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people . . . .”); ARK. CONST. of 1836, art. II, 
§ 24 (“This enumeration of rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the 
people . . . .”); CAL. CONST. of 1849, art. I, § 21 (“This enumeration of rights shall not be construed 
to impair or deny others retained by the people.”); IOWA CONST. of 1846, art. II, § 24 (“This 
enumeration of rights shall not be construed to impair or deny others, retained by the people.”); 
KAN. CONST. of 1859, Bill of Rights, § 20 (“This enumeration of rights shall not be construed to 
impair or deny others retained by the people . . . .”); ME. CONST. of 1820, art. I, § 24 (“The 
enumeration of certain rights shall not impair nor deny others retained by the people.”); MD.
CONST. of 1850, Declaration of Rights, art. 42 (“This enumeration of rights shall not be construed 
to impair or deny others retained by the people.”); MINN. CONST. of 1857, art. I, § 16 (“The 
enumeration of rights in this Constitution, shall not be construed to deny or impair others retained 
by and inherent in the people.”); N.J. CONST. of 1844, art. I, § 19 (“This enumeration of rights and 
privileges shall not be construed to impair or deny others retained by the people.”); OHIO CONST. of 
1851, art. I, § 20 (“This enumeration of rights shall not be construed to impair or deny others 
retained by the people . . . .”); OR. CONST. of 1857, art. I, § 33 (“This enumeration of rights, and 
privileges shall not be construed to impair or deny others retained by the people.”); R.I. CONST. of 
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example, in Section 21 of its Declaration of Rights, the founding California 
Constitution of 1849 read: “This enumeration of rights shall not be construed 
to impair or deny others retained by the people.”322  This copy of the Ninth 
Amendment followed twenty enumerated rights including Section 2, which 
enumerates the precise right that Akhil Amar identifies as the core of the 
Ninth Amendment323:
All political power is inherent in the people.  Government is instituted 
for the protection, security, and benefit of the people; and they have 
the right to alter or reform the same, whenever the public good may 
require it.324
Whatever “other” rights “retained by the people” to which Section 21 refers 
do not include the right to alter and abolish government that was enumerated 
in Section 2. 
The implications of this development for the five models is reasonably 
obvious.  It flatly contradicts the claim that the Ninth Amendment is a refer-
ence to state constitutional and common law rights, at least in the sense that 
such rights may freely be altered by state legislation.  Nor is it compatible 
with the residual rights analysis, as most state constitutions did not contain 
specific enumeration of state legislative powers.  It seems strongly to suggest 
an individual natural rights reading.  After all, such rights were thought to 
constrain all persons, including persons who serve as state officials. 
Although a Ninth Amendment-like provision in a state constitution 
could include protection of rights to alter or abolish state governments or of 
collective self-governance, there is no reason to think that this was its 
exclusive reference, and the California Constitution of 1849 is evidence that 
the rights retained by the people include other rights besides.  While the ex-
istence of such provisions in state constitutions is neutral with respect to the 
federalism model, such provisions may well have meant that state powers 
should be strictly construed, as Madison and Tucker urged with respect to 
federal powers.325
VI. The Ninth Amendment and Judicial Review 
The evidence presented in this Article is offered solely to establish the 
original meaning of the text of the Ninth Amendment.  It addresses the 
question: To what does “rights . . . retained by the people” originally refer?  
This evidence is not offered as direct proof that such rights, whatever they 
may be, merit judicial protection.  The question of judicial review in general, 
1842, art. I, § 23 (“The enumeration of the foregoing rights shall not be construed to impair or deny 
others retained by the people.”). 
322. CAL. CONST. of 1849, art. I, § 21. 
323. AMAR, supra note 69, at 120. 
324. CAL. CONST. of 1849, art. I, § 2. 
325. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1949 (1791) (statement of Rep. Madison, Feb. 2, 1791); Tucker, 
Note D, supra note 298, app. at 308. 
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or with respect to unenumerated rights in particular, implicates other 
arguments and additional evidence.326  This question is beyond the scope of 
this Article. 
Still, the evidence favoring the individual rights model of original 
meaning interpretation and the federalism model of constitutional 
construction would seem to have real practical implications for constitutional 
interpretation, whoever is doing the interpreting.  If the federalism construc-
tion is accepted, both expressed and implied federal powers should be 
“strictly” or narrowly construed—whether by legislators or by courts—
whenever they restrict the exercise of personal liberty, which is another term 
for natural rights.  For this reason, the judicial protection of liberty described 
in Footnote Four of United States v. Carolene Products Co., which reverses 
the presumption of constitutionality only when enumerated rights are 
infringed, is unconstitutional, as is the “Footnote Four-Plus” approach that 
similarly privileges certain unenumerated rights that are deemed by the Court 
to be “fundamental.”327  Indeed, Footnote Four would seem to be the epitome 
of a constitutional construction that is expressly barred by the original 
meaning of the Ninth Amendment.
In contrast, were either the state law rights or residual rights models 
correct, the Ninth Amendment would have no role to play whatsoever in 
constitutional adjudication—hence the appeal of these models to some 
judicial conservatives.328  Were the amendment limited to a collective rights 
reading, a strict construction of federal powers would be warranted only 
when the exercise of those powers interferes with the powers of the several 
states, and not when laws restrict personal liberty.  Kurt Lash agrees that the 
Ninth Amendment has a broader scope than this.329
Nevertheless, this debate over original meaning and its potential 
implication for judicial review should be placed in perspective.  One source 
of fears about allowing courts to take the Ninth Amendment seriously is the 
assumption that if natural liberty rights are acknowledged to be constitution-
ally protected, they may never be regulated under any circumstances.330
Since a great many laws touch upon liberty in some manner or other, it is 
assumed that we must therefore limit any constitutional protection to a hand-
ful of truly “fundamental” rights meriting so absolute a protection.  
Otherwise all laws would be constitutionally suspect.  But the individual 
natural rights and federalism models, if accepted, do not preclude all neces-
sary and proper regulations of liberty.  Nor can these models automatically 
326. See supra note 117. 
327. For a discussion of the infirmities of both approaches, see BARNETT, supra note 7, at 224–
52.
328. E.g., BORK, supra note 44, at 184–85 (endorsing the “state law rights model”). 
329. See Lash, Lost Original Meaning, supra note 10, at 401–10. 
330. See Randy E. Barnett, Who’s Afraid of Unenumerated Rights?, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 
(forthcoming 2006) (describing the reasons why courts and scholars have shied away from the 
judicial protection of unenumerated rights). 
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tell us whether a particular exercise of federal power is truly necessary and 
proper.  This would depend on the specifics of the statute in question and its 
purported justification. 
The individual natural rights model does not posit that the 
unenumerated rights retained by the people are any more absolute (in the 
sense that their exercise may never be regulated) than are the enumerated 
rights retained by the people.  Even enumerated rights may be regulated, 
though not prohibited, provided such regulations are proper insofar as they 
are incident to an enumerated power and truly necessary.331  An individual 
natural rights interpretation of the Ninth Amendment would entail simply 
that the rights retained by the people may be regulated by the federal gov-
ernment pursuant to an enumerated power, such as the power to regulate 
commerce among the several states.  The regulation of natural rights for 
other purposes may only be done by states, but regulated they may be.332  It is 
improper, however, to completely prohibit the rightful exercise of a natural 
right, but this too is beyond the scope of this Article.333
To appreciate the implication of accepting the natural rights model, it 
bears emphasis that under this model the Ninth Amendment provides no 
restriction on state power, notwithstanding the belief of the founders that 
state governments were also bound to respect natural rights.  In this regard, 
the original scheme was substantially altered by the adoption of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  There is substantial evidence that the original 
meaning of “privileges or immunities of citizens” does include natural rights, 
as well as the positive individual rights or privileges enumerated in the Bill 
of Rights.334  This too, like most other issues discussed in this section, is be-
yond the scope of this Article. 
Quite obviously, then, there is much more to be said about the proper 
role of judges in protecting unenumerated rights against either federal power 
under the Ninth Amendment or state power under the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  But the fact that the Ninth 
Amendment provides the only explicit rule of construction in the text of the 
Constitution (“shall not be construed”) strongly suggests that unenumerated 
rights deserve no less protection from courts than those that were 
enumerated.  To do any less would be to “disparage” if not to “deny” them, 
in violation of the Ninth Amendment. 
331. See BARNETT, supra note 7, at 302–12 (discussing the distinction between regulation and 
prohibition).
332. See Barnett, supra note 309, at 478–87 (elaborating a theory of state power that includes 
an ability to regulate individual liberty in order to prevent one person from intruding upon the 
liberty of another). 
333. See id. at 487–90. 
334. See id. at 456–64 (contending that, by its original meaning, the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects both the enumerated rights contained in the Bill of 
Rights and unenumerated natural rights). 
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VII. Conclusion: Federalism Not Confederalism 
When evaluating historical evidence to decide among conflicting 
models of original meaning, it is sometimes possible for individual items to 
be consistent with more than one model.  Other evidence may make a model 
more or less likely without establishing it definitively as accurate or 
inaccurate.  A choice among originalist models, therefore, should be based 
on the cumulative weight of the evidence.  The more items that support a 
particular model, the more likely that model is to be correct, especially when 
little or no evidence is inconsistent with it. 
As illustrated by the chart in the appendix, the evidence considered in 
this Article, taken cumulatively, strongly supports the individual natural 
rights model of the original meaning of the Ninth Amendment as well as the 
federalism model that protects these individual natural rights by construing 
federal power strictly.  Many items of evidence support one or both of these 
models, and none directly contradict either.  At the same time, this evidence 
refutes the state law rights and residual rights models and, taken 
cumulatively, severely undercuts the collective rights model of the Ninth (as 
opposed to the Tenth) Amendment. 
Those who, like Akhil Amar and Kurt Lash, seek to interpret the Ninth 
Amendment as protecting, at least in part or perhaps even entirely, the 
collective rights of “the people” as embodied in their state governments,335
rather than of individuals, are adopting a view of the Amendment that does 
not appear to have been shared by its author or by its principal proponents.  
Yet this collective rights reading of the Ninth and Tenth Amendments did 
come to be widely held sometime later in our history.336  Eventually, it was 
formally adopted by the Confederate States of America in the following 
provisions:
5.  The enumeration, in the Constitution, of certain rights shall not be 
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people of the 
several States.
6. The powers not delegated to the Confederate States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the 
States, respectively, or to the people thereof.337
335. See supra notes 70, 89 and accompanying text.  If this is indeed what Amar and Lash are 
claiming.  It is not always clear. 
336. The rise of the Calhounian states’ rights position in the run up to the Civil War makes any 
effort to discern the original meaning of the Ninth Amendment from antebellum nineteenth century 
cases and other authorities, as Kurt Lash attempts, likely to be misleading.  See Lash, Lost
Jurisprudence, supra note 89, at 604–09.  In the end, it is impossible to tell whether a particular 
much-later interpretation of the Ninth Amendment represents its original meaning or a deviation 
therefrom.  The evidence that would answer this crucial question is to be found in the sources 
identified in this Article, and not in the later sources that would be at issue.  In other words, reliance 
on later sources is bootstrapping at best. 
337. CONSTITUTION OF THE CONFEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA art. VI, §§ 5–6 (March 11, 
1861) (emphasis added).  The addition of “thereof” to the Tenth Amendment is reminiscent of 
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The collective rights model of the Ninth Amendment literally reads the 
italicized language into both the Ninth and Tenth Amendments.  But the fact 
that the Confederate States thought it necessary to add this language to the 
original language of the Ninth Amendment is significant.  It strongly sug-
gests that adding this extra language to the Ninth and Tenth Amendments as 
actually enacted would be to deviate from, rather than to respect, their origi-
nal public meaning. 
When Robert Bork compared the Ninth Amendment to an inkblot, he 
violated John Marshall’s famous dictum that “[i]t cannot be presumed that 
any clause in the constitution is intended to be without effect; and therefore 
such a construction is inadmissible, unless the words require it.”338  Still, 
Bork was on to something, for until quite recently the Ninth Amendment has 
been the Rorschach test of constitutional theory.  The question “What does 
the Ninth Amendment mean?” has frequently elicited interpretations that tell 
us more about the constitutional visions of the interpreters than about the 
words of the amendment.  But the Ninth Amendment is not an inkblot; it 
consists of English words that are simple and direct: 
The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights shall not be 
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people. 
The historical evidence presented here supports an unremarkable, almost 
mundane, conclusion: The Ninth Amendment’s public meaning in the 
founding era is identical to what ordinary readers take it to mean today (until 
they enter law school and are told otherwise).  No elaborate theory or hidden 
code is required to decipher its words.  The Ninth Amendment prohibits 
constitutional constructions—like that propounded by the Supreme Court in 
Footnote Four of Carolene Products339—that infringe upon the 
unenumerated, natural, and individual rights retained by the people.  In other 
words, it means what it says. 
Richard Henry Lee’s objection to the Tenth Amendment discussed in the text accompanying supra
note 215.  It is logically possible that this language was added to restore an original meaning that 
had been distorted by a well-known consensus of authorities—as, for example, I contend The 
Slaughter-House Cases distorted the meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause.  BARNETT,
supra note 7, at 192–203.  But there is no evidence that any such distortion had occurred.  
Moreover, if Kurt Lash is right in his claims about the original and continued interpretation of the 
Ninth Amendment, there would have been no need for the Confederacy to have altered the wording 
the way it did. 
338. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803). 
339. See BARNETT, supra note 7, at 229–34, 253–54 (illustrating how Footnote Four of 
Carolene Products is inconsistent with the Ninth Amendment, which “mandates that unenumerated 
natural rights be treated the same as those that were enumerated”). 
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Appendix: Summary of key pieces of evidence of original meaning340
State-Law 
Rights
Model
Residual
Rights
Model
Individual
Natural
Rights
Model
Collective 
Rights
Model
Federalism
Model
Madison’s
Bill of Rights 
Speech 
Directly 
Contradicts
Neutral Neutral341 Neutral Neutral 
Federalist
Objections to 
a Bill of 
Rights
Directly 
Contradicts
Directly 
Contradicts
SUPPORTS Somewhat342
WEAKENS 
Neutral 
Sedgwick–
Benson–Page
Exchange  
Directly 
Contradicts
Directly 
Contradicts
Greatly 
SUPPORTS
Somewhat 
WEAKENS 
Neutral 
Madison’s
Notes for Bill 
of Rights 
Speech 
Directly 
Contradicts
Directly 
Contradicts
SUPPORTS Somewhat 
WEAKENS 
Neutral 
Sherman’s 
Draft Bill of 
Rights
Directly 
Contradicts
Directly 
Contradicts
Greatly
SUPPORTS
Somewhat 
WEAKENS 
Neutral 
State 
Proposals
Directly 
Contradicts
Directly 
Contradicts
Somewhat
SUPPORTS
(New York) 
Somewhat
SUPPORTS
(Virginia)
SUPPORTS
Virginia 
Debates
Directly 
Contradicts
Directly 
Contradicts
Greatly 
SUPPORTS
Greatly 
WEAKENS 
Somewhat 
SUPPORTS
Madison & 
Burnley’s 
Replies  
Directly 
Contradicts
Somewhat 
SUPPORTS
Somewhat
SUPPORTS
Neutral Somewhat 
SUPPORTS
Madison’s
Bank Speech 
Directly 
Contradicts
Directly 
Contradicts
Neutral343 Neutral Greatly 
SUPPORTS
340. By “support,” I mean makes the model more likely.  By “weaken,” I mean makes the 
model less likely.  “Neutral” means makes the model neither more nor less likely.  “Directly 
contradicts” speaks for itself. 
341. Taken alone, Madison’s speech is neutral with respect to all models except the state-law 
rights model which it directly contradicts.  But when combined with the Federalist objections to a 
bill of rights, to which it refers, and Madison’s notes for his speech, it provides indirect support for 
the individual natural rights model and indirectly weakens the residual rights and collective rights 
models, while remaining neutral with respect to the federalism model. 
342. Madison’s Bill of Rights speech, Federalist objections to a bill of rights, the Sedgwick–
Benson–Page exchange, Madison’s notes for his speech, and Sherman’s draft bill of rights weaken 
the collective rights model because collective rights are not mentioned in these contexts and natural 
rights are, which is circumstantial evidence that collective rights were not included.  These items 
only somewhat weaken its support, however, because they do not directly prove that individual 
natural rights were the only rights which were retained by the people.  On the other hand, these 
items are not consistent with the suggestion that collective rights were the only rights to which the 
Ninth Amendment refers.  They also contradict the claim that reading the Ninth Amendment as 
including a reference to individual rights is anachronistic. 
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Madison’s
Whisky 
Rebellion
Speech 
Directly 
Contradicts
Greatly 
WEAKENS 
SUPPORTS Somewhat 
WEAKENS 
Somewhat 
SUPPORTS
Madison’s
Report on Va. 
Resolution
Directly 
Contradicts
Directly 
Contradicts
Neutral344 Indirectly345
WEAKENS 
Neutral 
St. George 
Tucker’s 
Notes
Directly 
Contradicts
Directly 
Contradicts
Greatly 
SUPPORTS
Directly 
Contradicts
Greatly 
SUPPORTS
Similar 
Clauses in 
State 
Constitutions
Directly 
Contradicts
Directly 
Contradicts
SUPPORTS Somewhat 
WEAKENS 
Neutral 
343. By directly contradicting the state-law rights and residual rights models, Madison’s Bank 
speech increases the likelihood that either the individual natural rights model or the collective rights 
model or both are correct, while offering little to favor one over the other.  While offering strong 
support for the federalism model, Madison does not clearly specify the nature of the rights that 
warrant the strict construction of federal power he finds in the Ninth Amendment. 
344. Madison’s Report, by itself, is neutral with respect to the individual natural rights model, 
but by contradicting the state-law rights and residual rights models and indirectly weakening the 
collective rights model, it makes the individual natural rights model somewhat more likely. 
345. Madison’s Report indirectly weakens the collective rights model by supporting the thesis 
that the Tenth Amendment provides its own federalism rule of strict construction when state powers 
and rights are abridged, thereby undercutting the claim that other statements in support of such a 
rule of construction must necessarily be about the Ninth Amendment. 
